"¶ 41 In People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835 (1992), the defendant argued "it was improper for the prosecution to suggest that the police officers' testimony was more credible because of their official position in the community and, more specifically, that it was improper for the prosecution to comment that the police officers would not risk their careers, reputations, andpensions in order to frame [the] defendant.
Thus, in our view, the door would have remained closed to any otherwise improper bolstering arguments by the State. The cases of People v. Williams, 289 Ill. App. 3d 24 (1997), and People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835 (1992), on which the State relies, do not mandate a contrary finding. Contrary to the State's understanding of the case, Davis never held that a defendant's challenge to the credibility of police officers necessarily opened the door to otherwise improper bolstering in the State's argument.
Thus, in our view, the door would have remained closed to any otherwise improper bolstering arguments by the State. The cases of People v. Williams, 289 Ill. App. 3d 24 (1997), and People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835 (1992), on which the State relies, do not mandate a contrary finding. Contrary to the State's understanding of the case, Davis never held that a defendant's challenge to the credibility of police officers necessarily opened the door to otherwise improper bolstering in the State's argument.
The cases of People v. Williams, 289 Ill. App. 3d 24 (1997), and People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835 (1992), on which the State relies, do not mandate a contrary finding. Contrary to the State's understanding of the case, Davis never held that a defendant's challenge to the credibility of police officers necessarily opened the door to otherwise improper bolstering in the State's argument.
However, in reviewing the propriety of a particular comment in closing argument, courts will consider that comment in the context of the entire closing arguments of both the State and the defendant ( People v. Moss, 260 Ill. App.3d 272, 281, 630 N.E.2d 850 (1993)), and a defendant may not claim prejudice from a prosecutor's comments when the defendant's earlier argument invited those comments ( People v. Richardson, 123 Ill.2d 322, 356, 528 N.E.2d 612 (1988)). For example, in People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App.3d 835, 593 N.E.2d 766 (1992), the court held that comments similar to those at issue in this case did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The defense had challenged the officers' testimony by arguing that the jury did not need to believe something had happened just because an officer had said that it had.
Parenthetically, we note that the mere fact that defendant's second trial ended with the jury deadlocked does not compel us to find the evidence closely balanced here. People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835, 840 (1992) ("Although defendant's first trial resulted in a hungjury, that fact alone would not necessarily compel us to view the evidence in the subsequent trial as closely balanced.").
However, although defendant's first trial resulted in a hung jury, we are not compelled to view the evidence in the subsequent trial as closely balanced. People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835, 840 (1992). Defendant argues that the evidence was closely balanced because it was a credibility contest between Y.H. and defendant as to whether she consented to the sexual intercourse.
Additionally, our supreme court and this court have found that this particular challenged statement, though improper, is not of a sort likely to inflame the passions of the jury so as to constitute reversible error. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 23; People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835, 841 (1992) (State's remark that officers would not risk careers to frame defendant "did not unfairly play upon the jury's sympathies" where defendant's trial strategy was to make the credibility of the officers a dispositive issue). We also note that, although Appel was the State's only occurrence witness, the inconsistent testimony about the time he started his shift and the location of stores near the scene of his arrest did not destroy his credibility.
Moreover, because challenged comments are reviewed in the context of the entire closing argument, even remarks generally considered improper may in fact be a proper response to the arguments of defense counsel. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839-41 (1992) (holding that where the prosecutor argued that police officers would not risk their careers, pensions and reputations to frame the defendant, such remarks did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because they were a proper response to defense counsel's attack on the police officers' credibility). "[A] defendant may not claim prejudice from a prosecutor's comments when the defendant's earlier argument invited those comments." Williams, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 36. ¶ 73 With these principles in mind, we examine the statements challenged by Selvie.
We are mindful that when a defendant's strategy is to challenge the credibility of the police or prosecutors, then it is appropriate for the State to respond that neither the police nor the prosecutors would risk their careers to frame the defendant. People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835, 841 (1992). The State gave a lengthy closing argument incorrectly asserting that defense counsel characterized Page and Perry as liars.