Therefore, they argued, the information was timely filed, since it alleged that it was filed within three years of the discovery of the welfare fraud. (1a) We conclude that the court's ruling was incorrect, and that the demurrer should have been sustained, under authority of People v. Darling, 230 Cal.App.2d 615 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219], and People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal.3d 475 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580]. Darling was written in 1964, before the enactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483, which occurred in 1965.

(See People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1080-1083 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 75, 141 P.3d 197]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 167] ( Faubus).) Finally, in light of our reasoning above, we reject the People's attempt to equate theft and welfare fraud by its citations to People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219], Faubus, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 1, and People v. Woods (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 327 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 868]. Darling did note that obtaining welfare funds through false affidavits constitutes theft by false representation or pretense as defined by Penal Code section 484. ( Darling, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at pp. 617-618.)

Prior to that time the limitation period for grand theft began to run from the commission of the theft even in cases where the victim was unaware of the loss of his property or did not know that the transfer of his property had been obtained by false pretenses. (See People v. Swinney (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 332, 341 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 148]; cf. People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 618-621 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219].) In 1969 the Legislature specifically addressed the latter two situations by amending section 800 to provide that the three-year limitation period did not begin to run until "discovery" of the theft.

(2) Of course, as the People explain, a literal interpretation of a statute is not necessarily controlling and will be rejected if it leads to an absurdity. ( People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 620 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219].) Such an absurdity exists, it is contended, when a defendant benefits by his misbehavior after commitment to the Youth Authority.

If those consequences are absurdity or injustice, the interpretation must be rejected. ( Inre Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 620 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219]; People v. Kuhn (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 253].) And if it is necessary to disregard the literal meaning of the words of the statute in order to avoid such absurd or unjust consequences, the courts must not hesitate to do so. ( Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 673-674 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 265, 423 P.2d 193]; Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845-846 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 609, 409 P.2d 689], and cases cited.)

Section 490a was enacted in 1927 as part of the Legislature's effort to consolidate the crimes of theft by larceny, theft by false pretenses, and theft by embezzlement under the umbrella definition of "theft." (People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 785, 789 (Williams); People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 618; see § 484, subd. (a).) The purpose of the consolidation was to eliminate common law technicalities in pleading and proving the several crimes.

Several cases cited by Artis were decided on similar facts. (See, e.g., People v. Silk (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d Supp. 899 [291 P.2d 1013], In re Joiner (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 667], People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580], People v. Mayers (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 252], and People v. Fiene (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 305 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 925]. Artis is equally incorrect in relying on People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219], where a defendant was charged with multiple counts of grand theft, each based on a separate "theft" of welfare funds through the filing of false affidavits. Four counts were beyond the three-year general felony statute of limitations.

(See Sobiek, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 458, 464.) However, as illustrated by the sale cases above, as well as People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615, at page 621 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219], the mere receipt of property or money from another does not give rise to a trust relationship. My concern is where in this sham sale a trust arose.

In others, such as obtaining property by false pretenses, the victim was aware of the transfer of possession but unconscious of the falsity which prompted it. Faced with these varieties of theft, People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 219], held, in effect, that neither kind of unawareness tolled or suspended the three-year period of limitations. The statute of limitations ran from the commission of all thefts, without discrimination between concealed and open thievery.

Subsequent amendments resulted in provisions the tenor of which is that reduction of an offense from a felony to a misdemeanor is a matter of reward for good behavior. Keeping in mind the rule of construction of penal provisions (§ 4, Pen.Code; People v. Sciortino, 175 Cal.App.2d Supp. 905, 908-909, 345 P.2d 594), viewing the statute with reference to its purpose and the evils to be cured thereby and in relation to others on the same subject (Stafford v. Los Angeles, etc., Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799, 270 P.2d 12; People v. Darling, 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 620, 41 Cal.Rptr. 219) and giving both statutes a reasonable interpretation to avoid an absurd result (People v. Darling, 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 620, 41 Cal.Rptr. 219), we think it obvious that the Legislature sought to protect the youthful offender who had successfully rehabilitated himself under commitment to the Youth Authority and reward him for good behavior by reducing his felony to a misdemeanor without destroying the court's power under section 1737.1, Welfare and Institutions Code, a statute designed to deal with those who could or would not be rehabilitated. The amendment provided 'Where a court commits a defendant to the Youth Authority upon conviction of a crime punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or fine or imprisonment in a county jail, the crime shall be deemed a misdemeanor.