Opinion
H046122
07-02-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN PAUL DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1765962)
A jury convicted defendant John Paul Davis of failing to register as a sex offender within five days of his release from incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 290.015, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Davis to two years in prison, which was deemed served based on accumulated custody credit.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Davis argues the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of his four prior convictions for failing to register as a sex offender within five days of his release from custody; and (2) not allowing into evidence his pretrial statement to police officers as to why he failed to register as a sex offender in this particular instance. In a supplemental opening brief, Davis contends his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to argue that the pretrial statement was admissible under the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule.
We disagree with Davis's arguments and will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 25, 2017, the district attorney filed an information charging Davis with felony failure to register as a sex offender within five days of release from incarceration (§ 290.015, subd. (a)). The information further alleged that Davis had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A. Trial
1. Prosecution case
The parties stipulated that, on December 22, 2008, Davis was convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure (§ 314, subd. 1) in Santa Clara County Superior Court. As a result of that conviction, Davis was required to register as a sex offender.
San Jose Police Sergeant John Marfia testified that he was the custodian of records for sex offender registrations as well as the supervisor for a team of officers "tracking, monitoring, and investigating crimes involving registered sex offenders in the city of San Jose." Marfia described the registration process, stating that the "very first form . . . a registrant receives notifying them of their duty to register" is an "8047 form." That form "serves as an official notification that they're required to register as a sex offender under the [Penal Code section] 290 laws of the State of California." The form sets forth a number of registration requirements, including the requirement that the offender must reregister within five business days of being released from incarceration. According to Marfia, Davis completed and signed form 8047 on five different occasions: February 15, 2009; December 12, 2009; September 1, 2010; October 29, 2015; and April 11, 2017. On each of those forms, Davis's initials appear next to the provision advising that he is required to reregister within five days of his release from incarceration.
Marfia further testified that when offenders come to the San Jose police station to register, they are taken to the fingerprinting unit where a data specialist assists them with printing out the necessary forms. One of these forms is the "8102," which is the "general sex registration department form." The 8102 is five pages long and includes the offender's name, addresses, phone numbers, next of kin, vehicle information, date of birth, height, weight, and other identifying information. The form also lists 23 requirements which the offender must read, acknowledge and separately initial, and each page includes a place for the offender's signature and thumbprint. If the offender indicates any sort of difficulty reading the form, a staff person at the police station or an offender's conservator, family member, or friend can read the conditions to them. Once the registration process—which includes filling out the forms, fingerprinting, and taking updated photographs (if necessary) of the offender—is completed, the forms and other materials are uploaded to the California Sex and Arson Registry (CSAR) and the local criminal justice database.
The record was unclear whether the form is labeled an "8102" or an "8102s" as both designations appear in the record. In this opinion, we presume "8102" is the singular and "8102s" is the plural.
Requirement 3 on the 8102 "addresses the Penal Code section that requires an offender to reregister with the police department if they've been in custody longer than 30 days." The requirement informs the offender "they have five business days from the time that they're released from custody to appear at a local law enforcement agency and reregister."
Marfia testified that Davis completed an 8102 with the San Jose police on August 25, 2014. Davis signed the form, thereby acknowledging that he had read it—or someone read it to him—and understood it. Davis's signature also served as an acknowledgement that it was his duty to know the registration requirements including any changes or updates to the law.
According to Marfia, Davis also completed 8102s on the following dates: July 24, 2014; June 23, 2014; May 27, 2014; April 28, 2014; March 27, 2014; and March 3, 2014.
Santa Clara County Deputy Sheriff Edward Durante testified that, in June 2017, he was informed by Davis's parole agent that Davis might not be in compliance with his sex offender registration requirement. At that time, Durante was assigned to the county's sexual assault felony enforcement task force, which monitors sex offenders within the county and "ensure[s] that sexual registrants are in compliance with the [Penal Code section] 290 registration law." Durante began investigating Davis's compliance and learned that Davis was in custody beginning on December 15, 2015 and had been released on April 11, 2017. Durante consulted the CSAR and reviewed the most recent 8102 on file for Davis, which was dated August 15, 2014. Based on that information, Durante determined that Davis had failed to register within five days of his release from custody on April 11, 2017.
