Opinion
350446
09-23-2021
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY EARL DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 04-012249-01-FH
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Redford, JJ.PER CURIAM
In 2005, defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 20 to 60 years' imprisonment for the assault conviction and two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant filed a claim of appeal as of right, and we affirmed his convictions and sentences. People v Daniels, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 16, 2006 (Docket No. 263346). In the trial court, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Nearly ten years after his convictions, defendant filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, primarily relying on an affidavit from the victim that recanted his trial testimony. The trial court initially allowed defendant to pursue this successive motion for relief from judgment, ordered the prosecutor to file a response to the motion, and stayed the case pending a review by the prosecutor's conviction integrity unit (CIU). Ultimately, the trial court lifted the stay and denied defendant's motion for relief from judgment. We denied defendant's application for leave to appeal, People v Daniels, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 17, 2019 (Docket No. 350446). Our Supreme Court directed that we consider the case as on leave granted. People v Daniels, 506 Mich. 945 (2020). Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
We presume that the trial court lifted the stay because relief was not recommended by the CIU, and the prosecutor filed a response opposing the motion for relief from judgment. Nonetheless, we note that a report from the CIU was not contained in the lower court record.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from defendant's shooting of John Butler in November of 2004. At defendant's trial, Butler was the prosecution's sole eyewitness, with several police officers testifying about the crime scene and the postshooting investigation. Butler testified that, about 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., he was walking on Charlevoix Street. Before Butler reached the driveway of the house, defendant came out of the front door, and the two men confronted each other on the driveway. Defendant told Butler, "[You] better start respecting me, man. I'm way older than you. And you don't talk to me any kind of way . . . ." Defendant then shoved Butler. Butler shoved defendant back, knocking defendant to the ground. In response, defendant pulled a gun from his waistband, pointed it toward Butler's chest, and started shooting. Butler was struck by bullets in his right arm, his left arm, and his pelvis. As Butler turned to run, "[he] felt some more shots hit [him] in the back."
At trial, defendant's theory was that he acted in self-defense and that the prosecution had not proved an intent to kill. Defendant testified that, about 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., he was finishing up a "demolition project" at the house on Charlevoix Street. While smoking a cigarette on the house's front porch, defendant saw a van driving slowly by the house, with Butler in the van's front passenger seat. A short time later, Butler appeared on foot. Butler swung a pipe at defendant's head, saying" I got you." The pipe missed defendant and hit the corner of the house. Defendant turned to run inside, but Butler grabbed and threw him to the ground. On the house's driveway was a car raised up on jacks. Defendant went under the car. Butler dropped the pipe and picked up an ax lying on the porch. Using the ax, Butler pounded on the jacks holding up the car-according to defendant so as to drop the car on defendant. Defendant drew his weapon and started shooting at Butler, firing off about four or five rounds. As noted, despite this theory of self-defense, defendant was convicted, and he did not obtain relief in his claim of appeal as of right or his first motion for relief from judgment.
On December 20, 2015, Butler purportedly was duly sworn before a notary and submitted an affidavit essentially backtracking from his contention that the shooting was the result of an altercation between the men, but rather, was the result of a joke gone awry. In the affidavit, Butler explained what actually transpired on the night of the crime. He stated:
The individual that notarized Butler's affidavit was named "Nykia Samione Daniels." It is unknown if she had any relationship to defendant.
On November 3, 2004, at about 2:00 am, in the City of Detroit, I was riding by a house where I knew that a death had occurred to a family member that lived at that house. I noticed the lights were on and someone was sitting on the porch. I decided to stop by because I wanted to pay my respects and possibly lighten up the mood a little. My intentions were not to harm or hurt anyone but only to scare the living daylights out of the person on the porch. I entered the property to the house at the back gate, and walked along the side of the house toward the porch. I picked up anobject inside the yard and hit the side of the house where the person was sitting. The person on the porch became startled and tried to run inside the house. I prevented him from doing so by grabbing him and pulling him off the porch. I admit I pulled a little too hard, and the person landed on the ground, got up, and ran to hide underneath a car that was jacked-up in the driveway. I then ran over to the jacked-up car and started to shake the car to make it look like I was trying to make it fall off the jack onto the person under it. I realized that my joke went too far when the person underneath the car began shooting at me. I was hit by several shots and fell down in the driveway. The person from underneath the car that was shooting at me approached me. There were no streetlights in that area at the time, so this was the first time I realized that the person I ripped off the porch was the same person shooting at me from underneath the car, to-wit, Stanley Daniels. Mr. Daniels walked up to me and asked me why did I do that? I told him that I was just trying to liven up the mood and get a laugh-I wasn't trying to hurt anyone.
