People v. David Mabeus

13 Citing cases

  1. Mabeus v. Colvin

    Civ. No. 9:16-CV-1141 (GTS/DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 27, 2018)

    Following this hearing, the Judicial Hearing Officer found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and recommended that Petitioner's suppression motion be denied. People v. Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1448 (3d Dep't 2009).

  2. People v. Mabeus

    68 A.D.3d 1557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 16 times

    Malone Jr., J. The relevant facts are more fully set forth in our prior decisions in this matter ( 63 AD3d 1447; 47 AD3d 1073). Briefly, defendant was charged in an eight-count indictment with various theft-related crimes following the August 2003 armed robbery of a McDonald's restaurant in Schenectady County. After County Court denied his request for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing, defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree, without waiving his right to appeal, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison and five years of postrelease supervision. Upon defendant's initial appeal to this Court, we withheld decision pending completion of a Mapp/Dunaway hearing to further develop the record regarding, among other things, the circumstances surrounding the application for a search warrant authorizing the installation of a global positioning system (hereinafter GPS) tracking device on defendant's vehicle and that of his live-in girlfriend, the execution thereof and the manner in which the physical evidence sought to be suppressed was recovered ( 47 AD3d at 1075).

  3. People v. Myhand

    120 A.D.3d 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 17 times

    rant application was not sufficient without resorting to any hearsay evidence provided by CI–1 and UP, we conclude that the hearsay information contained in the search warrant application passed the Aguilar–Spinelli test and could thus be used to establish probable cause for the search warrant. It is well established that “[p]robable cause may be supplied, in whole or part, through hearsay information ... New York's present law applies the Aguilar–Spinelli rule for evaluating secondhand information and holds that if probable cause is based on hearsay statements, the police must establish that the informant had some basis for the knowledge he [or she] transmitted to them and that he [or she] was reliable” (Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451; see Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d at 639, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55, 524 N.E.2d 409). “Notably, where the information is based upon double hearsay, the foregoing requirements must be met with respect to each individual providing information” (People v. Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1450, 885 N.Y.S.2d 363, citing People v. Ketcham, 93 N.Y.2d 416, 421, 690 N.Y.S.2d 874, 712 N.E.2d 1238 and People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342, 347–348, 610 N.Y.S.2d 464, 632 N.E.2d 870). “ ‘If the affidavit rests on hearsay—an informant's report—what is necessary under Aguilar is one of two things: the informant must declare either (1) that he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay, but there is good reason for believing it ’ ” (Parris, 83 N.Y.2d at 347, 610 N.Y.S.2d 464, 632 N.E.2d 870, quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637).

  4. Oseni v. Mahoney

    16-CV-8743 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 18, 2024)

    The purpose of a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is to develop the record concerning the circumstances surrounding the gathering of evidence obtained by the police during a search and seizure of a defendant. People v. Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2009). On March 23, 2010, Goode pled guilty to robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent determinate terms of imprisonment of seven years, along with five years of post-release supervision.

  5. People v. Merritt

    218 A.D.3d 1058 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    such circumstances, a CI's reliability and the basis of his or her knowledge need not be assessed, as the statement is in and of itself sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant" (People v Cowan, 177 A.D.3d 1173, 1175 [3d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1127 [2020]). However, recognizing that the sworn statement is not contained in the record on appeal, we have reviewed the transcript of the Darden hearing, which reflects that the information provided to the police by the CI was based upon personal interactions with defendant, "the most reliable demonstration of the basis for a CI's knowledge" (id. [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see People v Patterson, 199 A.D.3d 1072, 1073 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1163 [2022]), and was confirmed by police surveillance of the drug operations (see People v Jackson, 189 A.D.3d 1705, 1706 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1098 [2021]; People v Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1452 [3d Dept 2009]).

