Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. 99296C
Reardon, J.
A jury found that appellant Michael James Daniel—a convicted felon—presented a substantial danger of harm to others as a result of a severe mental disorder requiring treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2970.) As a result of this finding, he was involuntarily committed for one year to Atascadero State Hospital as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), extending a placement imposed as a condition of his parole from state prison. Daniel appeals, contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend his MDO commitment after his scheduled parole release date. We affirm the commitment order.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTS
In 2000, a jury convicted appellant Michael James Daniel of several felonies stemming from a violent incident. He was sentenced to six years in state prison. While in prison, Daniel was identified as an inmate suffering from a mental disorder. When he was paroled in 2007, he violated parole within a few weeks and was returned to prison. Adding in his term of parole, his estimated prison release date was October 9. On July 13, he was placed at the state Department of Mental Health as a condition of his parole. (§ 2962.)
All dates refer to the 2007 calendar year unless otherwise indicated.
On July 27, a petition was filed to extend Daniel’s involuntary commitment as an MDO. (§ 2970.) On September 6, he obtained a continuance of the September 10 jury trial date until October 1. Daniel’s first jury trial began on October 1. The following day, after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision, the trial court declared a mistrial and set an October 15 date for a new trial. On October 5, the trial court ordered Daniel to be held by the county sheriff until the second jury trial could be conducted, despite his October 9 prison release date.
Although this was titled an extension of an existing commitment, it appears that Daniel had not been civilly committed before this time, but had been incarcerated in prison. The commitment statute refers to the petition as one for continued involuntary treatment. (§ 2970.)
On October 15, the second trial began. The trial court overruled Daniel’s objection to being tried after his prison release date. At the end of the first day of trial, Daniel was again remanded to the custody of the county sheriff. The jury reached its verdict on October 16, finding that Daniel presented a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a severe mental disorder that was not in remission and could not be kept in remission without treatment. (§ 2970.) On October 26, a formal commitment order was filed, committing Daniel to Atascadero State Hospital for a one-year term commencing on October 9 and ending on October 8, 2008. In October 2008, that commitment was again extended, this time until October 9, 2009.
II. JURISDICTION
Daniel contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold him for his second trial on October 15-16, beyond the date of his scheduled parole release. He argues that once his October 9 release date arrived, the trial court was required to release him. He reasons that his action should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction after that date. On appeal, he seeks reversal of the trial court’s commitment order and an order for his unconditional release.
As the appeal is from an ordered one-year term of commitment that expired in October 2008, we first determine whether the appeal is moot. The parties agree that it is not, anticipating an extension of it. Recently, the trial court again extended Daniel’s commitment until October 2009. This extended commitment satisfies us that the appeal before us is not moot and that we should address the merits of the issues raised in it. (See People v. Fernandez (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 117, 134-135.)
Three cases on related issues are currently pending before the California Supreme Court. (See People v. Cobb (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 393, 398-403, review granted Mar. 12, 2008 (S159410) [due process implications of delay in prosecution of MDO petition and continued detention beyond release date]; People v. Price (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 955, 960-963, review granted June 13, 2007 (S151207) [due process implications of untimely filing of petition to extend insanity commitment]; see also People v. Lara (unpub. opn.), review granted Sept. 25, 2007 (S155481) [due process implications of untimely filing of petition to extend insanity commitment].)
Daniel raises two specific challenges to the trial court procedures. First, he appears to argue that because the state’s recommendation to the prosecutor that a petition for extension of his involuntary commitment was filed less than 180 days before his release date, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Before a prisoner with a severe mental disorder is scheduled for release from prison, a prosecutor may petition to continue the prisoner’s involuntary treatment for one year. (§ 2970.) That petition is triggered by an evaluation from the Director of Corrections, which “shall” be submitted to the prosecutor “[n]ot later than 180 days [before release], . . . unless good cause is shown for the reduction of that 180-day period . . . .” (Ibid.)
In our case, a timely evaluation would have been filed by April 12. (See § 2970.) It was not until June that two mental health professionals evaluated Daniel and concluded that he met the standard for an MDO commitment. On July 18, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended that the prosecutor file a petition to continue Daniel’s involuntary treatment. The warden noted that the recommendation was late, but opined that Daniel would be a danger to the community if released. In response to this recommendation, the prosecutor filed the petition on July 27.
Clearly, the recommendation was not filed before the 180-day period set out in statute. Daniel contends that there was no good cause for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to request the filing of his MDO petition less than 180 days before his scheduled prison release date. He reasons that this late request led to his second trial being conducted after his prison release date and led to an illegal extension of his commitment after that date.
By statute, the state’s recommendation that a prosecutor file a petition for extension of involuntary commitment “shall” be made no later than 180 days from the anticipated release date. (§ 2970.) The parties dispute whether the term “shall” in this provision was intended to be mandatory or directory. However, the 180-day time limit for recommending that a prosecutor file a section 2970 petition is not jurisdictional. The purpose of this statute is to protect the public from mentally disordered prisoners. That purpose would not be furthered by interpreting the language of this provision to create an absolute jurisdictional requirement. The Legislature intended that this time limit be directory, rather than mandatory or jurisdictional. (People v. Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 128-130.) Thus, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to consider the petition, even though the triggering recommendation was filed less than 180 days before Daniel’s prison release date.
Daniel contends that Fernandez was decided in error and urges us to disregard it. We find its reasoning to be persuasive.
Daniel also complains that his second trial was not commenced 30 days before his release date. By statute, the civil jury trial on the petition “shall” commence no more than 30 days before Daniel was to be released, unless he and the prosecutor waives the time or good cause is shown. (See § 2972, subd. (a).) Again, Daniel urges that this 30-day time period is jurisdictional, while the People contend that it was only directory.
Originally, trial was scheduled to begin on September 10, but that trial date was continued at Daniel’s request.
We find that the 30-day time period for commencing trial against Daniel was also directory and not jurisdictional. The purpose of the statute we are charged to interpret is to ensure a reasonable amount of time within which to conduct a trial before the prisoner is due to be released. This requirement is primarily for the benefit of the public, to provide a reasonable reassurance that a prisoner who has been receiving treatment for a severe mental disorder will not be released until a court can determine if the prisoner poses a continuing danger to others. If failure to comply with this 30-day limit resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, the purpose of the MDO law—to protect the public—would be frustrated, not furthered. (People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 450-451; see People v. Mitchell (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 936, 942-946 [similar 30-day period for commencement of § 1026.5 insanity commitment extension trial was not jurisdictional].) Significantly, the statute does not set any express deadline for completing the trial. (See § 2972; People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 452.) The absence of such a completion time also suggests that the Legislature did not intend the commencement date to be jurisdictional. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to hold Daniel beyond his prison release date in order to conduct his trial to its conclusion.
We decline Daniel’s invitation to disregard the decision in Williams.
The commitment order is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J., Rivera, J.