The trial court took judicial notice of an exhibit, which was published to the jury, reflecting that Davis had four prior convictions for failing to register as a sex offender within five days of his release from custody (§ 290.015, subd. (a)) on November 23, 2009, March 25, 2010, August 21, 2015, and December 19, 2016.
2. Defense case
Davis testified on his own behalf. He attended public schools in San Jose but dropped out of high school after tenth grade and never obtained a GED. He was enrolled in special education classes starting in middle school.
After dropping out of school, Davis held a variety of jobs, including working at car washes, auto detailers, landscaping, and janitorial companies. All his jobs involved manual labor, and none involved working in an office or filling out paperwork. Over the previous decade, Davis estimated he had been incarcerated seven of those 10 years.
Davis remembered going to the San Jose police department on more than one occasion to update his sex offender registration. He recognized his signature on the 8102 dated August 15, 2014, but testified that he was not able to read it when he was at the police station. When Davis asked for assistance with the form, "they just backed off really quick and go [sic] sign this and get out of here." Davis recalled speaking with Durante about his registration but denied telling him that "somebody had read the forms to [him]."
Davis admitted that he had previously been convicted for failing to register within five days of his release from custody. In April 2017, when he was released from jail, he signed the 8047 form he was provided, but did not believe he needed to register on this occasion. Davis explained that his public defender had informed him that she had filed an appeal regarding his 2008 indecent exposure conviction. Based on what the public defender told him, Davis thought "it was up in the air and I didn't have to do anything." On cross-examination, Davis admitted that the public defender never specifically told him that he did not need to register, but he "assumed" that was the case. Davis testified that, at the time, he did not understand that an appeal did not relieve him of his obligation to register, but "[n]ow I do."
The parties stipulated that, at the time of trial, Davis's appeal from the 2008 misdemeanor conviction was "still pending before the Court of Appeals." This is incorrect. We have no record of any such appeal by Davis. Presumably his appeal had been filed and was pending in the Appellate Division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which would have jurisdiction over any appeal from the judgment of conviction in a misdemeanor case. (§ 1466.)
Dr. Martin Williams, a psychologist, testified as an expert in clinical psychology and intelligence testing. Based on his clinical interview with Davis and associated testing, Dr. Williams determined that Davis was in the "borderline intellectual functioning category," with "an intellectual impairment" but not "intellectual disability." Dr. Williams assessed Davis's "verbal expressive ability, writing ability, and vocabulary" as equivalent to that of a second or third grader. Davis was tested to see if he might be malingering, but Dr. Williams found no evidence that he was.
According to Dr. Williams, a hypothetical "66-year-old . . . nongraduate special education student . . . [with] borderline IQ . . . hearing problems and . . . an employment history . . . of car wash, waxing cars, landscaping, but . . . not . . . any kind of office or paperwork" would "likely . . . have difficulty organizing and understanding complex information." When such a person was presented with "an array of complex information, that individual is likely to fixate on one aspect, and act as if that one aspect is the whole story."
3. Rebuttal case
Durante testified that, when he spoke to Davis in June 2017 about his failure to register, Davis told him that "the sex registration forms had been read to him." On cross-examination, Durante confirmed that he recorded this conversation with Davis, but the recording of that interview was not played for the jury.
4. Verdict and sentencing
The jury found Davis guilty of failing to register as required by section 290.015, subdivision (a). In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the allegations that Davis had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and three prison prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
At the July 20, 2018 sentencing hearing, the trial court granted Davis's Romero motion and sentenced Davis to the middle term of two years. With Davis's 829 days of credits, consisting of 415 custody credits and 414 days of conduct credits (§ 4019), his sentence was deemed served. The trial court imposed a $600 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) and an additional $600 parole revocation restitution fine was imposed but suspended (§ 1202.45). The court further imposed a $40 court security fee (§ 1465.8), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $259.75 criminal justice administration fee payable to the Santa Clara County Sheriff (Gov. Code, §§ 29550, 29550.1, 29550.2), and a $250 presentence investigation fee (§ 1203.1, subd. (b)). Davis's fines and fees were deemed satisfied through application of his excess 99 days of credit, at $125 per day (§ 2900.5).
