Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR907436-B
Marchiano, P.J.
Defendant Richard Leslie Davis was convicted by a jury of: manufacturing or processing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)), while personally armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c)); possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11383, subd. (c)(1)), while personally armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)); providing a place for the manufacture of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)); and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years, conditioned among other things on service of one year in county jail. This appeal contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts on all charges other than that of being a felon in possession of a firearm. We hold that all of the convictions were supported by substantial evidence and affirm the order for probation.
I. BACKGROUND
On the night of November 29, 2005, law enforcement officers acting on an anonymous tip discovered a large methamphetamine laboratory (meth lab) on a remote 37-acre “farm type” property in Lake County where defendant resided. Defendant’s mother owned the property and lived in the main residence, defendant and others lived in trailers behind the main residence, and the meth lab was located in a room in a shed behind the trailers. A dirt road on the property passed by defendant’s trailer and led to the shed, which was about 100 yards from the trailer.
California Department of Justice Special Agent Patrick Hague testified that the meth lab in this case was the largest of the 50 such labs he had investigated. He said that the lab was a “very sophisticated” “super lab” of the kind “usually run by large organizations, [with] numerous people . . . involved.” Lake County Sheriff Detective Andrew Davidson had been to about 30 meth labs, and had seen only one lab as large as this one. Materials in the lab included an enormous 72-liter cooking vessel; Davidson had never seen a cooking vessel larger than 22 liters. Hague said that cooking vessels were not readily available from retailers, and could cost up to several thousand dollars. Equipment and materials in the lab were being stored, not used, when the lab was discovered. A note on the door to the lab said, “Keep it keystered. Closed for the winter.” Samples recovered from the lab tested positive for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.
Tim Celli, one of the investigating officers, encountered defendant at his trailer, explained the purpose of the visit, and asked for permission to search the trailer. Defendant consented to a limited search that would not include drawers or his personal effects. Celli went into the trailer and saw rounds of ammunition, and a shotgun mounted on the wall of the back bedroom.
Celli asked if he could search other structures on the property, and defendant permitted him to enter a shed near the main residence, where Celli found a gun safe that defendant said contained antique guns he had inherited from his father. Defendant initially denied knowledge of a meth lab, but after the gun safe was found he said that there had been a meth lab on the property two years earlier, and he took the officers to the shed where the lab was located. The door to the lab was locked and the officers had to pry it open to get inside.
Defendant was arrested and taken to jail, where he agreed to answer questions from Davidson the next day; an audiotape of the interview was played for the jury at trial. Defendant admitted owning the shotgun found in his trailer. He had rented the shed to people who told him they needed to store some things; he first said he could not remember the tenants’ names, but later admitted knowing who they were and refused to identify them. They would come by occasionally, and when he went to the shed one day he saw them cooking methamphetamine. They paid rent for awhile and then left. He did not know what to do after they left, and had “been sweating about this thing for the last couple of years.” The tenants had a key to the lab; he did not think he had a key to it. He doubted that his fingerprints would be on anything inside the lab, but he had been inside it and “touch[ed] a few things” when the tenants were there.
An anonymous tip had identified a man named Johnny Radford or William Paul Radford as a person associated with the lab, and Radford and others were arrested at the property along with defendant. Defendant told Davidson that Radford and the others arrested had nothing to do with the lab; “It’s all on me,” defendant said. Davidson told defendant, “Okay sir. You, you have a way to help yourself here, obviously, but you’re not, you’re not going for that. You’re just wanting to take the fall on this. I hope you know what you’re, what you’re doing.” Defendant replied, “I don’t want to. I just am, I feel that I have no choice . . . .”
Defendant testified at trial and denied any involvement in the methamphetamine manufacturing operation. He had lived on the farm for four and one-half years. He had the unloaded single barrel shotgun the police found in his trailer because “we live out in the woods, and you never know when the need may arise.” He rented the room in the shed to an acquaintance and another individual in the summer of 2003; if he named them he would “be afraid to walk down the street.” They told him that they needed to store some household goods, and they unloaded boxes from a van into the room. In early 2004, he went to the shed and discovered that they were making methamphetamine there. He told them to stop, declined their offer of a share of the proceeds, and said he would burn down the building if they did not pack up and leave. They took some things and left, saying they would be back for the rest of their property in a couple of days, but they never returned. Defendant said that he did not know what to do with the property in the room. He tried to sell the glassware in the lab at one point to a person he declined to identify.
