Moreover, "[e]ven if a defendant is justified in using deadly physical force at the beginning of a single, ongoing encounter with an assailant, his right to use that force terminates at the point where he can no longer reasonably believe that the assailant still poses a threat to him." People v. Del-Debbio, 664 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (1st Dep't 1997).

On October 27, 2006, Justice Straus re-sentenced Dingle to seven and one-half to fifteen years imprisonment. People v. Dingle, 30 A.D.3d 1121, 1122 (1st Dep't 2006) (citing People v. Del-Debbio, 244 A.D.2d 195 (1st Dep't 1997)).See id. ("[O]nce the jury convicted defendant of recklessness under the depraved indifference count, it, of necessity, acquitted him of any intentional behavior . . . [W]e find the evidence entirely sufficient to support the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.").

Justification has both a subjective requirement, that "defendant... actually believed... he [was]... threatened with the imminent use of deadly physical force," and an objective requirement, that defendant's "reactions were... those of a reasonable man acting in self-defense" (People v Collice, 41 N.Y.2d 906, 907 [1977]). The defense does not automatically apply throughout the entirety of an encounter-a defendant who may be justified in using deadly physical force at the start of an encounter loses the right to use such force "at the point he can no longer reasonably believe the assailant still poses a threat to him'" (People v Williams, 35 N.Y.3d 24, 45 [2020], quoting People v Del-Debbio, 244 A.D.2d 195, 195 [1st Dept 1997]). Applying this standard to the evidence here, we conclude defendant was entitled to a justification instruction on the second-degree murder charge.

Defendant advances three additional contentions on appeal. None of those contentions has merit.First , defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction that the jury must determine whether the use of deadly physical force was justified with respect to each of the gunshots that struck the victim (cf.People v. Del–Debbio , 244 A.D.2d 195, 195, 664 N.Y.S.2d 28 [1st Dept. 1997] ["Even if a defendant is justified in using deadly physical force at the beginning of a single, ongoing encounter with an assailant, his right to use that force terminates at the point he can no longer reasonably believe the assailant still poses a threat to him"], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 925, 670 N.Y.S.2d 406, 693 N.E.2d 753 [1998] ). An objection on that point, however, was unlikely to have succeeded, and trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to advance an argument that has little or no chance of success (see People v. Caban , 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 [2005] ; People v. Stultz , 2 N.Y.3d 277, 287, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 [2004], rearg. denied 3 N.Y.3d 702, 785 N.Y.S.2d 29, 818 N.E.2d 671 [2004] ).

Muldoon Getz, Rochester ( Gary Muldoon of counsel), for Charles Lafler, respondent. The indictment, which grouped together 10 different allegations of actions allegedly committed by three different people, is duplicitous. ( People v Sedlock, 8 NY3d 535; People v Sanchez, 84 NY2d 440; People v Watt, 81 NY2d 772; People v Keindl, 68 NY2d 410; People v Morris, 61 NY2d 290; People v Payne, 241 AD2d 466; People v Pryce, 41 AD3d 983; People v Dunton, 30 AD3d 828; People v Del-Debbio, 244 AD2d 195; People v Hines, 39 AD3d 968.) Before: Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judges CIPARICK, GRAFFEO and READ concur.

Criminal Court dismissed one of the two second-degree harassment counts as multiplicitous, based upon its determination that a single offense was charged in the two counts (seePeople v. Alonzo , 16 NY3d 267, 269-270 [2011] ). Contrary to defendant's claim, this dismissal on multiplicity grounds did not constitute an amendment of the accusatory instrument in violation of CPL 100.45(3) (seePeople v. Frascone , 271 AD2d 333 [2000] ; People v. Del—Debbio , 244 AD2d 195 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 925 [1998] ). In point of fact, the proper remedy for multiplicitous counts is dismissal of all but one of the affected counts (seePeople v. VanGorden , 147 AD3d 1436, 1439 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1037 [2017] ).

The fact that defendant's use of force undisputedly caused very serious injuries was naturally relevant to whether it was "readily capable" of causing such injury, and the court properly took the nature of the injuries into consideration. The court also correctly instructed the jury that a defendant who continues to use force after no longer reasonably believing such force to be necessary for self-defense may be criminally liable for harm caused by the unjustified additional force, and that the jury should separately consider each successive punch in that light (seePeople v. Del–Debbio, 244 A.D.2d 195, 195, 664 N.Y.S.2d 28 [1st Dept. 1997], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 925, 670 N.Y.S.2d 406, 693 N.E.2d 753 [1998] ). Although Del–Debbio and other cases involving this principle involved the use of deadly force

As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal. The charge, viewed as a whole, conveyed the correct principles of law as applied to the particular facts, with regard to the issues of whether defendant used excessive force (seePeople v. Del–Debbio, 244 A.D.2d 195, 195, 664 N.Y.S.2d 28 [1st Dept. 1997], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 925, 670 N.Y.S.2d 406, 693 N.E.2d 753 [1998] ), and whether he was the initial aggressor (seePeople v. Valentin, 29 N.Y.3d 57, 62, 52 N.Y.S.3d 249, 74 N.E.3d 632 [2017] ). Nothing in the charge prevented the jury from fairly assessing defendant's justification defense under the facts presented.

People v Rivera, 257 AD2d 425, 425-426, lv denied 93 NY2d 901; see generally People v Allen, 24 NY3d 441, 448-450), we conclude that it is without merit. " [T]here is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict,' " such as which shot was intended for each officer (People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 408, cert denied 542 US 946; see People v Del-Debbio, 244 AD2d 195, 195, lv denied 91 NY2d 925). As the People correctly concede, however, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that defendant was more than 18 years old at the time of the crimes.

People v. Rivera, 257 A.D.2d 425, 425–426, 683 N.Y.S.2d 513, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 901, 689 N.Y.S.2d 714, 711 N.E.2d 990 ; see generally People v. Allen, 24 N.Y.3d 441, 448–450, 999 N.Y.S.2d 350, 24 N.E.3d 586 ), we conclude that it is without merit. " ‘[T]here is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict,’ " such as which shot was intended for each officer (People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 408, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828 ; see People v. Del–Debbio, 244 A.D.2d 195, 195, 664 N.Y.S.2d 28, lv. denied 91 N.Y.2d 925, 670 N.Y.S.2d 406, 693 N.E.2d 753 ). As the People correctly concede, however, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that defendant was more than 18 years old at the time of the crimes.