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Davis timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of prior convictions
Davis argues the trial court erred in admitting, under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b), his four prior convictions for failing to register within five days of his release from custody. He claims that, because he did not dispute the element of intent at trial, but instead raised the defense of mistake-of-fact, there was no justification for admitting these prior convictions. We disagree.
1. Relevant background
Before trial, the prosecution brought a motion in limine to introduce Davis's four prior convictions under section 290.015, subdivision (a), "to prove [his] knowledge" of the requirement that he register as a sex offender after his release from custody. Defense counsel objected, arguing the prior convictions were not sufficiently similar because in the present case, Davis did not register due to his belief that the pending appeal of the triggering offense relieved him of that obligation. Defense counsel also claimed the convictions should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 and that their admission would violate Davis's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court disagreed, ruling the prior convictions "go to the intent element . . . of the charged crime, and are also relevant to a defense of mistake by defendant." Citing Evidence Code section 352, the court continued that it did not "find that . . . there would be a substantial risk of undue prejudice confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury that outweighs the probative value" of the convictions.
Before deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of failure to register in violation of section 290.015, subdivision (a). Among the elements the prosecution had to prove was that Davis "actually knew he had a duty under Penal Code section 290 to register as a sex offender and that he had to register within five working days of release from incarceration."
The jury was also instructed on how to consider the evidence of Davis's prior convictions, as follows: "You may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the limited purposes of deciding whether: [¶] The defendant acted willfully in connection with the crime alleged . . . ; [¶] The defendant's alleged actions were not the result of mistake; . . . [¶] In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity between the uncharged offenses and the charged offense. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except for the limited purposes set forth above. [¶] Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime. [¶] Evidence of the uncharged offenses is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of willfully failing to register as a sex offender within five working days of release from incarceration. The People must still prove that offense, the crime charged in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt."
a. Standard of review and applicable legal principles
Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of propensity or disposition to engage in a specific conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person's conduct on a specified occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act may be admitted, however, not to prove predisposition to commit such an act, but rather to prove some other material fact, such as that person's intent or identity. (Id., § 1101, subd. (b).) In evaluating the relevance of other-crime evidence to determine its admissibility under section 1101, subdivision (b), it is important to identify the purpose for which the evidence is offered. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 406.) "The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent." (Id. at p. 402.) "We review the trial court's decision whether to admit evidence, including evidence of the commission of other crimes, for abuse of discretion." (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 841.)
b. Analysis
Here, the prosecution offered evidence of Davis's four prior convictions for failing to register within five days of his release from custody to demonstrate his knowledge of the registration requirement, thereby proving that his failure to register in this case was willful.
The California Supreme Court has held that a defendant accused of failing to register in violation of section 290 must "actually know of the duty to act. . . . [A] sex offender is guilty of a felony only if he 'willfully violates' the registration or notification provisions of section 290." (People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752.) "The word 'willfully' implies a 'purpose or willingness' to make the omission. [Citation.] Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act without knowing what act is required to be performed. As stated in People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 334, 'the term "willfully" . . . imports a requirement that "the person knows what he is doing." [Citation.] Consistent with that requirement, and in appropriate cases, knowledge has been held to be a concomitant of willfulness. [Fn. omitted.]' Accordingly, a violation of section 290 requires actual knowledge of the duty to register. A jury may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement." (Ibid.)
In his briefing on appeal, Davis suggests that he did not dispute the element of intent at trial, but rather presented only mistake-of-fact as a defense. That is not entirely true. Defense counsel's final argument addressed Davis's "mental state" several times, and even advised the jury that it would "have to . . . talk about and focus on element 3 of [CALCRIM No.] 1170" in the jury room. CALCRIM No. 1170 lists the elements of the crime of failing to register and "element 3" in that instruction is that "[t]he defendant actually knew he had a duty . . . to register as a sex offender and that he had to register within five working days of release from incarceration."
