Opinion
B325309
04-16-2024
In re DAMION B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. DAMION B., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Order Filed Date 5/10/24
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. TJ23855, Melissa N. Widdifield, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 16, 2024, be modified as follows:
On page 2, the last full paragraph, last sentence beginning, "It declared minor" is deleted and the following sentence is inserted in its place, so the sentence reads:
It declared minor to remain a ward of the juvenile court and ordered suitable placement for a maximum term of six years four months.
On page 17, footnote 9 is deleted in its entirety, which will require the renumbering of the subsequent footnote.
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
This appeal stems from three separate incidents and three petitions filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 against Damion B. (minor). On February 2, 2021, in the first petition, it was alleged that minor committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 1). That petition was later amended to allege that he also committed joyriding (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 2). Minor admitted that he committed count 2. The juvenile court sustained the petition as to count 2 and dismissed count 1.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On April 26, 2021, in a second petition, it was alleged that minor committed robbery (§ 211; count 1) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2).
On April 1, 2022, in a third petition, it was alleged that minor committed fleeing a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 1).
After a contested adjudication on the second petition, the juvenile court sustained the petition as to count 1 (robbery) and denied the petition as to count 2.
On November 30, 2022, the juvenile court amended the third petition, reducing count 1 (fleeing a peace officer) to a misdemeanor. Minor then admitted that offense.
The juvenile court disposed of all three petitions at the same time. It declared minor to remain a ward of the juvenile court and committed him to the division of juvenile facilities for a maximum term of six years four months.
Minor appeals from the juvenile court's adjudication of the second petition. He argues that the juvenile court committed certain evidentiary errors. He also contends the juvenile court's determination that he committed robbery is not supported by sufficient evidence. Finally, he asserts that his maximum confinement time is incorrect.
We agree with minor that the maximum period of confinement must be corrected. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence
A. Minor and his accomplice rob Gloria Lambertz (Lambertz) and take her car
On April 22, 2021, at around 6:00 p.m., near Fir Avenue in Los Angeles County, Lambertz was waiting in her car for a friend to bring her some tamales. She was parked in her black Ford Fusion in front of her friend's house.
Lambertz heard a knock on her driver's side open window. She turned and saw minor pointing a gun at her face. He told her to get out of the car. Lambertz reached for her purse on the front passenger seat and her phone in the console area so she could take them with her. As she did so, Treshawn P. (Treshawn) leaned inside the open front passenger window and took her purse and phone. Lambertz unlocked the door and exited her car.
Jorge Flores Patino (Patino) was changing a tire on his truck in the area. He saw minor and Treshawn approach Lambertz's car and start talking to Lambertz, who had rolled down her window. He went back to working on his tire.
Patino described both men as young. They were both a little taller than Patino who is five foot-seven inches tall, and were both skinny. Patino testified that they were skinnier than minor's trial counsel, who was six foot-two inches tall and 175 pounds. Both wore hoodies; one had a camouflage jacket and black jeans. The driver was lighter skinned than the passenger.
A few minutes later, Lambertz started screaming. Patino saw one of the men pull her out of the car and push her away from the car. She looked at Patino and told him that they were stealing her car.
Patino crossed the street with his tire iron. He walked over to Lambertz's car, and banged on the driver's side window. Patino told the young men to get out of the car. Minor, who was sitting in the driver's seat, tried to take off, but the car was still in park. Minor pointed the gun at Patino. When Patino pulled the door open, Treshawn said, "'[J]ust shoot him, shoot him.'" At that point, Patino, who was afraid, ran back across the street and behind his truck. Lambertz was also afraid. She ran and hid behind a parked car. The two men drove away. Inside the car were Lambertz's cell phone and purse. And, inside her purse were Lambertz's driver's license, credit cards and medications. The incident lasted less than five minutes.
B. The police locate Lambertz's phone
Patino's wife called the police. At approximately 6:15 p.m., Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) Deputy Daniel Velasco drove to Fir Street in response to a carjacking call. He spoke with Lambertz, who reported that she had just been carjacked by two black males. After Lambertz told the officers which way the two young men drove away, the other responding officer drove off in that direction.
Lambertz called her grandchildren. Once they arrived, Lambertz had one of her granddaughters use the "find-my-phone" feature to track Lambertz's phone. She, in turn, provided that information to Deputy Velasco. Deputy Velasco then directed an airship to the location where the phone was "pinging," on Grape Street and 99th Street, close to the Jordan Downs projects.
