• 3 If the opinions of the expert witnesses on the issue of insanity conflict, the trier of fact may accept one expert's opinion over another. ( People v. Moore (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 881, 498 N.E.2d 701; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) The weight to be given an expert's opinion depends upon the reasoning and factual details used to support that opinion.
• 3 The court found in People v. Long (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 815, 817-18, 333 N.E.2d 534, 537, that a defendant suffering from chronic alcoholism, alcoholic amnesia, passive aggressive personality, loss of reality and control upon excessive drinking, headaches due to cerebral concussion and anxiety and depression suggesting a suicidal risk was not entitled to an order of the trial court sua sponte for a competency hearing where a psychiatrist testified that defendant nonetheless understood the charges against him and cooperated with counsel. ( 30 Ill. App.3d 815, 817-18, 333 N.E.2d 534, 537.) It is clear that the trial court is not obliged as a matter of law to accept psychiatric opinion. ( People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 834, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) However, where the only evidence adduced at a fitness hearing was that the defendant was unfit to stand trial, the court was not free to ignore it.
In response, the State argues that the trial court was within its province as fact finder to reject all the expert testimony and rest its finding that the defendant was not insane solely on the lay testimony presented at trial. The State is correct in its assertion that it need not present expert testimony on the issue of defendant's sanity ( People v. Thurman, 223 Ill. App.3d at 201; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208) and may instead rely on facts in evidence and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom by the trier of fact. People v. Camden (1991), 219 Ill. App.3d 124, 578 N.E.2d 1211; People v. Jackson (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 919, 356 N.E.2d 979.
This conduct reveals an awareness on his part of the criminality of his actions. See Peoplev. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208. As additional support for his argument that the State failed to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant has cited this court's decision in People v. Garcia (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 417, 509 N.E.2d 600.
Since the trial court could have found the defendant sane on the basis of this testimony alone, we conclude that there was no grave error and that fundamental fairness or the interest of justice does not require a reversal under the limited exception of the waiver rule characterized as "plain error." See People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 833-34; People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 510, 519. See also People v. Young (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 351, 353-54.
( People v. Foster (1979), 76 Ill.2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6; People v. Redmond (1974), 59 Ill.2d 328, 320 N.E.2d 321; People v. Bloodworth (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 341, 385 N.E.2d 904.) However, the issue as to a defendant's mental condition at the time of an offense is one of fact ( People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill.2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171; People v. Roberts (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 124, 389 N.E.2d 596), and a trial court's finding of sanity will not be disturbed unless it is so manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence as to indicate that the verdict was based on passion or prejudice ( People v. Rockamann (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 575, 399 N.E.2d 162; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208). Furthermore, the court, as the trier of fact, is not obligated to accept the ultimate opinion of a psychiatrist ( People v. Varnado (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 413, 384 N.E.2d 37; People v. Young (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 351, 376 N.E.2d 739), and may properly conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense by accepting lay testimony over expert testimony ( Roberts; People v. Kuhn (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 59, 385 N.E.2d 388). Moreover, the weight to be afforded an expert's opinion is measured in part upon the facts which he marshalls in support of it. People v. Romaine (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 1089, 399 N.E.2d 319; People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 510, 380 N.E.2d 423.
Indeed, it is clear that the trial judge is not obliged as a matter of law to accept opinions of psychiatrists. ( People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208.) Further, the conclusions of experts are only as valid as the bases or reasons for them.
The State is not required to present expert medical testimony when confronted with the issue of insanity. ( People v. Bloodworth; People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208; People v. Horton (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 704, 331 N.E.2d 104.) In addition, a jury may properly conclude that defendant was sane by accepting lay testimony over expert testimony.
Thus, the burden fell upon the State to prove defendant's sanity as an element of the crime charged. In this regard, the State is not required to present expert medical testimony when confronted with the issue of insanity ( People v. Deizman, 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208 (1st Dist. 1976); People v. Horton, 29 Ill. App.3d 704, 331 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1975)), and a jury may properly conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense by accepting lay testimony over expert testimony. ( People v. Spears, 63 Ill. App.3d 510, 380 N.E.2d 423 (5th Dist. 1978).
On July 21, 1975, plaintiff was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to a term of 5 to 20 years, which conviction was affirmed by this court. People v. Deizman (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 829, 358 N.E.2d 1208. During plaintiff's period of incarceration prior to trial, Gloria Deizman, plaintiff's wife, requested in his behalf that plaintiff be placed on sick leave.