In addition, part of the defense case at trial was Dr. Williams' expert opinion that Davis was in the "borderline intellectual functioning category" with a verbal and writing ability equivalent to someone in second or third grade. The jury would certainly have evaluated Dr. Williams' testimony in considering not just Davis's mistake-of-fact defense but also whether Davis had sufficient intellectual ability to understand his duty to register in the first place.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Davis's prior convictions under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), as those convictions were relevant to the question of Davis's knowledge of the registration requirement.
a. Standard of review and applicable legal principles
Even where evidence of uncharged conduct is otherwise admissible, however, it must be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its potential to prejudice the fact finder against a party, to confuse the issues, or to consume undue amounts of time. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1130.) The trial court's decision to admit evidence over an Evidence Code section 352 objection is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 842.)
b. Analysis
In this case, the trial court expressly considered—and rejected—the idea that the risk of undue prejudice outweighed the probative value of the convictions, as it was required to do under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court took judicial notice of Davis's prior convictions, which were listed on a one-page document that was read into the record, and published to the jury, so the introduction of that evidence did not consume an undue amount of time. The evidence also was unlikely to provoke an emotional bias against Davis as the jury was simply provided the dates and court case numbers for each of his four convictions for failure to register under section 290.015, subdivision (a).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 352.
4. Due process
Having found no error in admitting Davis's prior convictions under Evidence Code sections 1101 or 352, Davis's claim that admission of this evidence violated his constitutional due process rights is without merit as well. (People v. Rocha (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1400.)
B. Davis's pretrial statement to police
Davis next argues that the trial court erred in precluding evidence of certain statements he made to Durante in June 2017 when he was interviewed about his failure to register. As he did below, Davis claims these statements were admissible under the rule of completeness (Evid. Code, § 356) and as prior consistent statements (Evid. Code, §§ 791, 1236). On appeal, he also expressly raises the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1250) as an additional bases for admitting the prior statements.
1. Background
After the defense rested, the prosecutor advised the court that it intended to recall Durante to the stand to rebut Davis's express denial that he had told Durante at his June 2017 interview that someone at the police station had read the registration forms to him when he previously filled them out. The prosecution indicated that it would ask Durante one question: Did Davis, during the 2017 interview, tell him " 'that these forms were read to him?' "
However, the prosecution objected to the defense presenting additional evidence from that June 2017 interview, stating "I do not believe [recalling Durante for this one] question and answer is opening the door to then revisiting an 11-minute interview of the defendant that talks about the various—a lot of different subjects that were not—that are not an appropriate subject for impeachment, or rehabilitating. [¶] I also think that it would be beyond the scope of rebuttal, given how little [sic] my rebuttal is going to be."
The trial court ruled it would allow the prosecution to recall Durante as a rebuttal witness but that did not "open[] the door or ma[k]e relevant the [defense's] proposed selection from the interview—the transcript of the interview." Accordingly, the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection. For purposes of appeal, the court allowed defense counsel to file two court exhibits: (1) a transcript of part of the June 2017 interview; and (2) and an audio recording of that interview.
Defense counsel argued that because the prosecution's rebuttal evidence consisted of a prior inconsistent statement by Davis, thereby calling into question his credibility, it was important that the defense have an opportunity to rehabilitate that credibility. To that end, the defense wished to introduce a portion of the June 2017 interview where Davis told Durante he did not think he had to register because his case was on appeal. Defense counsel offered three arguments in favor of admissibility: (1) as a prior consistent statement regarding Davis's motive; (2) for the "nonhearsay purpose of showing Mr. Davis's demeanor in terms of his tone, the content of his speech, so that the jury can use it to consider his credibility"; and (3) under the rule of completeness set forth in Evidence Code section 356.
The trial court found that the defense evidence was not a "prior consistent statement" because it was not addressing the same subject—whether Davis told Durante that someone at the police station had read the registration forms to him—as the inconsistent statement the prosecution was introducing as rebuttal. As for Davis's "demeanor," the trial court ruled that the evidence was beyond the scope of rebuttal, not relevant, and excludable under Evidence Code section 352.
Finally, the trial court ruled that the evidence could not come in under the rule of completeness because the evidence that Davis told Durante that he believed that the pending appeal meant he did not have to register has no connection to the subject matter of what the prosecution was introducing, i.e., whether the registration forms were read to Davis.
