Opinion
Court of Appeals No. 16CA0002
05-19-2016
The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of D.A.H., a Child, and Concerning D.H., Respondent-Appellant.
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Jonathan Weinstein, Assistant County Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee Gina G. Bischofs, Guardian Ad Litem Linda D. Lauchli, P.C., Linda D. Lauchli, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
Adams County District Court No. 14JV150
Honorable Jill-Ellyn Straus, Judge JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
J. Jones and Lichtenstein, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Jonathan Weinstein, Assistant County Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee Gina G. Bischofs, Guardian Ad Litem Linda D. Lauchli, P.C., Linda D. Lauchli, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, D.H. (father) appeals the trial court's judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with D.A.H. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In May 2014, the Adams County Human Services Department (Department) filed a dependency and neglect petition after learning that father, who was on parole, had recently tested positive for methamphetamine on two occasions. The Department was also concerned that father was selling methamphetamine out of the home that he shared with the six-year-old child. ¶ 3 Based on father's admission, the court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for father. ¶ 4 The Department subsequently moved to terminate the parent-child legal relationship between father and the child. At the hearing on the termination motion in October 2015, the court received father's statement as well as the parties' offers of proof. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated father's parental rights.
Because father agreed to the offer of proof procedure — and does not challenge it on appeal — we do not consider whether such a procedure afforded father due process or is sufficient to establish the termination criteria by clear and convincing evidence. See People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 631 (Colo. 1982); see also CRE 103 (governing offers of proof). --------
II. Parental Unfitness
¶ 5 Father contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was an unfit parent and his circumstances were unlikely to change in a reasonable time. We disagree.
A. The Law
¶ 6 The court may terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent's conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2015; People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶ 7 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders him unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care. People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the child's physical, emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). ¶ 8 In determining whether a parent can become fit within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether any changes occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding, the parent's social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent's conduct or condition. D.P., 160 P.3d at 353. A reasonable time is not indefinite, and must be determined by considering the child's conditions and needs. A.J., 143 P.3d at 1152. ¶ 9 Additionally, the court may consider even a relatively short period of parental incarceration as a significant factor in determining a parent's fitness and ability to become fit within a reasonable time. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 701-02 (Colo. 2006). ¶ 10 We will not disturb the trial court's findings and conclusions when the record supports them. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982).
B. Analysis
¶ 11 The record from the termination hearing shows that father had been unable to maintain sobriety. After having his parole revoked due to methamphetamine use, father successfully completed a ninety-day residential treatment program in late 2014. But, within three months of completing the program, father missed urinalysis tests, resumed selling methamphetamine, and was arrested for a new drug offense. ¶ 12 As a result of the new offense, father had begun serving a three-year sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections in May 2015. Thereafter, father had voluntarily chosen to participate in an intensive, nine-month program that provided both substance abuse and mental health treatment. He had also moved to have his criminal sentence reconsidered and hoped to be released into the community once he finished the program. ¶ 13 However, father had completed only four months of the program and acknowledged that he was uncertain when he would be released. Consequently, father remained unavailable to parent the child in the near future. In contrast, the child, who had not seen father since his arrest eight months earlier, needed permanency. ¶ 14 The record therefore supports the trial court's findings that father would not be released from prison in the near future and that he had an overall history of lack of success in complying with the treatment plan. On this record, we discern no error in the trial court's findings that father was an unfit parent and his conduct or condition was unlikely to change in a reasonable time. ¶ 15 Accordingly, we will not disturb them on appeal.
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LICHTENSTEIN concur.