Opinion
May 11, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (DeLury, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's conviction arises, inter alia, from the sale of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer. The defendant initiated the subject purchase, although she only knew the undercover officer who was the buyer from one previous drug transaction. The defendant took the undercover officer to a premises where drugs were sold, took money from the undercover officer, and returned with the crack cocaine.
The defendant unpersuasively argues that the People have failed to disprove her agency defense beyond a reasonable doubt and, further, contends that the trial court's agency charge was erroneous. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant's conduct evinced a sufficient indicia of "[s]alesman-like behavior" (People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78, 85, cert denied 439 U.S. 958) for the jury to determine that she was neither a mere extension of the undercover officer nor acting only in his interest (see, People v. Andujas, 79 N.Y.2d 113; People v Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45, 53, cert denied sub nom. Hahn-DiGuiseppe v New York, 439 U.S. 930; People v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 N.Y.2d 64, 75, cert denied 439 U.S. 935). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15).
The trial court's agency charge, when read as a whole, was not prejudicial to the defendant and was entirely proper (see, People v. Lam Lek Chong, supra; People v. Roche, supra; People v Pierce, 112 A.D.2d 527, 529). Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.