Opinion
February 13, 1996
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that his initial inculpatory statement to the detectives should have been suppressed as the result of a custodial interrogation which was conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The test to determine whether an individual is in custody so as to trigger the requirement that Miranda warnings be provided is whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought he or she was in custody under the circumstances (see, People v Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, cert denied 400 U.S. 851; People v Nolcox, 190 A.D.2d 824; People v. Smedman, 184 A.D.2d 600, 604). The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicated that when the detective first spoke to the defendant at his home, the detective merely informed the defendant that he was investigating a shooting. Before any further conversation was had, the defendant admitted to being the shooter. This statement was spontaneous and not the product of police interrogation (see, People v. Gonzalez, 75 N.Y.2d 938, cert denied 498 U.S. 833; People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303; People v. Simmons, 210 A.D.2d 441). Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that he or she was in custody at the time the defendant uttered the inculpatory statement.
We agree, however, with the defendant's contention that his subsequent statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of custodial interrogation. Once the defendant admitted to being the shooter, it is inconceivable that he harbored any reasonable expectation that he had the right to leave. Consequently, he was in custody at that time (cf., People v. Smith, 214 A.D.2d 845). Therefore, the detective should have given the defendant his Miranda rights before questioning him further (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467-468). Consequently, the defendant's subsequent statements should have been suppressed. The error, however, in admitting these statements at trial was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt (see, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the suppression court properly denied suppression of the evidence seized at his house. The testimony adduced at the suppression hearing indicated that the defendant's mother, with whom the defendant lived, voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of the premises by the detectives (see, People v. Kelley, 220 A.D.2d 456; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 989; see also, People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128-130). Moreover, the defendant himself informed the detectives where the evidence in question was located and he voiced no objection to their retrieving the evidence from the house (see, People v. Kelley, supra; People v. Miller, supra).
The defendant's sentence was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v. Tevaha, 84 N.Y.2d 879, 881). O'Brien, J.P., Sullivan, Copertino and Joy, JJ., concur.