Opinion
12924 Ind. No. 895/18 Case No. 2019-2099
01-21-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Philip DEBLASIO, Defendant–Appellant.
Stephen Chu, Interim Attorney–in–Charge, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Margaret E. Knight of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Beth Fisch Cohen of counsel), for respondent.
Stephen Chu, Interim Attorney–in–Charge, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Margaret E. Knight of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Beth Fisch Cohen of counsel), for respondent.
Renwick, J.P., Manzanet–Daniels, Kapnick, Kern, Kennedy, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (James M. Burke, J.), rendered January 2, 2019, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of making a terroristic threat, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of four years, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the indictment dismissed.
The evidence of defendant's "intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population" ( Penal Law § 490.20[1] ) was legally insufficient to support the conviction (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). We also find that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence in that respect (see id. ).
At the end of an altercation, defendant, a Muslim, threatened to shoot "you guys," referring to several Bangladeshi worshippers at defendant's mosque. Although there was evidence presented at trial that defendant bore animus toward Bangladeshi people, the threat mentioned no group or population and instead appears to have been based on a personal dispute defendant had with one or more of his fellow worshippers over money or a missing phone. Accordingly, this threat was not directed at a "civilian population" as that term was explained by the Court of Appeals in People v. Morales , 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247, 958 N.Y.S.2d 660, 982 N.E.2d 580 (2012). To find that defendant's act amounted to a terroristic threat would trivialize the definition of terrorism by applying it "loosely in situations that do not match our collective understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act" ( id. ; see also Penal Law § 490.00 ).
In light of the foregoing, we do not reach defendant's remaining contentions.