C. The police locate minor and Treshawn
LASD Deputy Adrian Ines assisted in locating the two suspects. He was directed to 9901 Grape Street, where Lambertz's cell phone was pinging. There, Deputy Ines saw two suspects, including minor, who matched the description he had received. No one else was in the immediate area of the pinging.
Minor and Treshawn tried to evade the deputies. When detained, minor was wearing a black sweater. When officers patted down Treshawn, they recovered Lambertz's cell phone, a credit card, and two key fobs from his pockets.
Minor and Treshawn were detained at 9901 Grape Street, four blocks from the Fir Avenue address. Lambertz's car was recovered at 2179 East Century Boulevard, which is no more than a block from where minor and Treshawn were detained. The suspects were detained about 45 minutes after the incident and about 20 minutes after Lambertz's phone was tracked.
D. Lambertz identifies minor and Treshawn
The police informed Lambertz that they had located the two young men they believed had stolen her car, and took her to a field show up. Lambertz identified minor as the person with the gun and Treshawn as the one who climbed into the passenger seat.
Deputy Velasco read Lambertz the field identification admonishment prior to conducting the field show up. Lambertz understood that she was under no obligation to identify anyone.
Lambertz identified minor by his clothing and his build. He was wearing all black clothes. In addition, he had a "small, slimmer" build. Similarly, she identified Treshawn by his clothing. He was wearing white clothes "with glitter all over the clothes."
At a field show up, Patino was unable to identify either minor or Treshawn. E. Several items taken from Lambertz are never recovered; her car is returned to her damaged
The police informed Lambertz that they had found her car. They returned her cell phone, work identification card, and two credit cards. Her purse, driver's license, registration, owner's manual, and the rest of her belongings were gone. In addition, inside the car, officers found a credit card that did not belong to Lambertz, as well as a blue TAP card that was not hers.
The passenger side of her car, which was new, had been damaged. Specifically, the front tail light and mirror were broken as if the car had struck a wall.
F. Deputy Ines's body camera recording
Minor and Treshawn were placed in the same patrol car. Deputy Ines activated his body worn camera and placed it on the front seat.
The video was played for the juvenile court. As stipulated by the parties, the video was not transcribed. Deputy Ines testified that the video was a true and accurate memorialization of the body camera video that was taken that day. While the prosecution also had a transcript of the recording, the transcript was not admitted into evidence or considered by the juvenile court in rendering its verdict. Based upon the representations in the parties' appellate briefs, there appears to be no dispute as to which portions of the recording were audible (and therefore quoted in the briefs) and inaudible.
Near the beginning of the recording, one speaker asked: "Where is that n***?" The other speaker answered, "I don't know, the n*** disappeared. Anthem went home."
Shortly thereafter, one speaker asked, "You took their keys and phone and all that?" They also talked about how they almost got away. At one point, one speaker said, "Bro, I kept telling you walk faster. If we would have made it inside that dirt gate they can't do nothing."
Several minutes later, one speaker said, "Ay cuh if we hopped on that [inaudible], if we got away from Watts."
At another point in the recording, there was a discussion regarding DNA:
First speaker: "They are talking about DNA was definitely in the car."
Second speaker: "I don't know shit about that car."
First speaker: "His fingerprints are all over the steering wheel."
Second speaker: "Whose?"
First speaker: "Infamous."
At other times, the young men talk about the consequences of their crimes and the future. One speaker said, "No more dumb s***. Stay out of the way. That's what I was supposed to do in the first place." Two minutes later, one speaker asked, "So you gon turn?" The other responded, "Imna blow on any of these [people] but I ain't bout to have a strap on. How we doing it now." A speaker then asked, "Would you rather die or be in jail?" The other speaker answered, "I'm done catching bullets." Finally, one of the speakers added: "I'm done with this s***. I'm done robbing and finessing."
In their respondent's brief, the People purport to know which speaker was Treshawn and which one was minor, based upon earlier identifying answers. As discussed infra, the identity of each speaker is irrelevant to our analysis.
II. Defense evidence
Minor did not testify and presented no evidence in his defense.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of Deputy Ines's body camera video
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting the body camera video because part of it is unintelligible and therefore irrelevant.
The audio recording is 21 minutes and 30 seconds long. Minor argues that three minutes and 26 seconds of the recording is either inaudible or unintelligible, and the recording contains a four minute, 11-second period of apparent silence.
A. Proceedings below
1. Juvenile court admits the video into evidence
Following the first day of testimony, minor's counsel objected to the admission of a transcript that the prosecution provided for the body camera recording. Both the prosecutor and the juvenile court pointed out that the transcript was not being offered into evidence. When the juvenile court suggested that any dispute could be resolved by not presenting it with a transcript, the prosecutor noted that she was required to submit it by the California Rules of Court. The juvenile court, in turn, suggested that the parties stipulate that the transcript need not be submitted.
