Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SA052588. Antonio Barreto, Jr., Judge.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
Eric Davidson appeals from convictions on charges of identity theft and possession of a forged driver’s license. He contends the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence found by police as a result of a search of his person and his car. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The information charged Davidson with two counts of identity theft in violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) (counts 1 and 2), and two counts of possession of a forged driver’s license in violation of section 470b (counts 3 and 4). The information further alleged as to all counts that Davidson was convicted of seven prior felonies within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Davidson pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations. A jury convicted Davidson on all counts and found the prior conviction allegations true. The court sentenced Davidson to an aggregate term of 10 years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three years for count 1, consecutive terms of eight months each on counts 2 through 4, and five consecutive one-year terms pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), after finding that two of Davidson’s seven prior felony convictions overlapped with others. The court also imposed various statutory fines and fees.
Before trial, Davidson moved to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5, claiming that the warrantless search was unreasonable and unlawful. The court denied his motion after an evidentiary hearing, at which Davidson, one of the arresting officers, and other witnesses testified.
The testimony at the hearing showed the following facts: At approximately 9:20 p.m. on January 24, 2004, Culver City police officer Bellante, while on patrol with his partner, officer Treanor, observed a Pontiac Grand Am, driven by Davidson, following another car too closely. Davidson then switched lanes, cutting off a car. Bellante heard loud music coming from Davidson’s car. Bellante stopped Davidson for three traffic violations: Vehicle Code section 21703 (following too closely), Vehicle Code section 22107 (unsafe lane change), and Vehicle Code section 27007 (use of a music amplification system audible from a distance of fifty feet or more). (Davidson testified that he was not pulled over by the officers, but rather that he pulled into a parking lot to meet a friend and “suddenly” he saw a police car parked about 25 feet away.)
Davidson said his name was “Timothy Burns” and gave Bellante a North Carolina driver’s license with that name on it. Bellante ran a D.M.V. check on the license and found no record on file for it. He also noticed that the D.M.V. hologram on the license was faded and the picture and bar code appeared to be off-center, leading him to believe that the license was not genuine.
Davidson showed objective symptoms of being under the influence of a stimulant—his pupils were excessively dilated and nonreactive to light, he talked “a lot” and could not stand still, he licked his mouth as if it were dry, and his forehead was sweating, even though it was a “cool evening.”
Because Davidson appeared to be under the influence of a narcotic and had provided a suspicious-looking driver’s license, officer Treanor decided to search Davidson and his vehicle “for evidence of narcotic use and additional identification to confirm his true identity.” He first asked Davidson if he had anything illegal in his possession or in his car, and Davidson responded, “No.” Treanor asked for permission to search Davidson’s car, and Davidson replied, “Sure. Go ahead. I don’t have anything illegal.” (Davidson claims that he did not give permission for the search.)
In Bellante’s presence, Treanor conducted a search of Davidson’s person. He recovered a driver’s license in the name of “Roshon Loud,” whom Davidson claimed was his girlfriend. However, Davidson said he did not know her last name and did not know where she lived other than the street name.
A search of Davidson’s car revealed copper wire mesh, which Bellante believed, based on his training and experience, was used for smoking rock cocaine. Davidson admitted that he smokes rock cocaine but claimed that the last time he had done so was three weeks earlier. When asked to take a urine drug test, he replied, “We both know that I will piss dirty.”
Upon searching Davidson a second time, Bellante recovered a rock cocaine pipe from his front right jacket pocket and a Visa credit card in the name of “Kris Houghtaling” from his back right jeans pocket. Bellante then placed Davidson under arrest for being under the influence of a narcotic in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a), and for possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364. As the officers attempted to handcuff Davidson, he grew “very tense,” and there was a brief struggle before he was taken into custody.
A further search of Davidson revealed a wallet containing two credit cards in the name of “Timothy Burns.” The wallet also contained receipts showing transactions made at Bank of America and Hammonds Oil under the name “Kris Houghtaling.” A search of a jacket located inside Davidson’s car revealed two lost property reports and a burglary report filed with the Los Angeles Police Department, as well as an envelope containing nine separate forms of identification in different names—two of which had a picture that appeared to be Davidson’s. Later, a booking search revealed another rock cocaine pipe.
DISCUSSION
Davidson argues that the officers lacked probable cause to stop and detain him, rendering the subsequent search and seizure invalid under the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.
“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, whether express or implied, if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine the relevant legal principles and apply those principles in evaluating the reasonableness of the search based on the facts as found by the trial court. [Citations.]” (People v. Mays (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 972.)
As Davidson acknowledges, “[i]f there is conflicting testimony, we must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluations of credibility, and the version of events most favorable to the People, to the extent the record supports them. [Citations.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) The trial court expressly found Bellante’s testimony more credible than Davidson’s. Because Bellante’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence of the facts to which he testified, we must accept his version of the facts, despite Davidson’s testimony to the contrary.
“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” (Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354.) It follows that an officer who observes the commission of a minor criminal offense in his presence has sufficient legal justification for the lesser intrusion of a traffic stop. “Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.” (Henry v. United States (1959) 361 U.S. 98, 102.)
Bellante testified that he stopped Davidson “to issue a citation” after witnessing Davidson violate three different Vehicle Code provisions. Davidson contends that the officers never intended to cite him for traffic violations and therefore had no probable cause to stop him. He infers that, instead, “the officers stopped appellant for innocuous traffic infractions, in essence, just because they wanted to see who they were dealing with.” The argument fails because the record contains substantial evidence (namely, Bellante’s testimony) that Bellante “stopped the vehicle to issue a citation.” In any case, as Davidson acknowledges, the actual motives of the officers are irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. (Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138; People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 733.) A traffic stop is lawful if the “‘circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the officer’s] action.’” (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813, quoting Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 138.) Here, the circumstances of Davidson’s numerous traffic infractions, viewed objectively, justified the stop.
Davidson also argues that the officers lacked probable cause to detain him because there is a “lesser degree of criminality associated with traffic violations.” The argument fails because an officer may “without violating the Fourth Amendment” arrest an individual who has committed “even a very minor criminal offense in his presence.” (Atwater v. Lago Vista, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 354.) Given that in Atwater the appellant’s failure to wear a seatbelt justified her arrest, any of Davidson’s three traffic infractions provided Bellante and Treanor a valid reason to detain him.
Davidson’s only argument concerning the search is that “[t]he warrantless search was presumptively unreasonable... unless there was reasonable cause for the seizure.” Because we have already rejected all of Davidson’s arguments that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, Davidson’s argument concerning the search fails as well.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: CHANEY, J., JOHNSON, J.