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People v. Dawson

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight.
Nov 25, 2003
B166964 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)

Opinion

B166964.

11-25-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID CLINTON DAWSON, Defendant and Appellant.

David Clinton Dawson, in pro. per.; Elizabeth A. Missakian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.


INTRODUCTION

David Clinton Dawson appeals from the trial courts order denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis with respect to his 1984 robbery and attempted robbery convictions. We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. Acting in propria persona, appellant subsequently filed a supplemental brief. We conclude that no arguable issues exist.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February, 1984, appellant pled guilty to three counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery and admitted various arms-use enhancement allegations in Los Angeles Superior Court Case A907096. Appellant was sentenced to five years in prison.

In March, 2003, appellant filed a Motion and Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Vacate Judgment and Withdraw Guilty Plea, alleging that he was not advised of his privilege against self-incrimination or his rights to have a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine witnesses; that he was not advised of all the direct consequences of his plea, including the effect of the later-enacted Three Strikes Law; and that the direct penal consequences of his 1984 plea agreement were altered by the Three Strikes Law. Appellant argued he should be allowed to withdraw his plea.

The trial court denied appellants petition, finding that appellant was adequately advised of his rights and waived them. The court rejected appellants contention regarding the subsequent passage of the Three Strikes Law, noting that neither the court nor prosecutor was required to foresee future changes in the law. The court also found appellants explanation for the 19 year delay in bringing this claim to be inadequate.

We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. On October 1, 2003, we advised appellant he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. On October 14, 2003, he filed a supplemental brief.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion because there is no reporters transcript of the 1984 hearing at which he pled guilty. The courts minute order of the hearing recites that he was advised of and waived his rights to a trial by court or jury, to confront witnesses for the purposes of cross-examination, and his privilege against self-incrimination. Appellant argues, however, that the minute order is inadequate and that the court erroneously "presume[d] from a silent record" that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Appellant relies upon a portion of a court reporters transcript of unknown proceedings attached to his writ petition in the trial court. In those proceedings, appellant or some other person named David Dawson testified that before he entered a guilty plea in "a case [he was] involved in in1984," neither the judge nor the district attorney advised him of his right to a jury trial, his right to be represented by counsel, his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him, his right to the assistance of the court in subpoenaing his own witnesses, or his right to remain silent and not incriminate himself. Nor, according to the transcript, did the judge or district attorney inform him that by entering a guilty plea, he was giving up all of those rights.

The record of proceedings in case number A907096 is not, as appellant argues, a silent one. The courts minute order records a proper advisement and waiver of rights by appellant prior to his guilty plea. The courts minutes "import absolute verity unless and until amended." (Shellhaas v. Petrolane, Ltd. (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 171, 174.) "No proof is admissible to show facts contrary to those which appear in the records and minutes of judicial proceedings." (Ibid.) Appellant never moved the trial court to amend the minutes of his 1984 plea proceeding to conform to his version of events. Accordingly, the minute orders recitation of the advisement and waiver must be deemed to be accurate.

Moreover, the trial court is presumed to have known and applied the relevant statutory and case law. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046.) In the context of a guilty plea, this means that the trial court is presumed to have accepted the plea only if the court or the prosecutor, on the record, informed the defendant of his rights to a jury trial, confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination on the record and obtained an express, specific waiver of those rights.

Given the recitation in the minute order and the presumption that the court knew and applied the relevant law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the self-serving testimony in the partial transcript attached to the petition. Appellant has not established that he was not advised of his rights prior to pleading guilty in case number A907096.

Appellant also argues that in 1996, the People "deviated from the terms of the 1984 plea bargain by using that agreement for the purpose of enhancing the maximum he could receive from the prior from five years to life in prison, basing its [sic] action on the Three Strikes law." Although the record on appeal contains no evidence of a subsequent conviction, appellants argument clearly suggests that he was charged with and convicted of another felony in 1996, and that he received a term of 25 years to life in prison under the Three Strikes Law. In a related argument, appellant complains that he was not advised that the 1984 plea agreement "could one day be altered by an additional penal consequence."

Appellant misunderstands the nature of the Three Strikes Law. The Three Strikes Law does not apply retroactively to alter the punishment for any prior conviction. Instead, it increases the penalties for subsequent offenses committed by specified recidivists. Thus, a second or third strike term appellant received was attributable solely to his new offense and his status as a recidivist. It was not additional punishment for his 1984 conviction, or any other prior conviction. (See, e.g., Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721, 728; People v. Sipe (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 468, 478-479; People v. Jacob (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1172.)

Neither the court nor counsel participating in the 1984 proceedings were required to foresee future changes in sentencing law and advise appellant accordingly. The enactment of both the legislative and initiative versions of the Three Strikes Law provided appellant with ample notice that any future felony he committed could trigger application of the enhanced penalties. Appellant cannot rescind his guilty plea on the theory that when he entered to plea, he did not know what the future would bring.

In addition to considering the above contentions, we have examined the entire record and are satisfied appellants attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., RUBIN, J.


Summaries of

People v. Dawson

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight.
Nov 25, 2003
B166964 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Dawson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID CLINTON DAWSON, Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight.

Date published: Nov 25, 2003

Citations

B166964 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)