In his affidavit, Butler further explained that he lied about the underlying facts because he was angry with defendant for the shooting when Butler was only joking. He reported that he ran into defendant's brother, Kenneth Daniels, at a liquor store several months earlier and told the story contained in the affidavit. Daniels asked Butler to speak with an attorney which led to the submission of the affidavit.
Kenneth Daniels also executed an affidavit, stating that he ran into Butler at a liquor store where Butler confessed to giving false statements and testimony at defendant's trial.
In light of the affidavits, defendant filed a successive motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G)(2). Reasoning that he could not have discovered Butler's affidavit before his 2009 motion for relief from judgment, defendant argued his successive motion was permitted because Butler's affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence.
In a written order on January 4, 2017, the trial court found "defendant ha[d] established the requisite showing of newly discovered evidence necessary to establish an exception which would allow him to file a successive motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G)(2)." The trial court, therefore, "ordered that Defendant's Successive Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion for Appointed Counsel [were] both GRANTED." And given that the prosecution had not yet responded to defendant's motion, the trial court ordered the prosecution to respond within the time designated in MCR 6.506(A).
MCR 6.506(A) states that "[t]he trial court shall allow the prosecutor a minimum of 56 days to respond."
Defendant filed supplemental briefing, alleging that Butler had died. Yet, he also moved for a new trial and requested funds for an investigator to determine whether Butler was still alive. Defendant further asserted that the prosecutor's failure to promptly respond to his motion for relief from judgment, the delay in the appointment of defense counsel, and the failure to produce the lower court file deprived him of his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. Defendant submitted that, despite the possibility that Butler was dead, defendant was still entitled to a new trial.
After defendant moved for a new trial, the prosecution opposed the motion, contending that defendant had no grounds for relief because Butler's affidavit itself was not evidence. To be entitled to relief, defendant would need Butler to testify in conformance with his affidavit, but defendant could not do so, because Butler was dead. The prosecution argued, even if Butler were alive, defendant would still not be entitled to a new trial. Like the witness in People v Terrell, 289 Mich.App. 553; 797 N.W.2d 684 (2010), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Grissom, 492 Mich. 296, 320; 821 N.W.2d 50 (2012), defendant was present during Butler's actions, hence defendant had knowledge of the contents of Butler's affidavit long before this motion. Therefore, Butler's affidavit was not newly discovered; it was newly available. Third, even if Butler's affidavit were newly discovered evidence, defendant had failed to show he was entitled to a new trial under People v Cress, 468 Mich. 678, 692; 664 N.W.2d 174 (2003). While Butler's affidavit was consistent with defendant's theory of self-defense, its contents would not make a different result probable on retrial. Butler would not be seen as a credible witness because his affidavit would be impeached by his prior testimony.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution and denied defendant's motions. The trial court found defendant failed to satisfy either of the two exceptions under MCR 6.502(G)(2). According to the trial court, defendant was present during the actions Butler described in his affidavit, so defendant would have known about the content of Butler's affidavit at the time of trial. Thus, Butler's affidavit was not newly discovered evidence. The trial court found defendant failed to satisfy the Cress test. The trial court concluded defendant had shown only that the materiality of Butler's affidavit was newly discovered because defendant had witnessed the actions described in that affidavit. Also, the trial court stated that a different result on retrial was not probable because Butler could not be seen as a credible witness when he would be directly impeached by his prior testimony. The trial court also denied defendant's motion for reconsideration.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his successive motion for relief from judgment and motion for a new trial. In doing so, he asserts the trial court deprived him of due process and the right to confront the witnesses against him. We disagree.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on a motion for relief from judgment. People v Gomez, 295 Mich.App. 411, 414; 820 N.W.2d 217 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law or when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Duncan, 494 Mich. 713, 722-723; 835 N.W.2d 399 (2013). "Underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo, while a trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error." People v Bosca, 310 Mich.App. 1, 26; 871 N.W.2d 307 (2015) (citation omitted). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." People v Brooks, 304 Mich.App. 318, 319-320; 848 N.W.2d 161 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews de novo "[a] defendant's constitutional due process claim." People v Schumacher, 276 Mich.App. 165, 176; 740 N.W.2d 534 (2007). Likewise, whether a defendant was denied his right to confront a witness is a constitutional question that this Court reviews de novo. People v Bruner, 501 Mich. 220, 226; 912 N.W.2d 514 (2018). When the appellate court reviews the issue de novo, it reviews the legal issue independently without deference to the lower court. People v Jemison, 505 Mich. 352, 360; 952 N.W.2d 394 (2020) (citation omitted).
