Opinion
No. 303252
06-19-2012
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL LEE DANTZLER, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 10-003521-FC
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and BOONSTRA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant Samuel Lee Dantzler appeals by right his jury conviction of first-degree felony murder. MCL 750.316(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Because we conclude that there were no errors warranting relief, we affirm.
This case arises from the January 2006, savage beating and murder of Bernard Hill. That night, Hill "jumped on" his ex-girlfriend, Quiana Turner, with whom he had a child. After assaulting Turner, Hill went to Nikitta McKenzie's apartment; McKenzie was Hill's current girlfriend. Sometime after 12:45 a.m., Hill looked out a window and saw shadows moving about. He hid in the living room closet and someone kicked in the front door. Six black men wearing black clothing, including black hats, rushed into McKenzie's apartment. One of the men shoved a gun in McKenzie's face and demanded to know if Hill lived there. McKenzie told the men that Hill lived in the apartment, but was not home. The man with the gun again demanded to know if Hill lived there and she repeated her response. Hill then emerged from the closet. McKenzie retreated to the bathroom and waited for the men to leave. She heard loud crashes, furniture falling, and the men fighting. Finally, she heard Hill scream, followed by gunshots. The room fell silent. She discovered Hill's body nearby; he died from a single gunshot wound to the back of his head. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree felony murder on the theory that he either killed Hill or aided and abetted in Hill's murder while participating in breaking and entering McKenzie's apartment.
Defendant first argues that the trial court denied him his due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury that is could infer that missing fingernail evidence would have exonerated him. At trial, defendant's lawyer successfully argued—over the prosecutor's objection—that the trial court should give the jury an adverse inference instruction with regard to missing fingernail evidence. The trial court agreed to give the instruction, but decided to alter the standard instruction by changing the word "infer" to "consider." Thus, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider whether, rather than infer that, the evidence would have exonerated defendant. Defendant's trial lawyer thanked the court for the instruction and later expressed agreement with the instruction. By affirmatively approving the instruction, defendant's lawyer waived any claim that the instruction was erroneous. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Hence, there is no error to review. Id. at 216.
Even if defendant's trial lawyer had not waived this claim of error, we would nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not plainly err in giving this instruction. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Under the plain error rule, the defendant must show that (1) error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected defendant's substantial rights. Id. To establish the third element, the defendant must generally show that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceeding. Id.
In general, a defendant is not entitled to an adverse jury instruction unless he can demonstrate that the police destroyed evidence in bad faith. People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993). Defendant failed to introduce any evidence of bad faith, and the prosecution offered evidence indicating that the destruction resulted from a mishap or standard procedures for discarding evidence in unsolved cases, rather than bad faith. The medical examiner maintained the evidence for over three years before its inadvertent destruction, and defendant failed to show any indication that the medical examiner colluded with police to destroy the evidence. The law did not require the trial court to grant defendant any instruction regarding the fingernails, and because defendant benefited from the instruction, the trial court's refusal to include the defendant's preferred language did not amount to error, let alone error that affected the outcome. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
Defendant next argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "reviews the record evidence de novo in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 83; 777 NW2d 483 (2009).
In order to convict defendant of felony murder, the prosecution had to prove that defendant killed Hill, that when he did so he had the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], and did so while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of (in relevant part) breaking and entering. See People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 318-319; 733 NW2d 351 (2007) (stating the elements of felony murder); MCL 750.316(1)(b). The prosecution could also convict defendant under the theory that he aided and abetted another in committing felony-murder; to meet its burden under this theory, the prosecution had to present evidence that "(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement." Carines, 460 Mich at 757 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant does not argue that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that the assailants committed a felony when they broke and entered into the apartment. Additionally, defendant does not dispute that the men intentionally killed Hill during the commission of that felony. Defendant's sole argument is that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he participated in the breaking and entering and murder.
Identity is an element of every crime. People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). Thus, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed or aided and abetted the acts in question. Id. However, the prosecution may meet its burden to prove identity by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence. Carines, 460 Mich at 757.
The prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant participated in the breaking and entering and Hill's murder. Most telling, the prosecution presented DNA evidence from the black knit cap found at the scene of the murder, showing that defendant wore the hat. The hat also contained DNA from Hill. From this evidence, a jury could rationally find that defendant was present at McKenzie's apartment on the night in question and that he physically participated in the attack on Hill, which ultimately ended with Hill's murder. Defendant's explanation that another person placed his DNA in the hat was implausible and the jury was free to reject that testimony as incredible. See Roper, 286 Mich App at 88.
The prosecution also presented other strong circumstantial evidence that defendant participated in Hill's murder. The prosecution established that Hill had beaten Turner the night of his murder. Hill's mother testified that two of defendant's relatives visited her house looking for Hill, and that they arrived in defendant's car. When she did not answer the door, the men left in defendant's car, which was full of men. Thereafter, a group of men broke down McKenzie's front door before beating and murdering Hill. Although Hill's mother and Turner had agreed that Hill's mother would watch Turner's baby for the remainder of the weekend, Turner's cousin picked her up later that morning after Hill's murder but before Hill's mother learned of her son's death. Based on these facts, the jury could rationally infer that Turner's relatives, including defendant, were the men that killed Hill. In his defense, defendant stated that he and Hill remained friendly despite the fact that Hill had beaten Turner several times in the past. But the jury was free to disregard that testimony.
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conviction.
Defendant finally argues that the trial court denied him his due process rights by refusing to pay an expert to independently analyze the DNA evidence. "This Court reviews a trial court's decision whether to grant an indigent defendant's motion for the appointment of an expert for an abuse of discretion." People v Tanner, 469 Mich 437, 442; 671 NW2d 728 (2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Roper, 286 Mich App at 84.
Generally, equal protection requires that the state afford an indigent defendant an expert witness when the witness remains important to the defendant's preparation of a defense. People v Stone, 195 Mich App 600, 605; 491 NW2d 628 (1992). However, this requirement does not allow the defendant to hire an expert of his choosing, and the state may satisfy this requirement by providing defendant access to any competent expert. Id at 606.
The trial court entered an order in which it agreed to pay for an expert to analyze the DNA evidence on defendant's behalf. The trial court agreed to pay the expert's hourly fee and expenses. Defendant then attempted to hire two experts. The first could not work for defendant because he previously worked on this case for the prosecution. The second would not work on the case without a retainer fee, which the trial court refused to authorize, because it deemed the $2,500 fee exorbitant. The trial court consulted the court's chief judge, who agreed that the fee amounted to an extraordinary cost that the court should not pay. Defendant did not seek another expert and did not enter any evidence to establish that other experts were unavailable. Because the trial court agreed to pay for an expert on defendant's behalf, the state satisfied its obligation to provide defendant with the means to prepare his defense. Defendant's unilateral decision not to take advantage of the opportunity did not amount to a violation of his right to equal protection. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to pay the expert's retainer fee.
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
Elizabeth L. Gleicher
Michael J. Kelly
Mark T. Boonstra