Opinion
690 KA 17–01495
07-31-2019
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (SARA A. GOLDFARB OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (KENNETH H. TYLER, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (SARA A. GOLDFARB OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (KENNETH H. TYLER, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of, inter alia, murder in the second degree ( Penal Law§ 125.25[1] ), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress statements that he made to the police after he purportedly invoked his right to remain silent. We reject that contention. The law in that area is well settled. If a suspect in custody "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease" ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966] ; see People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 322, 482 N.Y.S.2d 237, 472 N.E.2d 13 [1984], cert denied 472 U.S. 1007, 105 S.Ct. 2700, 86 L.Ed.2d 717 [1985] ). The statements defendant made to a police detective—"I can't talk no more" and "I've told you everything"—"when taken in context, [were] not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent or a direction that he wished the interview to end" ( People v. Howard, 72 A.D.3d 1199, 1201, 897 N.Y.S.2d 786 [3d Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 806, 908 N.Y.S.2d 165, 934 N.E.2d 899 [2010] ; see e.g. People v. Cole, 59 A.D.3d 302, 302, 873 N.Y.S.2d 603 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 924, 884 N.Y.S.2d 705, 912 N.E.2d 1086 [2009] ; People v. Allen, 147 A.D.2d 968, 968, 537 N.Y.S.2d 415 [4th Dept. 1989], lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 1010, 541 N.Y.S.2d 765, 539 N.E.2d 593 [1989], reconsideration denied 74 N.Y.2d 660, 543 N.Y.S.2d 403, 541 N.E.2d 432 [1989] ; cf. People v. Douglas, 8 A.D.3d 980, 980–981, 778 N.Y.S.2d 622 [4th Dept. 2004], lv denied 3 N.Y.3d 705, 785 N.Y.S.2d 33, 818 N.E.2d 675 [2004] ).
In any event, we conclude that any error by the court in refusing to suppress the statements made by defendant after he purportedly invoked his right to remain silent is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt (see People v. Deas, 102 A.D.3d 464, 464, 961 N.Y.S.2d 10 [1st Dept. 2013], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1097, 965 N.Y.S.2d 793, 988 N.E.2d 531 [2013] ; see generally People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ). We note that defendant made no admissions to the detective during his prolonged interview, and the videotape of defendant's police interview was not admitted in evidence at trial. Moreover, defendant testified at trial and admitted to having stabbed the two victims; the only issue at trial related to defendant's intent, and his statements to the detective were not harmful to defendant on that issue.
Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). Contrary to defendant's final contention, the sentence is not unduly harsh and severe.