Generally, "[a] defendant is only entitled to file one motion for relief from judgment." People v Swain, 288 Mich.App. 609, 631; 794 N.W.2d 92 (2010) (Swain I); MCL 6.502(G)(1). However, a defendant may file a successive motion for relief from judgment if: "(1) there is a retroactive change in the law that occurred after the first motion or (2) there is new evidence that was not discovered before the first motion." Id. at 632; MCR 6.502(G)(2). Thus, "before a trial court may consider a successive motion for relief from judgment, the defendant must make a threshold showing" that one of these exceptions applies. People v Owens, ___ Mich. App___, ___; N.W.2d___ (2021) (Docket No. 352908); slip op at 6.
If a defendant files a successive motion on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the defendant is entitled to a new trial only if he can establish the following four elements:
(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Owens, ___ Mich.App. at___; slip op at 10, quoting Grissom, 492 Mich. at 313 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
"In order to determine whether newly discovered evidence makes a different result probable on retrial, a trial court must first determine whether the evidence is credible." People v Johnson, 502 Mich. 541, 566-567; 918 N.W.2d 676 (2018) (citation omitted). In doing so, "the trial court is not acting as the 'ultimate fact-finder,' because the question is not whether to dismiss the criminal case but whether to retry the defendant." People v Rogers, ___ Mich. App___, ___;___ N.W.2d___ (2020) (Docket No. 336000) slip op at 13 (citation omitted). "Given this, when analyzing the evidence offered for retrial, the trial court must consider 'whether a reasonable juror could find the [evidence] credible on retrial.'" Id. "[I]f a witness is not patently incredible, a trial court's credibility determination must bear in mind what a reasonable juror might make of the testimony, and not what the trial court might decide, were it the ultimate fact-finder." Johnson, 502 Mich. at 568.
With Butler unavailable to provide live testimony, defendant could not admit Butler's recanting statements into evidence. Whether admitted in the form of Butler's affidavit or through Daniels's testimony, Butler's statements would be inadmissible hearsay. In both forms, Butler's statements were made out of court and would be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted- namely that Butler lied at trial.
We reject defendant's contention that Daniels's testimony and Butler's affidavit could be admitted as a statement against penal interest. For MRE 804(3) to allow in hearsay statements tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability, a proponent offering the statements to exculpate the accused must show two things. See People v Barrera, 451 Mich. 261, 268-269, 272-273; 547 N.W.2d 280 (1996). First, the proponent must show the statements were "so far tending to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing [them] to be true." MRE 804(3); Barrera, 451 Mich. at 269-270. Second, the proponent must identify "corroborating circumstances clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statement[s]." MRE 804(3); Barrera, 451 Mich. at 272-273. Here, there is a lack of any corroborating circumstances to indicate the trustworthiness of Butler's alleged statements.
"In evaluating whether a statement against penal interest that inculpates a person in addition to the declarant bears sufficient indicia of reliability to allow it to be admitted as substantive evidence against the other person, courts must evaluate the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement as well as its content." Id. at 274, quoting People v Poole, 444 Mich. 151, 165; 506 N.W.2d 505 (1993), abrogated in part on other grounds People v Taylor, 482 Mich. 368, 374; 759 N.W.2d 361 (2008). Our Supreme Court has provided a nonexclusive list of circumstances that favor admissibility and circumstances that favor exclusion:
Taylor abrogated only the portion of Poole pertaining to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. See Taylor, 482 Mich. at 374.
The presence of the following factors would favor admission of such a statement: whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends, colleagues, or confederates-that is, to someone to whom the declarant would likely speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes the role or responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3) was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant had a motive to lie or distort the truth. [Barrera, 451 Mich. at 274, quoting Poole, 444 Mich. at 165]
The level of corroboration necessary depends on how crucial a statement is to a defendant's theory of defense: "the more crucial the statement is to the defendant's theory of defense, the less corroboration a court may constitutionally require for its admission." Barrera, 451 Mich. at 279.
In this case, even though this Butler's alleged statement would be crucial to defendant's defense, there is virtually no circumstance to corroborate its trustworthiness. Other than Daniels's affidavit averring that Butler approached him in a liquor store, it is entirely unclear under what conditions Butler allegedly made these recanting statements. There is no way to evaluate whether Butler was prompted or influenced in any way, and it is unclear if Daniels or the attorney Butler spoke with were people with whom he could be expected to tell the truth.
