Opinion
2007-1070 S CR.
Decided November 20, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (William Burke, J.), rendered June 13, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his guilty plea, of stalking in the third degree.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
RUDOLPH, P.J., McCABE and MOLIA, JJ.
Defendant was convicted of stalking in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.50). He contends that the information charging him with that offense is jurisdictionally defective. The information alleged that on February 14, 2007, defendant,
"with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm a specific person, intentionally engaged in a course of conduct directed at such person which was likely to cause person [ sic] to reasonably fear physical injury or serious physical injury, the commission of a sex offense against, or . . . unlawful imprisonment . . . of such person . . . in that defendant . . . showed up at [the complainant's] place of employment several times and told her that she was in danger. [The complainant] changed her job to another town and [defendant] showed up there on her first day placing her in fear of a physical or sexual attack."
The information was supported by defendant's sworn statement and the complainant's deposition, which clearly show that defendant specifically sought out contact with the complainant, at her place of employment, on numerous occasions between February 10, 2007 and February 21, 2007. In her deposition, the complainant expressed her fear of defendant due to his conduct and her concern that he might physically hurt or sexually attack her.
As this court stated in People v Prevete ( 10 Misc 3d 78 , 79-80 [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists 2005]):
"Accusatory instruments are to be accorded a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading and will be upheld so long as they serve the fundamental purposes of providing the accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense' and in a form sufficiently detailed to prevent a subsequent retrial for the same offense ( People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; People v Sylla , 7 Misc 3d 8 , 10 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2005]). Moreover, proof of states of mind, such as guilty knowledge or intent, absent a confession, are normally based on circumstantial evidence ( e.g. People v Johnson, 65 NY2d 556, 561 [1985]; People v Mackey, 49 NY2d 274, 279 [1980]; People v Collins, 178 AD2d 789, 789 [1991]), and for pleading purposes, the requisite mental state may be alleged on the basis of a logical implication of the act itself or upon the surrounding circumstances ( e.g. People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1997]; People v McGee, 204 AD2d 353 [1994]; People v Ramnauth , 8 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50968[U] [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists 2005])."
We find that the allegations of the factual portion of the information contain facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge of stalking in the third degree which, along with the supporting depositions, provide reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the offense charged ( see CPL100.15, 100.40). The factual allegations establish, if true, every element of the crime of stalking in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.50), provide defendant with sufficient notice to prepare a defense, and are adequately detailed to prevent him from being tried twice for the same offense ( see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360; Prevete, 10 Misc 3d 78; People v Sylla , 7 Misc 3d 8 , 10 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2005]).
Since defendant pleaded guilty with the understanding that he would receive the sentence that was thereafter imposed, he has no basis to now complain that the sentence was harsh and excessive ( see People v Kazepis, 101 AD2d 816).
Rudolph, P.J., McCabe and Molia, JJ., concur.