Defendant had a key to the shed where the gun safe was located, and to other buildings on the property, but said that he did not have a key to the meth lab. He testified on direct examination that he gave the tenants the one key he had to the lab room. On cross-examination, he said that he never had a key to the room. He said that one of the tenants helped him finish building the room, and provided the door and the lock and the key to it.
Defendant accounted for the possibility of his fingerprints in the lab as follows. He said that one day around the fall of 2004 he heard his dog barking in the shed. “I went down [to the shed],” he said, “and I could hear her inside the [lab room]. I correctly concluded that soon thereafter (sic) she had chased a cat or a rat or some animal up onto a pile of boxes that were next to the wall, outside wall of the [lab room]. And the boxes at one point were leveled with the rafters. And this [lab room] had a cardboard ceiling stapled to the underside of the ceiling joist. And apparently the dog had run out onto this cardboard and fallen into the room, and I didn’t have a key for the room. So I climbed up on the boxes, let myself down in and got the dog out.” He might have touched something while he was in the room retrieving his dog.
Police found the fingerprints of a Marvin Stevenson and a David Rovetti, but no fingerprints from defendant, in the lab. Defendant said that he did not know Stevenson; he knew someone named David Rovetti, but Rovetti had not been one of the lab tenants and had not been to the lab room.
Special Agent Hague opined, based on his observations at the scene, that the property in the lab had been left there between a month and a month and a half. He noted that the roof of the lab consisted only of flattened cardboard boxes “spaced up in the rafters.” Since the lab was not a sealed structure, he would have expected to find more “dirt or contamination” on the items inside it if they had been left there for a more extended time. He would also have expected to see more evaporation of the liquids in the lab. He further opined that a dump site for methamphetamine manufacturing trash found in a wooded area three-quarters of a mile from the lab was also only a month to a month and a half old. The same anonymous tip led police to the dumpsite and lab, and they appeared to be part of the same operation given their size and proximity. Had the items at the dumpsite been there for a longer time, Hague would have expected them to have been more rusted and covered with more foliage. Hague acknowledged that these opinions were based on his lay observations rather than his scientific training.
Defendant testified that he was a handyman who “lived at poverty level.” He was 61 years old at the time of trial. He admitted being a methamphetamine user, but said that he was using the drug only once or twice a month around the time he was arrested in this case.
Hague testified that many people playing different roles would be involved in a large methamphetamine operation like the one here, including: the leader; the cook; the financier; “smurfs” who collect equipment and precursor materials; security personnel responsible for internal and external surveillance; and personnel who move and store the materials. Hague testified that he would expect firearms to be kept in close proximity to any meth lab that was operational; the firearms could be further away if the manufacturing materials were merely being stored. Detective Davidson said that a gram of methamphetamine would cost $60 to $150 dollars, and that a heavy user could consume a gram in a day.
The People argued to the jury that defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and was involved in the storage and security aspects of the lab operation. The prosecutor submitted that defendant lied about the extent of his methamphetamine use, and was compensated in methamphetamine for his illegal activities.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Review
When sufficiency of the evidence is questioned, we “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Circumstantial evidence may suffice to provide proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933 (Bean)), and the standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792). “Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” (Bean, supra, at pp. 932-933.)
B. Overview of the Evidence
There was substantial circumstantial evidence of defendant’s involvement in an ongoing methamphetamine manufacturing operation in this case. First, he lived 100 yards away from a very large meth lab. Second, his residence was situated on the dirt road that led to the lab, enabling him to function as a lookout for the operation. Third, he kept a shotgun and ammunition in his trailer. Fourth, he knew about the lab. Fifth, he was, by his own statements, the only one who lived on the property who knew about the lab. Sixth, he was an acknowledged methamphetamine user who could benefit from access to the finished product. Seventh, there was evidence that the lab had been used in the relatively recent past, and was only temporarily “closed for the winter.” On this last point, the jury could credit Hague’s opinion of the length of time the equipment and materials in the lab had lain dormant, and there were photos of the items in evidence to assist the jury in that assessment.
