People v. Dawn

10 Citing cases

  1. People v. Cappadora

    2015 Ill. App. 2d 131281 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 27. Indeed, the scope of any consent to search is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose. People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 40. ¶ 27 In this case, it is undisputed that defendant voluntarily consented to the deputies entering the home for the purpose of searching the basement. That consent included the authority to enter the kitchen, as it was necessary to do so to access the basement.

  2. People v. Ward

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 150792 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 27. Consent may be limited, as consent to enter one's home does not necessarily imply consent to enter all areas of the home. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 33. To establish the scope of any consent, it is important to consider any expressed or implied limitations.

  3. People v. Ward

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 150792 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 27. Consent may be limited, as consent to enter one's home does not necessarily imply consent to enter all areas of the home. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 33. To establish the scope of any consent, it is important to consider any expressed or implied limitations.

  4. People v. Murphy

    2016 Ill. App. 133748 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Warrantless entry into the home is permitted where governmental actors have probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the intrusion. People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 22 (citing People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311-12 (1994)). We first consider whether the officers had probable cause to enter defendant's apartment and arrest him. ¶ 34 Probable cause to arrest an individual exists when the officers, at the time of the arrest, know facts "sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime."

  5. People v. Hagestedt

    2023 Ill. App. 2d 210715 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 141 A mere hunch is not probable cause. People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 24. It requires more than mere suspicion but less than what is necessary to convict.

  6. People v. Penelton

    2019 Ill. App. 2d 170408 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 88-89 (2010); People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 20. We may consider the entire record, including trial testimony.

  7. People v. Robinson

    2017 Ill. App. 142555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)

    Warrantless entry into the home is permitted where governmental actors have probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the intrusion. People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 22 (citing People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311-12 (1994)). Such exigencies include when officers are responding to emergencies, preventing the imminent destruction of evidence, or hotly pursuing a fleeing suspect.

  8. People v. Habay

    2017 Ill. App. 2d 151250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)

    The State bears the burden of proving that the police acted within the scope of the consent given. People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 30. ¶ 77 The evidence regarding the scope of the authorized search was disputed. Defendant's parents testified that Gallagher mentioned at their home that the police wanted to confirm defendant's IP address; Gallagher denied saying that.

  9. People v. Walsh

    2017 Ill. App. 2d 140974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)

    This presumption of unreasonableness may be overcome by a showing that there was a voluntary consent to search, or there was a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances that justify the intrusion. People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App (2d) 120025, ¶ 22. "Defendants have the right to place explicit limitations on the scope of their consent and have the right to withdraw consent once it is given." People v. Prinzing, 389 Ill. App. 3d 923, 937 (2009).

  10. People v. Brooks

    2014 Ill. App. 2d 121012 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    The Anthony court's concern regarding dueling inferences arising from a single ambiguous gesture is not present here. ¶ 18 Citing People v. Dale, 301 Ill. App. 3d 593 (1998), and People v. Dawn, 2013 IL App. (2d) 120025, defendant contends that, even if Daniels' nod qualifies as consent to enter the hallway, the officers' search of the bedrooms exceeded the scope of that consent. Defendant's reliance on those cases is misplaced.