Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is properly before us, we find that the commissioner in this case did not irrationally infer that a blowjob referred to an act of prostitution. In People v. Darling (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 361 N.E.2d 121, the evidence indicated a police officer offered $25 to defendant "for a straight blow job." Although the court did not address the same issue presented in this case, the court nonetheless equated the term "blow job" with an act of prostitution. ( 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 700, 361 N.E.2d 121, 123.)
See 96 A.L.R.2d at 1295, 1329. In People v. Darling, 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 361 N.E.2d 121 (1977), the court held the trial court did not commit error even though the defendant was not allowed allocution as provided by statute because her attorney was given the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation and suggest sentencing alternatives; the defendant did not specifically make a request to speak; and allocution would not, under the circumstances of the case, have changed the sentence imposed. Several other jurisdictions agree that allocution is satisfied by counsel's answer.
In these circumstances we agree with the appellate court opinions in this and other cases which have held similar omissions to be formal, but not reversible, errors. People v. Jones (1977), 56 Ill. App.3d 600; People v. Darling (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 698; People v. Spiler (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 178. Defendant had an unusual record of prior convictions, including both a misdemeanor theft conviction in April 1978 and a felony theft conviction in October of that year.
Where, as here, a defendant is given full opportunity to introduce evidence in mitigation, counsel for that defendant is given full opportunity to be heard at sentencing, and the defendant makes no request to speak, the failure of the court to tender that opportunity to the defendant is not reversible error. ( People v. Darling (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 361 N.E.2d 121.) No new sentencing hearing is required. We affirm for the reasons stated.
( Hill v. United States (1962), 368 U.S. 424, 428, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, 421, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471.) As the People point out, and as defendant concedes, the reviewing courts of this State have uniformly held that the failure of a trial court to specifically invite a defendant to address the court at the sentencing hearing is technical error only. ( People v. Spiler (1st Dist. 1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 178, 182, 328 N.E.2d 201, 204; People v. Horobecki (1st Dist. 1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 598, 363 N.E.2d 1, 5; People v.Darling (3d Dist. 1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 700-01, 361 N.E.2d 121, 123; People v. Skidmore (3d Dist. 1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 862, 869, 372 N.E.2d 723, 729; People v. Jones (5th Dist. 1977), 56 Ill. App.3d 600, 606, 371 N.E.2d 1150, 1154.) We are convinced that Spiler, Horobecki, Darling, Skidmore, and Jones were correctly decided, and we decline defendant's invitation to follow Green.
The trial judge erred in not permitting the matters set forth above to become a part of the record on the matter of mitigation. • 4 Compounding this error was the court's failure to afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf, in accordance with section 5-4-1(a)(5) of the Unified Code of Corrections. The general rule is that such an oversight or failure is only a technical shortcoming at a hearing in aggravation and mitigation during which counsel's arguments were considered. ( People v. Darling (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 701, 361 N.E.2d 121; People v. Spiler (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 178, 328 N.E.2d 201.) But where, as here, defense counsel's argument in mitigation was unnecessarily restricted, the additional failure to extend to the defendant the opportunity to address the court in his own behalf became a serious omission.
While the proper practice is to afford a defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf during a sentencing proceeding, failure to do so has not been deemed to be a fundamental defect of such magnitude as to require the reversal of a conviction and the voiding of the sentence imposed thereon. See People v. Darling (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 698, 361 N.E.2d 121, and People v. Spiler (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 178, 328 N.E.2d 201. The defendant further argues that the sentence he received should be vacated because the trial court heard hearsay evidence of other crimes when sentence was imposed. From the record we find it to be true that the presentence report contained hearsay allegations of prior improper activities on the part of the defendant.