2. Standard of review
We review claims of evidentiary error for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.)
a. Prior consistent statement
Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b) provides for the admissibility of a witness's prior consistent statement if it is offered after an "implied charge has been made that [the witness's] testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated . . . and the statement was made before the . . . motive for fabrication . . . is alleged to have arisen." Even though a defendant may have multiple motives to testify untruthfully, if the evidence suggests a recent motive to fabricate, a defendant's prior consistent statement is admissible to show that the recent motive did not affect his or her testimony. (People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1014, disapproved on another ground by People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, fn. 13.)
Davis's argument that the court should have admitted his statement to Durante fails because the prosecution never suggested, either expressly or impliedly, that any motive for him to testify untruthfully was formed after he made that statement. (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 609 [admissibility hinges on motive or bias ascribed by opposing party].) On direct examination, Davis testified he did not believe he was required to register because his public defender told him that his 2008 conviction for the registrable offense was on appeal. On cross-examination, the prosecutor did not suggest that Davis was lying about what his public defender told him. Instead, the prosecutor elicited Davis's admission that his public defender never specifically said the words: "You can stop registering." Instead, she made more generalized statements such as " 'From this point on I got you' " and "everything is 'up in the air' " which Davis assumed meant that he did not need to register. At most, the prosecutor's cross-examination strongly suggested that Davis's interpretation of the public defender's statements was unreasonable, not that he was lying about what she told him. Such a suggestion alone was not a basis for admitting prior consistent statements.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis's request to present evidence of his statement to Durante under Evidence Code section 791.
b. Rule of completeness
Evidence Code section 356 provides, in relevant part, "Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; . . . and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence." "The purpose of this section is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed." (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 156.)
"Application of Evidence Code section 356 hinges on the requirement that the two portions of a statement be 'on the same subject.' " (People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 861, disapproved on another ground by People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104.) "[Section 356] permits the introduction of statements that are necessary for the understanding of, or to give context to, statements already introduced." (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 458, disapproved on another ground in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919-920.)
Here, Davis wished to admit a statement about why he believed he did not need to register, but that statement would not help the jury understand or place in context the testimony that Durante offered—that Davis in fact told him someone had read the registration forms to him. Davis's evidence was not related to the prosecution's rebuttal evidence and accordingly the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 356 in excluding it.
c. State of mind and ineffective assistance of counsel
The Attorney General notes that defense counsel did not expressly argue at trial that Davis's statements to Durante were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and contends that he has therefore forfeited the argument on appeal. Apparently anticipating the possibility that the argument was forfeited, Davis filed a supplemental opening brief in which he contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not sufficiently making clear this alternative basis for admitting the evidence. We will assume that the state of mind argument was forfeited and proceed to analyze Davis's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
"Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel." (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must establish both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) The deficient performance component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" "under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at p. 688.) "If the record 'sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,' an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected 'unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.' " (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.)
With respect to prejudice, a defendant must show "there is a reasonable probability"—meaning "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"—"that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) We "need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed." (Id. at p. 697.)
On this record, Davis cannot show a reasonable probability that, had his statement to Durante been admitted, the result of the trial would have been different. Davis testified at trial about his conversation with his public defender who told him "we have an appeal going on" and "everything was in the air" which he interpreted to mean that he did not need to register. The jury also heard Davis testify, on cross-examination, that his public defender never expressly told him "you can stop registering" but that he simply "assumed" he did not need to while the case was on appeal. The jury obviously did not believe Davis's testimony, especially given his admission that this was based entirely on his own assumption, as opposed to any specific instruction from his public defender.
The jury had other reasons to doubt Davis's credibility. The jurors were informed that Davis had four prior felony convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, and they were expressly instructed that they could consider those convictions in evaluating Davis's credibility. In addition, Durante's rebuttal testimony directly contradicted Davis's testimony that no one at the police station read the registration forms to him before he initialed and signed them in August 2014. Under these circumstances, there was no reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a favorable verdict had the evidence been admitted under the state of mind exception or any other evidentiary theory.
As a result, we find no merit to Davis's ineffective assistance of counsel argument.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Premo, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Greenwood, P.J. /s/_________
Elia, J.