  6. People v. Spirito

    216 A.D.3d 1208 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Defendant thus argues that, under the circumstances of this case, the search of his residence was not based upon reasonable suspicion. That said, "[a]n informant's tip may provide the basis for a warrantless search... if the informant (1) is reliable and (2) has some 'basis for the knowledge' justifying [the] conclusion that the subject of the tip was involved in illegal activity" (People v Dunn, 170 A.D.2d 773, 775 [3d Dept 1991], quoting People v Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423 [1985]; see People v Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1450 [3d Dept 2009]; People v Vann, 245 A.D.2d 818, 819 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 945 [1998], lv dismissed 91 N.Y.2d 978 [1998]). "The 'basis of knowledge' requirement, focusing on the trustworthiness of the information, can be satisfied either by the informant's own description of underlying circumstances personally observed or, failing this, by police investigation that corroborates defendant's actions or develops information consistent with detailed predictions by the informant" (People v O'Donnell, 146 A.D.2d 923, 924-925 [3d Dept 1989], quoting People v Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 423-424).

  7. People v. Graham

    215 A.D.3d 998 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 12 times

    The affidavits submitted by law enforcement in connection with the warrant applications included information from two confidential informants (hereinafter CIs) who recounted an October 2017 discussion with Knox in which she indicated that relevant evidence was buried under her residence. Insofar as the CIs gave consistent accounts of the conversation and revealed certain information that had already been independently corroborated by law enforcement, County Court did not err in concluding that the warrant applications sufficiently established the CIs’ basis of knowledge and reliability (seePeople v. Myhand, 120 A.D.3d 970, 974, 991 N.Y.S.2d 222 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 952, 7 N.Y.S.3d 281, 30 N.E.3d 172 [2015]; People v. Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1452, 885 N.Y.S.2d 363 [3d Dept. 2009] ). In any event, the warrant applications provided probable cause for issuance of the warrants independent of the information provided by the CIs.

  8. People v. Jackson

    189 A.D.3d 1705 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 12 times

    In the application, a police officer attested that the information supplied by this CI was confirmed by an investigation conducted by police officers, including that two other CIs provided corroborative information regarding having purchased drugs in a similar manner and location, near defendant's vehicle and from a person matching defendant's general description. Thus, in addition to the officer's attestation that the first CI had provided credible information to the police in the past, information gleaned from the police investigation established that the first CI was reliable (seePeople v. Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1450–1452, 885 N.Y.S.2d 363 [2009] ; People v. Tocci, 52 A.D.3d 541, 541–542, 859 N.Y.S.2d 719 [2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 858, 872 N.Y.S.2d 81, 900 N.E.2d 564 [2008] ). The application also revealed that the CI recently participated in a controlled drug buy involving defendant and one of his dealers, thereby establishing the CI's basis of knowledge, which was further elucidated during the Darden hearing.

  9. People v. Gomez

    162 A.D.3d 1311 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 9 times

    The court properly determined that the warrant applications, read together, established the confidential informant's reliability and basis of knowledge. The informant had previously provided information that police had substantiated in another investigation, and the information in this case was based on the informant's direct contact with defendant through text messages, which the authoring police officer had seen (seePeople v. Mabeus, 63 A.D.3d 1447, 1450–1452, 885 N.Y.S.2d 363 [2009] ). Given defendant's criminal history, the serious nature of the crime and the fact that he agreed to the sentence as part of his plea bargain, we do not find that his sentence is harsh or excessive.

  10. People v. Bartholomew

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 7112 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

    se to believe that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur (see generally People v Mercado, 68 NY2d 874, 877, cert denied 479 US 1095), and there is sufficient evidence from which to form a reasonable belief that evidence of the crime may be found inside the location sought to be searched (see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423). It is equally well settled that, under New York law, "[p]robable cause may be supplied, in whole or part, through hearsay information . . . New York's present law applies the Aguilar-Spinelli rule for evaluating secondhand information and holds that if probable cause is based on hearsay statements, the police must establish that the informant had some basis for the knowledge he [or she] transmitted to them and that he [or she] was reliable" (id.; see People v Griminger, 71 NY2d 635, 639). "Notably, where the information is based upon double hearsay, the foregoing requirements must be met with respect to each individual providing information" (People v Mabeus, 63 AD3d 1447, 1450; see People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 421; People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 347-348). Here, although an identified citizen is presumed to be reliable and thus the information submitted in support of the warrant application met that prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test (see Parris, 83 NY2d at 349-350; People v Holmes, 115 AD3d 1179, 1180-1181, lv denied 23 NY3d 1038), the application failed to establish the basis of knowledge of the ultimate source of the information in the warrant application.