People v. Deizman

11 Citing cases

  1. People v. Williams

    201 Ill. App. 3d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that expert's intentional disregard of certain records, including social histories to find facts relevant to his final diagnosis, and his statement that they were not important to his final opinion, undermined his credibility

    • 3 If the opinions of the expert witnesses on the issue of insanity conflict, the trier of fact may accept one expert's opinion over another. ( People v. Moore (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 881, 498 N.E.2d 701; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) The weight to be given an expert's opinion depends upon the reasoning and factual details used to support that opinion.

  2. People v. Schwab

    502 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    • 3 The court found in People v. Long (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 815, 817-18, 333 N.E.2d 534, 537, that a defendant suffering from chronic alcoholism, alcoholic amnesia, passive aggressive personality, loss of reality and control upon excessive drinking, headaches due to cerebral concussion and anxiety and depression suggesting a suicidal risk was not entitled to an order of the trial court sua sponte for a competency hearing where a psychiatrist testified that defendant nonetheless understood the charges against him and cooperated with counsel. ( 30 Ill. App.3d 815, 817-18, 333 N.E.2d 534, 537.) It is clear that the trial court is not obliged as a matter of law to accept psychiatric opinion. ( People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 834, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) However, where the only evidence adduced at a fitness hearing was that the defendant was unfit to stand trial, the court was not free to ignore it.

  3. People v. Baker

    253 Ill. App. 3d 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that in determining the credibility of an expert witness it was relevant that the witness was a State-employed psychiatrist, who was appointed by the circuit court to examine defendant, rather than a paid expert offering an opinion solely for purposes of the trial

    In response, the State argues that the trial court was within its province as fact finder to reject all the expert testimony and rest its finding that the defendant was not insane solely on the lay testimony presented at trial. The State is correct in its assertion that it need not present expert testimony on the issue of defendant's sanity ( People v. Thurman, 223 Ill. App.3d at 201; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208) and may instead rely on facts in evidence and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom by the trier of fact. People v. Camden (1991), 219 Ill. App.3d 124, 578 N.E.2d 1211; People v. Jackson (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 919, 356 N.E.2d 979.

  4. People v. Tylkowski

    171 Ill. App. 3d 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the absence of license plates on the car of a suspect for murder justified his initial on-the-street detention by police

    This conduct reveals an awareness on his part of the criminality of his actions. See Peoplev. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208. As additional support for his argument that the State failed to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant has cited this court's decision in People v. Garcia (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 417, 509 N.E.2d 600.

  5. People v. Smith

    93 Ill. App. 3d 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 12 times
    In Smith, the defendant did not object to the evidence on the basis of privilege and therefore the court found that the privilege was waived.

    Since the trial court could have found the defendant sane on the basis of this testimony alone, we conclude that there was no grave error and that fundamental fairness or the interest of justice does not require a reversal under the limited exception of the waiver rule characterized as "plain error." See People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 833-34; People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 510, 519. See also People v. Young (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 351, 353-54.

  6. People v. Ware

    410 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    ( People v. Foster (1979), 76 Ill.2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6; People v. Redmond (1974), 59 Ill.2d 328, 320 N.E.2d 321; People v. Bloodworth (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 341, 385 N.E.2d 904.) However, the issue as to a defendant's mental condition at the time of an offense is one of fact ( People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill.2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171; People v. Roberts (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 124, 389 N.E.2d 596), and a trial court's finding of sanity will not be disturbed unless it is so manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence as to indicate that the verdict was based on passion or prejudice ( People v. Rockamann (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 575, 399 N.E.2d 162; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208). Furthermore, the court, as the trier of fact, is not obligated to accept the ultimate opinion of a psychiatrist ( People v. Varnado (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 413, 384 N.E.2d 37; People v. Young (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 351, 376 N.E.2d 739), and may properly conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense by accepting lay testimony over expert testimony ( Roberts; People v. Kuhn (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 59, 385 N.E.2d 388). Moreover, the weight to be afforded an expert's opinion is measured in part upon the facts which he marshalls in support of it. People v. Romaine (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 1089, 399 N.E.2d 319; People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 510, 380 N.E.2d 423.

  7. People v. Williams

    87 Ill. App. 3d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 18 times
    Reversing trial court's finding that defendant was fit to stand trial when both of the court appointed psychiatrists testified that defendant was unfit to stand trial

    Indeed, it is clear that the trial judge is not obliged as a matter of law to accept opinions of psychiatrists. ( People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) Further, the conclusions of experts are only as valid as the bases or reasons for them.

  8. People v. Dominique

    86 Ill. App. 3d 794 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 38 times
    In Dominique, the court found that the fact that defendant had been diagnosed as mentally ill some nine months before trial and was taking medication at time of trial to maintain contact with reality did not of itself raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness.

    The State is not required to present expert medical testimony when confronted with the issue of insanity. ( People v. Bloodworth; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208; People v. Horton (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 704, 331 N.E.2d 104.) In addition, a jury may properly conclude that defendant was sane by accepting lay testimony over expert testimony.

  9. People v. Bloodworth

    68 Ill. App. 3d 341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 12 times

    Thus, the burden fell upon the State to prove defendant's sanity as an element of the crime charged. In this regard, the State is not required to present expert medical testimony when confronted with the issue of insanity ( People v. Deizman, 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208 (1st Dist. 1976); People v. Horton, 29 Ill. App.3d 704, 331 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1975)), and a jury may properly conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense by accepting lay testimony over expert testimony. ( People v. Spears, 63 Ill. App.3d 510, 380 N.E.2d 423 (5th Dist. 1978).

  10. Deizman v. Bd. of Educ., Dist. 201

    369 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    On July 21, 1975, plaintiff was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to a term of 5 to 20 years, which conviction was affirmed by this court. People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208. During plaintiff's period of incarceration prior to trial, Gloria Deizman, plaintiff's wife, requested in his behalf that plaintiff be placed on sick leave.