The next morning, the discussion continued, with the juvenile court summarizing minor's counsel's position from their off-the-record discussion regarding the admissibility of the body camera video: The audio portion is difficult to hear; it is difficult to identify the speakers so as to attribute the statements to the correct speaker; and the transcript provided by the People is inaccurate. Thus, minor's position was that the video should be excluded and the juvenile court should be precluded from viewing the transcript because it was inaccurate.
The juvenile court noted that it would need to review the recording to rule on minor's motion to exclude and that if "it is just too hard to make out who is saying what, [then] the court is not going to consider the evidence." The prosecutor responded that "the People are not intending to offer into evidence who each speaker is." Rather, all the People intended to use the recording to show was that the two persons detained (minor and Treshawn) were discussing the robbery; the admissibility of the recording was not premised on the court's ability to discern which speaker made which statement. In turn, minor's counsel argued that because one of the speakers made more incriminating statements than the other, it was important for the court to determine which speaker made which statements.
At this point, the juvenile court determined that it would listen to the video without a transcript and then make a decision whether it could be considered at all.
Accordingly, during the testimony of Deputy Ines, the video was played, and the deputy identified it as the body camera video from April 22, 2021, that he placed inside the patrol vehicle when minor and Treshawn were inside. Counsel and the court then discussed the admissibility of the recording. Initially, the juvenile court stated that the evidentiary value of the recording was "null." After all, "there was not a single word of that that I understood other than the officers." "In order for the court to understand that tape, I would have to sit with it at my ear and listen to it over and over again. That's the absolute definition of undue consumption of time whether you are doing a bench trial or whether you are doing a jury trial."
The parties stipulated that the court reporter need not transcribe the audio of the recording.
In response, the prosecutor argued that it had provided a transcript to aid the court in its review of the audio, and that minor's counsel was entitled to do the same. Moreover, the concerns expressed by the court went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Ultimately, the court took the matter under submission.
Prior to the parties' summation, the juvenile court ruled on the admissibility of the body camera video. It again rejected the prosecutor's request to use the transcript as a guide as it would essentially supplant the audio recording. However, the court agreed that any concerns as to its ability to hear the audio went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Thus, the court determined that it would listen to the audio recording without the aid of the transcript and "I hear what I hear."
2. Counsel's closing arguments
Both parties referenced the body camera video during their arguments. The prosecutor played clips of the audio recording during her summation. Prior to her doing so, the juvenile court instructed the prosecutor that she was to argue from the audio recording, not the transcript, and that "the Court did not refer to it. The Court is not going to take it into chambers as trier of fact and review it." After the prosecutor played the first clip from the audio, the court indicated that it could understand everything that was being said in the recording, stating: "Can you stop here? For what ever reason, I don't know whether the volume is up, I can hear a lot more today than I could on Friday. I can make out everything. I can make out full sentences of people other than parts of a sentence of people other than the officer. I guess I want everybody to know that."
3. The court's verdict
After taking the matter under submission, the juvenile court rendered its verdict sustaining the petition as to count 1 and denying it as to count 2. It identified the body camera audio as one of the three categories of evidence in the case. Regarding the audio, the court noted that it again listened to it, and was able to understand significantly more than during trial, likely because of the distance between the bench and counsel table. The court acknowledged that it was difficult to discern who was making which statements, but "the identity of the speakers on the tape only matter[s] if it is plausible that a third party was the driver of the car." The court also indicated that while it could not determine which speaker was minor and which was Treshawn, it could distinguish between "speaker A and speaker B."
The juvenile court determined that in light of the other evidence, it was unreasonable to conclude that either Treshawn or a third person was driving Lambertz's stolen car, and that it did not matter whether minor was speaker A or speaker B: "[T]here's definitely statements that are inculpatory that a reasonable trier of fact could reasonably draw the conclusion that the speaker was involved in the carjacking and that the other person in the car even if not the speaker was also involved in the carjacking. Again, this is based on the presumption that there couldn't be a third party involved.
"Now, looking at the timeline, looking at the distance, the People's position has been we're talking like a four-mile distance here between where the car was dropped off and where the car was taken, carjacked from the victim. We're talking about 45 minutes from the time of the offense and the two young men being stopped by the police.
"I agree with the position of the People that it is unreasonable to conclude that Treshawn . . . was the driver based on all the evidence that was presented. However, the court also concludes that it is completely unreasonable to infer that there was potentially a third party driving the car that ditched the gun. Because it does not make any logical sense for a third party to have driven the car, ditched the gun, ditched the car and ditched all the property. It just doesn't make any sense[].
