Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC938626
Mihara, J.
Defendant Ella Mae Michelle Daigle was convicted by jury trial of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). The jury also found true allegations that a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) in the commission of the robberies. The court found true allegations that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12). Defendant was committed to state prison to serve an 11-year term. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdicts.
Defendant had also been charged with being an accessory to robbery (Pen. Code, § 32). The jury was instructed that the accessory count was an alternative count to the robbery counts, and it did not return any verdict on the accessory count. The accessory count was subsequently dismissed.
Defendant’s motion to strike the strike finding was denied.
I. Analysis
“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “ ‘[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) “[The] appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425; accord People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1237.)
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164 (Cooper).) “For purposes of determining liability as an aider and abettor, the commission of robbery continues so long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety.” (Cooper, at pp. 1169-1170.) “[A] getaway driver must form the intent to facilitate or encourage commission of the robbery prior to or during the carrying away of the loot to a place of temporary safety.” (Cooper, at p. 1165.)
The prosecution’s case at trial disclosed the following facts. A Burger King was robbed near closing time at about 9:30 p.m. on March 23, 2009. No customers were inside the Burger King at the time of the robbery, but a truck was at the “drive-thru” window. Two men wearing gloves and black masks entered the Burger King. Both of the masked robbers had handguns, which they pointed at Burger King employees. The robbers filled a bag with money from a drawer and took an employee’s wallet. The robbery lasted about 10 minutes.
The defense presented no witnesses at trial.
Two witnesses were in the truck at the “drive-thru” window during the robbery. They could see the robbery taking place. The witnesses saw the two robbers “running” from the Burger King after the robbery. The robbers “tucked” their guns “inside their clothing, ” but they continued to wear their masks and gloves. One of the robbers was carrying a white bag. The robbers were “running as fast as they could.” The two robbers ran directly to a car stopped in a nearby red zone, opened the car’s rear door, and got into the car. Defendant, the driver of the car, was in it when the robbers entered the car. The robbers were still wearing their masks and gloves when they entered the car. After the two robbers entered the car, the car’s lights went on, and the car drove off.
Although there were significant distinctions between the accounts given by the two witnesses in their trial testimony, our standard of review requires us to resolve all conflicts in favor of the jury’s verdicts. Therefore, we need not detail these distinctions.
One of the witnesses called 911, and they followed the car containing the robbers while the witness talked to the 911 operator. While the witnesses were following the car, one of them saw the robbers remove their masks. The car drove “fast” for about five minutes until it reached an apartment building. At that point, the car slowed down, and one of the robbers “jumped out” of the car. The car made a u-turn, and it subsequently ran a stop light. At the entrance to the freeway, the car slowed down, and the other robber got out of the car and ran into some bushes. The car proceeded onto the freeway where it sped up to 90 miles per hour. It took the very next exit off the freeway and went to a gas station. The truck containing the witnesses also pulled into the gas station. Defendant got out of the car holding her cell phone and asked the witnesses why they were following her. One of the witnesses replied: “ ‘You know why I’m following you. The cops are on their way.’ ” Defendant then “started playing with” her phone. The police arrived less than a minute later and arrested defendant.
Defendant contends that “there is simply nothing to show that appellant is culpable for robbery as an aider and abettor.” She claims that there was no evidence “that she had knowledge that the two men planned to rob the Burger King, ” but “only evidence that she gave the men a ride, and that at some point they either asked to get out of the car or she told them to get out of the car.” Her contention ignores both the applicable law and the evidence.
Defendant also relies on the fact that the two witnesses gave different descriptions of the events. This argument ignores the applicable standard of review, which requires us to resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury’s verdicts.
The prosecution was not required to prove that defendant had advance knowledge that the two men “planned to rob the Burger King.” The prosecution could establish defendant’s liability as an aider and abettor by proving that defendant knew that the men had robbed the Burger King and establishing that she intended to and did aid the robbers in asporting the loot away. (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165.)
Nor was it true that the evidence established “only” that defendant “gave the men a ride.” Defendant was in her car, in a red zone, with the lights off, near the Burger King during the robbery. The fact that defendant was sitting in her car, at night, with the lights off, in a red zone reflects that she was waiting for the two men to come out of the Burger King. The two robbers ran directly from the Burger King to her car. This too reflects that the men and defendant had prearranged that she would act as their getaway driver. The fact that defendant immediately turned on the cars lights and drove away when the men entered her car confirmed that her role as the getaway driver was preplanned.
Defendant could not have been unaware that the two men had just committed a robbery when they reached her car. The two men were running, wearing masks and gloves, and carrying a white bag. It strains credulity to suggest that defendant failed to appreciate the significance of these circumstances. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant would have understood that the two men had just committed a robbery and that the white bag contained the loot from the robbery. By acting as the prearranged getaway driver for two men who had obviously just committed a robbery and were plainly escaping with the loot, defendant satisfied the requisite elements for aider and abettor liability.
Her subsequent conduct further demonstrated that she and the two robbers shared a unity of purpose. She drove quickly away from the Burger King, dropped one man off at one location, made a u-turn, ran a stop light, and then dropped the other man off at a different location. Her intent to aid the men in escaping with the loot could not have been more manifest. In addition, apparently aware that she was being followed, she got on the freeway, drove at an excessive speed, but then got off at the first exit. When she confronted the two witnesses, she expressed no surprise that the police were on their way. This was the conduct of a person who knew that she had facilitated the men’s escape from the scene of the robbery.
While the evidence against defendant was necessarily circumstantial, it was fully sufficient to satisfy the elements of aider and abettor liability for the robbery counts. The jury’s verdicts are supported by substantial evidence.
II. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J., Lucas, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.