Further, the circumstances suggest the affidavit is untrustworthy. First and foremost, Butler allegedly made these statements more than nine years after defendant's trial, long after the events to which Butler's statements refer. Also, the only live witness able to testify regarding what Butler said is Daniels, someone with an interest in this case. Finally, and more generally, recantation evidence is traditionally viewed with suspicion. See Rogers, Mich.App. at; slip op at 12 (citations omitted). With little to no circumstances to corroborate the trustworthiness of Butler's statements and with other circumstances suggesting untrustworthiness, there is no basis to conclude that either Butler's affidavit or Daniels' testimony would be admissible on retrial.
Defendant suggests he could introduce Butler's statements, through the affidavit or Daniels, for impeachment purposes. However, the admissibility of Butler's affidavit is immaterial because no reasonable juror would find it credible. This is not because the affidavit conflicts with Butler's prior testimony, but rather, the contents of Butler's affidavit are "patently incredible." See Johnson, 502 Mich. at 567.
After announcing he falsely testified regarding the circumstances of how he was shot by defendant, Butler's affidavit explains "what actually occurred" the night of the crime was a joke gone horribly wrong. The affidavit states that, about 2:00 a.m., Butler was "riding by a house where [he] knew that a death had occurred to a family member that lived at that house." Hoping "to pay [his] respects" and "possibly lighten up the mood a little[, ]" Butler decided to stop by the house. He saw a person he did not recognize sitting on the front porch of the house. To "lighten up the mood," Butler picked up an object and hit the side of the house where the person was sitting, all in a harmless effort to "scare the living daylights out of" them. Startled, the person on the porch tried to run in the house. Butler then grabbed this person from the porch and threw him to the ground. The person scurried under a car raised on jacks. Butler shook the car "to make it look like [he] was trying to make it fall off the jack onto the person under it." But the person under the car started shooting. Butler was shot and fell to the ground. The shooter approached him, and Butler realized it was defendant.
Accepting these statements as true, no reasonable juror could believe the story that this was simply a harmless prank gone wrong. Rather, this nonsensical affidavit was contrived to match defendant's testimony and theory of self-defense raised in the trial court. It is difficult to discern how Butler would pay his "respects" and "lighten the mood" to a family suffering from the loss of a loved one at 2:00 a.m. by attempting to "scare the daylights" out of them. Moreover, the extent of the "prank" did not end after Butler startled defendant on the porch. He purportedly threw defendant to the ground, and when defendant hid under a car for cover, Butler shook the car to make defendant think that Butler was trying to crush him. No reasonable juror would believe that Butler went to such an extent in an attempt to liven the mood of a person apparently in grief from the loss of a loved one.
Moreover, Butler's affidavit does not confirm defendant's testimony at trial regarding self-defense. Specifically, defendant justified his shooting of Butler by testifying that Butler picked up an ax and attempted to use it to knock the vehicle off the jacks and crush defendant under the vehicle. In his affidavit, Butler merely asserted that he shook the vehicle and did not describe having a weapon in his possession and using it in any form at this time. Butler's self-described shaking of the vehicle without the aid or use of an ax does not lend support to defendant's theory of self-defense. Also of concern are inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the statements here. In his testimony at trial, defendant never mentioned there being a death of a member of the family of the 3641 Charlevoix Street household. Rather, defendant testified he was at the house performing a "demolition project" for an "Uncle Taylor" and the house was empty at the time. Standing alone, these inconsistencies could be left to the fact-finder to resolve. But coupled with the incredibility of Butler's alleged statements, we conclude that no reasonable juror could believe the shooting was the result of a joke gone awry.
The Self-Defense Act, MCL 780.971 et seq, did not become effective until October 1, 2006, and codified the circumstances when a person may use deadly force in self-defense without the obligation to retreat. People v Guajardo, 300 Mich.App. 26, 35-36; 832 N.W.2d 409 (2013). This shooting occurred in November 2004.
In addition to his argument the trial court abused its discretion in denying his successive motion for relief from judgment and motion for new trial, defendant also submits that his conviction violates his due-process rights because his convictions rested on perjured testimony. However, because defendant offered no admissible or credible evidence that Butler's testimony was in fact perjured, this contention is without merit. Even if Butler's testimony was perjured, there is nothing to suggest the prosecution, or anyone else, would have been aware of it. Accordingly, defendant has not shown he was deprived of due process.
Affirmed.