"Potentially, that's a completely illogical conclusion to draw in the court's opinion. So if you conclude a third party can't be involved, it really doesn't [matter] who the speaker is in the car."
B. Relevant law
1. Admissibility of evidence and the standard of review on appeal
"Only relevant evidence is admissible [citations], and all relevant evidence is admissible, unless excluded under the federal or California Constitution or by statute." (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13; see Evid. Code, §§ 350, 351.) Relevant evidence is evidence that "tend[s] in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.)
It is well-established the trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 512; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) As such, we do not disturb a trial court's ruling on appeal "'except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]'" (Id. at pp. 11241125.) A "miscarriage of justice" occurs only when the reviewing court, after an examination of the entire record, is of the opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
2. Video and audio recordings
"To be admissible in evidence, an audio or video recording must be authenticated." (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 747, disapproved on another ground in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2.) "A . . . video recording is typically authenticated by showing it is a fair and accurate representation of the scene depicted." (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267.)
"'"[A[ tape recording may be admissible even if substantial portions of it are unintelligible."'" (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 611; see also People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1205, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216; People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 574.) "'"'"[T]o be admissible, tape recordings need not be completely intelligible for the entire conversation as long as enough is intelligible to be relevant without creating an inference of speculation or unfairness." [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] Thus, a partially unintelligible tape is admissible unless the audible portions of the tape are so incomplete the tape's relevance is destroyed."'" (Jones, supra, at p. 611.)
C. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Deputy Ines's body camera video. (People v. Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 611; People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1205; People v. Siripongs, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 574.) First, the juvenile court stated that upon listening to the recording in chambers, it was able to understand "significantly more" than during trial, likely because of the distance between the bench and counsel table. Moreover, the juvenile court indicated that while it could not discern whether minor was speaker A or speaker B, it could discern which statements came from which speaker. Because it did not matter whether minor was speaker A or B, the recording was relevant and, thus, admissible.
Even though portions of the recording remained unintelligible, the recording was nonetheless admissible. (People v. Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 611.) Indeed, at trial, minor's counsel acknowledged that while he disagreed with portions of the prosecutor's transcript, "I don't think there's a lot of differences. We can talk about it." Even on appeal, minor does not dispute that most of the recording was intelligible; nor does he dispute the actual content of most of the recording. To the extent that minor continues to dispute portions of the transcript provided by the prosecutor, the juvenile court made clear that it "did not refer to it" and was "not going to take it into chambers as trier of fact and review it."
Second, the fact that the recordings refer to other people, such as "Infamous" and "Anthem", is not a basis for excluding it. Rather, to the extent that the recording includes exculpatory evidence, it is an indication that its admission did not create any "unfairness." (People v. Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 611.) Similarly, the fact that the recording is subject to "differing interpretations" is not a basis for excluding it from evidence. (Id. at p. 610 ["Although the parties debated the meaning of the taped conversation-which contained both statements that could be interpreted as inculpatory and statements that could be interpreted as exculpatory-the recording was neither misleading nor inflammatory, and was therefore properly admitted"].)
Third, to the extent that minor is concerned that the juvenile court did not hear or understand the portions of the recording that he considers to be exculpatory, minor's counsel addressed it during his closing argument. He argued that the recording was "very, very quiet," essentially asking the court to give it little weight. He also argued what he believed the recording stated and what the relevance of those statements were. Thereafter, it was up to the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to decide. (Cf. People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1214 ["However, notwithstanding the alleged inaccuracy of the original transcript, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the videotapes and not the transcript were the relevant and controlling evidence. Absent evidence to the contrary, and defendant has provided none, we presume the jury followed this instruction"].)
The People argue that minor's counsel could or should have asked for leave of court to prepare his own transcript as a guide for the court. But as the juvenile court rightly recognized: "The problem is that if I [cannot] make out any words [in the recording], then the transcript wouldn't be a guide anymore. It would completely supplant the audio. I would be completely relying on the transcript for the contents of the audio," which would have been inappropriate.
Most of minor's argument is simply his disagreement with the court's conclusion as to the significance and proper interpretation of the recording. But minor's different understanding of the significance of the recording is not a basis for excluding it from evidence. (People v. Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 610-611.)
D. Any alleged error was harmless
Even if the trial court had erred by admitting the recording into evidence, any alleged error was harmless in that it is not reasonably probable that a different result would have been reached had the challenged evidence been excluded. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018-1019; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
First, during his closing argument, minor's counsel argued, in part, that other persons were responsible for the robbery. That defense was based entirely on the body camera video. Because minor's entire third party culpability defense was premised on the admission of the audio, he cannot demonstrate manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b); see also People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 57 ["in the absence of prejudice, a defendant may not complain of error favorable to the defendant"].)
