Opinion
NO. 4-12-0520
05-13-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLLIE J. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Adams County
No. 10CF19
Honorable
William O. Mays,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief was properly dismissed because defendant did not assert an error for which habeas relief may be granted. ¶ 2 In April 2012, defendant, Rollie J. Davis, an inmate, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under the Habeas Corpus Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/10-101 et seq. (West 2010)). Defendant, who pled guilty to a later offense of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A-3(a) (West 2010)), alleged he was improperly convicted of an enhanced offense when the State failed to prove he committed an earlier offense of retail theft. The trial court found it lacked jurisdiction over defendant's petition and dismissed it. ¶ 3 On appeal, defendant, appearing pro se, reasserts the arguments made in his petition. The State argued defendant's habeas corpus petition failed to make a claim cognizable under the Act. We agree with the State and affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In January 2010, defendant was charged with a subsequent offense of retail theft, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/16A-3(a) (West 2010)). The State alleged in the information defendant had previously been convicted of theft over $300 in July 1994. ¶ 6 In August 2010, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty in three cases, including this retail-theft case. The two other offenses to which defendant pled guilty were obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West 2008)) (case No. 10-CF-218), a Class 4 felony, and theft over $300 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (b)(4) (West 2008)) (case No. 10-CF-481), a Class 3 felony. Defendant was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for retail theft and to concurrent terms of three years' imprisonment for obstructing justice and theft over $300. The retail-theft sentence was ordered served consecutively to the concurrent three-year terms. Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. ¶ 7 In April 2012, defendant filed his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief. Defendant alleged he was being unlawfully held because the State failed to prove the prior conviction, used to enhance the retail-theft offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony, beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant alleged the assistant State's Attorney failed to file a certified copy of his prior conviction and did not produce a positive identification of defendant as having been the same person who committed the prior offense. Defendant further maintained he had not been convicted of a Class 4 felony or greater in the 10 years before the retail-theft offense was committed. Defendant argued his felony conviction must be vacated and he should be sentenced as having committed a Class A misdemeanor or he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. ¶ 8 On May 16, 2012, the trial court sua sponte determined it lacked jurisdiction over defendant's claim and struck his pleadings. This pro se appeal followed.
¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling, not by arguing the dismissal itself was improper, but by essentially reasserting the allegations made in his pro se petition. In response, the State maintains the following: (1) defendant may be released from imprisonment before the appeal is decided and the issue, therefore, may be moot; (2) defendant has not made a claim cognizable under the Act; and (3) defendant's case fails on the merits. ¶ 11 We begin with the State's argument defendant's appeal may be moot. When the State filed its brief on October 9, 2012, the State alleged defendant's projected date to begin mandatory supervised release was October 29, 2012. The State, citing Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430, 704 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1998), maintained, because the habeas corpus procedure is unavailable to individuals serving mandatory supervised release, the issue may be moot. ¶ 12 Defendant's appeal is not moot. Since the State filed its brief, defendant's projected parole date has changed. The website for the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) indicates the projected date for the start of mandatory supervised release is September 24, 2013. Defendant remains a prisoner for which habeas corpus relief may be appropriate. See Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at 430, 704 N.E.2d at 351 (observing habeas corpus is available to obtain the release of a prisoner who was imprisoned by a court that lacked jurisdiction or who is entitled to release due to some occurrence subsequent to his conviction). ¶ 13 The State also argues defendant's claim is not recognized by the Act. We agree. Section 10-124 of the Act (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2010)) provides seven grounds upon which a prisoner may be granted habeas corpus relief. These grounds fall into two categories: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the prisoner, or (2) some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction entitled the prisoner to release. People v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205, 792 N.E.2d 1266, 1270 (2001). If a prisoner's claim does not fall within either of these categories, habeas corpus relief is inappropriate even if the prisoner alleges he was denied his constitutional rights. People v. Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d 524, 528, 825 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (2005). ¶ 14 In this case, defendant raises a challenge to his conviction and sentence. He does not assert the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him or the subject-matter of his conviction. He does not argue an event occurred after his conviction that entitles him to release. The Act does not afford defendant relief. His petition was properly dismissed. ¶ 15 The trial court dismissed defendant's petition upon concluding it lacked jurisdiction over defendant's habeas corpus petition. The State concedes the court erred in this decision, because defendant filed his petition in the county in which he was sentenced. See 735 ILCS 5/10-103 (West 2010). Even if the trial court erred in its analysis, we may affirm the dismissal on any grounds appearing in the record. See Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 61, 896 N.E.2d 327, 333 (2008). Defendant failed to state a claim recognizable under the Act, and his habeas corpus petition was properly dismissed.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 We affirm the trial court's judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. ¶ 18 Affirmed.