Opinion
364929
07-03-2023
People of Michigan v. Sean Darnell Daniels
LC No. 07-024398-01-FC
Michael J. Riordan Presiding Judge, Thomas C. Cameron, Noah P. Hood Judges
ORDER
The motion to waive fees is GRANTED for this case only.
Pursuant to MCR 7.205(E)(2), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Wayne Circuit Court's September 27, 2022 order and REMAND this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
The trial court's analysis was erroneous in several respects. First, the trial court erred by utilizing the Cress test as a basis to conclude that defendant's successive 6.500 motion was "precluded" (i.e., procedurally barred) under MCR 6.502(G). See People v Swain, 499 Mich. 920 (2016) ("Cress does not apply to the procedural threshold of MCR 6.502(G)(2)").
People v Cress, 468 Mich. 678; 664 N.W.2d 174 (2003).
Second, the trial court erred by holding that "newly available" evidence is categorically insufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial under Cress and its progeny. See People v Rao, 491 Mich. 271, 282-283; 815 N.W.2d 105 (2012) (holding that, even if a defendant was actually aware of certain evidence at the time of trial, that defendant may nevertheless satisfy the "newly discovered" evidence prong of the Cress test by demonstrating that he or she employed "reasonable diligence to make that evidence available and produce it at trial").
Finally, the trial court erred by relying on People v Terrell, 289 Mich.App. 553, 559; 797 N.W.2d 684 (2010), citing People v Davis, 199 Mich.App. 502, 516; 503 N.W.2d 457 (1993), for the proposition that "[n]ewly discovered evidence does not require a new trial where it would merely be used for impeachment purposes or where it relates only to a witness's credibility." Both Terrell and Davis have since been overruled on that very point. See People v Grissom, 492 Mich. 296, 319-320; 821 N.W.2d 50 (2012) ("To the extent that any Michigan decisions impose a per se prohibition against granting a new trial in light of newly discovered impeachment evidence, they are hereby overruled.").
Because the trial court's decision to deny relief from judgment was founded on legal error, it necessarily constituted an abuse of discretion. See id. at 321. In such circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to remand for the trial court to reconsider the matter under the appropriate legal framework. See id. at 321-322. On remand, the trial court shall do so promptly, reconsidering this matter on the merits in light of this order.
This order is to have immediate effect. MCR 7.215(F)(2). We do not retain jurisdiction.