Second, as the juvenile court pointed out, other evidence established that minor and Treshawn committed the robbery together. Deputy Ines detained minor and Treshawn because they matched the description he had received. They were detained at 9901 Grape Street, four blocks from the Fir Avenue address. Lambertz's car was recovered at 2179 East Century Boulevard, which is no more than a block from where minor and Treshawn were detained. The suspects were detained about 45 minutes after the incident and about 20 minutes after Lambertz's phone was tracked. Further, Deputy Velasco directed an airship to the location where the phone was pinging. When Deputy Ines arrived at the location of the pinging, no one other than minor and Treshawn were in the immediate area. And, minor and Treshawn tried to evade the deputies, demonstrating a consciousness of guilt. (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 607.)
On appeal, minor asserts that the distance between Grape Street and Fir Avenue is four miles; thus, the evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding regarding the distance between the relevant locations. But Deputy Velasco testified that the distance was approximately four blocks.
Under minor's theory of the case, Treshawn and a third man would have had to have left the car at 2179 East Century Boulevard. The third man would have had to separate from Treshawn and leave the scene as no one other than minor and Treshawn were in the immediate area of the phone pinging when Deputy Ines arrived. He would have had to disappear without being spotted by the airship despite the short distance (four blocks) between the location of the crime (Fir Avenue) and the locations where the car was found (2179 East Century Boulevard) and where minor and Treshawn were found (9901 Grape Street), which were within a block of each other. Treshawn then would have had to either (1) contact minor and have him meet up in the general area of the Grape Street address or (2) randomly run into minor on Grape Street in the short time before he and Treshawn were detained. This version of events simply lacks believability.
II. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that minor committed robbery
Minor contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that he committed robbery.
A. Relevant law
"'The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] 'Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.]'" (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) "'In reviewing the record to determine the sufficiency of the evidence [we] may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses, nor reweigh any of the evidence, and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all conflicts, in favor of the judgment.' [Citation.]" (People v. Sumahit (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 347, 352.)
The appellant "bears a massive burden in claiming insufficient evidence" because the reviewing court's "role on appeal is a limited one." (People v. Akins (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 336.)
B. Substantial evidence supports minor's conviction for robbery
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that minor and Treshawn robbed Lambertz. A short time lapsed between the time of the robbery and the time of their detention. They were detained in the same general area as both the crime and the location where Lambertz's car was abandoned. They were the only ones in the immediate area of Lambertz's phone pinging. And, both men attempted to evade the police.
We can reach this conclusion without addressing whether Lambertz's identity of minor was sufficient.
Minor offers another theory: a third person was the driver, that person left the scene without being spotted by the airship, and minor just met up with Treshawn on Grape Street. Aside from the fact that an alternate theory is not grounds for reversal (People v. Castro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 137, 140 ["'when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the'" factfinder]), as the juvenile court expressly found, this theory lacks credibility.
The body camera audio also supports the juvenile court's determination that minor committed the robbery. At one point, the juveniles talked about how they almost got away. One speaker said, "Bro, I kept telling you walk faster. If we would have made it inside that dirt gate they can't do nothing." Several minutes later, one speaker said, "Ay cuh if we hopped on that [inaudible], if we got away from Watts." Those statements only make sense if both men participated in the robbery. The "we" necessarily refers to minor and Treshawn. Within this context, the speaker could not have been talking about himself and a third person.
IIII. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to correct the maximum time of confinement. Minor contends that the maximum term of confinement is incorrect. The People agree.
The juvenile court imposed a maximum term of confinement of six years four months. That figure is incorrect because it exceeds the permissible adult maximum sentence, which is no more than four years. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d).)
Where petitions have been sustained as to multiple felonies, "'the "maximum term of imprisonment" shall be specified in accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 1170.1 of the Penal Code.'" (In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 810.) Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: "The principal term shall consist of the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes .... The subordinate term for each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed." The calculation of one-third the middle term also applies to applies to misdemeanors that are part of a felony commitment. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 537.)
Applying these legal principles, minor's maximum term should be the middle term of three years for robbery (§ 211; count 1 of the second petition) plus eight months (one-third of the middle term of two years) for joyriding (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 2 of the first petition) plus four months (one-third of one year) for the misdemeanor count of fleeing a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 1 of the third petition), for a total maximum term of four years.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the juvenile court to correct the maximum term of confinement to four years.
We concur: LUI P.J., CHAVEZ J.