Although the court's findings might very well support a reasonable belief defendant's purse contained something she did not want the officers to find, perhaps even something illegal, that is an entirely different question than whether the facts and circumstances supported a reasonable belief she was armed and dangerous. ¶ 41 In People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 577, 286 Ill.Dec. 882, 815 N.E.2d 92, 94 (2004), two Elgin, Illinois, police officers initiated a Terry stop of the juvenile defendant because he was riding a bicycle at night without a light (see 625 ILCS 5/11–1507(a) (West 2002)). While the officers were questioning him, “defendant appeared nervous.

To justify a protective patdown, the State must demonstrate that "a reasonably prudent person, when faced with the circumstances that the police confronted, would have believed that his safety or the safety of others was in danger." People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 580, 286 Ill.Dec. 882, 815 N.E.2d 92 (2004). Since the record discloses bizarre behavior by defendant in a high-crime area, we find that the officers had a reasonable concern about their safety and the safety of others in their vicinity.

To justify a frisk," 'the officer must reasonably believe that the defendant is armed and dangerous.'" Shipp, 2015 IL App (2d) 130587, ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 580 (2004)). This means that" 'a reasonably prudent person, when faced with the circumstances that the police confronted, would have believed that his safety or the safety of others was in danger.'"

Unlike the improper searches in Flowers and Holliday, nothing in the record herein indicates that the detective was engaged in any exploratory search or that the pat-down of defendant was part of any routine. See also Walker, 2013 IL App (4th) 120118, ¶ 51 (where detective "never testified he searched the [defendant's] purse as a protective measure before allowing defendant to retrieve her identification" but "[r]ather, [the detective's] curiosity was piqued about what was in the purse," the appellate court concluded that the detective's "curiosity does not justify a Terry search"). ¶ 41 Citing People v. Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d 576 (2004), defendant contends that "anxiousness does not create a reasonable belief that someone is armed with a weapon." In Davis, the defendant was observed riding his bicycle at nighttime without a light, in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

725 ILCS 5/108-1.01 (West 2008); People v. Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580 (2004). Here, even if the stop had been proper, the police had no grounds to conduct a frisk. ¶ 43 In order to frisk a defendant for weapons, "the officer must reasonably believe that the defendant is armed and dangerous."

This is an objective standard that is satisfied if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person in that situation would believe that his or her safety or the safety of others is in danger. People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 580, 286 Ill.Dec. 882, 815 N.E.2d 92 (2004). Likewise, the sole fact that a person has been properly detained as a suspect in a crime such as burglary does not automatically grant an officer the right to conduct a search.

During a Terry stop, an officer may frisk a person for weapons where the officer reasonably believes that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. People v. Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580 (2004). "This reasonable belief is met if a reasonably prudent person, when faced with the circumstances that the police confronted, would have believed that his safety or the safety of others was in danger."

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to quash an arrest and suppress evidence, we apply a dual standard of review. People v. Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d 576, 579 (2004). We accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings and reverse those conclusions only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

and Officer Zeman testified that in his experience, defendant's behavior was unusual. See Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 25; cf. People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 581-83 (2004) (finding the officer had no reason to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, where the defendant was compliant with the officer's requests, it was not a high-crime area, the defendant only exhibited some nervousness, and he could have placed his hand in his pocket for any number of innocent reasons).

In addition, it was late evening, officers were patrolling the area due to a gang conflict resulting in several shootings, and Officer Zeman testified that in his experience, defendant's behavior was unusual. See Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 25; cf. People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 581-83 (2004) (finding the officer had no reason to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, where the defendant was compliant with the officer's requests, it was not a high-crime area, the defendant only exhibited some nervousness, and he could have placed his hand in his pocket for any number of innocent reasons).