Defendant’s case hinged on the credibility of his testimony, which the jury could reasonably choose to disbelieve. First, as just stated, the condition of property in the lab could be found to contradict defendant’s claim that the lab had not been used for several years. Second, defendant gave inconsistent accounts of the key to the lab, saying first that he did not think he had a key to it, then that he gave the tenants his only key, then that he never had a key. Third, his dog-fell-through-the-roof explanation for the possibility of his fingerprints in the lab could have strained credulity. Fourth, he knew people—the lab tenants—who could have corroborated his professed innocence, but chose not to identify them.
Additional questions favorable to the prosecution were raised by the evidence, such as: Why would the tenants abandon items of value in a large and sophisticated meth lab? Why did defendant not have a key to the lab when he had keys to other buildings on the property? Why did defendant not report the lab to the police when he first learned of it, as an innocent person might have been expected to do?
Accordingly, while defendant’s culpability was certainly disputable, inferences of guilt could reasonably be drawn as to all of the challenged verdicts.
C. Specific Offenses and Enhancements
Defendant contends that he could not be convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine on the prosecution’s aiding and abetting theory because he did not know that the tenants were going to use the room as a meth lab until after he had rented it to them. (See CALCRIM No. 401 (Fall ed. 2007) [defendant must intend to aid and abet the perpetrator “[b]efore or during the commission of the crime”].) However, the jury was not obliged to believe defendant’s testimony as to how a meth lab came to be situated on the property. Defendant contends that Hague’s admittedly unscientific opinion about how recently the items in the lab had been used was of “absolutely no [evidentiary] worth.” But, as Hague noted and as defendant’s dog-rescue testimony underscored, the lab had only a flimsy cardboard roof. As a matter of common sense and as a proper subject of lay opinion, items in the lab could have been expected to exhibit significant wear and tear if they had been exposed to the elements under the cardboard roof for as long as defendant claimed.
Defendant argues that he could not be convicted of possessing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine because there was no substantial evidence that he constructively possessed those substances found in the lab. “Constructive possession exists when a defendant ‘maintains control or a right to control the contraband.’ ” (Armstrong v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 535, 538.) Constructive possession may be established by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from such evidence. (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215.) “ ‘The narcotics need not be found on the person of the defendant; it is sufficient if they are deposited in a place under the possession and control of the accused. Exclusive possession of the premises is not necessary nor is physical possession of the drug of the essence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jackson (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 704-705.)
The jury could reasonably find that the property in the lab was under defendant’s possession and control. There was substantial evidence that defendant was aiding and abetting a methamphetamine manufacturing enterprise. According to the sign on the door, the lab was not shut down permanently, only “closed for the winter.” Defendant lived nearby, knew of the lab’s existence, had the keys to buildings on the property, and equivocated about possessing a key to the lab. It was reasonable under the circumstances to infer that he was storing the property in the lab until the manufacturing resumed.
Defendant contends that the arming enhancements must be reversed because no nexus was established between the methamphetamine manufacturing enterprise and the gun found in his trailer. (See generally People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002 [arming must occur during underlying crime and have some facilitative nexus to the offense].) Defendant notes that the trailer was 100 yards away from the lab, and he submits that his possession of the gun and involvement in the enterprise were merely coincidental. However, the evidence did not compel that inference. The dirt road on the property that led to the lab passed by defendant’s trailer. Since surveillance for the operation could have been conducted from the trailer, it was reasonable to infer that the gun in the trailer was connected with the operation’s security. Davidson testified that while firearms are generally found in close proximity to operational meth labs, they could be kept further away, when, as here, the manufacturing materials are merely being stored. Thus, the distance between the gun and the lab did not preclude findings that the gun was at defendant’s ready use and could be used to facilitate the manufacturing and possessory offenses.
Defendant maintains that he could not be found to have rented or furnished a place for manufacturing or storage of a controlled substance for sale or distribution because he did not know that the tenants were going to use the shed as a meth lab when he rented it to them, or because he rented the premises long before the offenses alleged in the case transpired. Again, however, the jury was not compelled to accept his account of how and when the lab was established and operated.
III. DISPOSITION
The order for probation is affirmed.
We concur:Stein, J., Swager, J.