At the suppression hearing, the driver of the vehicle admitted that he committed the subject traffic infraction, even though his account of the interaction between the officers and the occupants of the vehicle otherwise differed from the police officer's account. Nothing in the record supports the defendant's contention that the police officer patently tailored his testimony to nullify constitutional objections, or that his testimony was otherwise unworthy of belief (see People v. Cooks, 57 A.D.3d 796, 797, 870 N.Y.S.2d 80 ; People v. Rivera, 27 A.D.3d 489, 490, 812 N.Y.S.2d 575 ; People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664, 624 N.Y.S.2d 234 ). Upon making a valid traffic stop, the police had discretion to order the occupants to exit the vehicle (see People v. Patron, 141 A.D.3d 545, 35 N.Y.S.3d 243 ; People v. Davis, 103 A.D.3d at 811, 962 N.Y.S.2d 174 ; People v. Grant, 83 A.D.3d at 864, 921 N.Y.S.2d 285 ; see also People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773, 774, 545 N.Y.S.2d 90, 543 N.E.2d 733 ).
At the suppression hearing, the driver of the vehicle admitted that he committed the subject traffic infraction, even though his account of the interaction between the officers and the occupants of the vehicle otherwise differed from the police officer's account. Nothing in the record supports the defendant's contention that the police officer patently tailored his testimony to nullify constitutional objections, or that his testimony was otherwise unworthy of belief (see People v Cooks, 57 AD3d 796, 797; People v Rivera, 27 AD3d 489, 490; People v Curry, 213 AD2d 664). Upon making a valid traffic stop, the police had discretion to order the occupants to exit the vehicle (see People v Patron, 141 AD3d 545; People v Davis, 103 AD3d at 811; People v Grant, 83 AD3d at 864; see also People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 774).
rode in the back of the detectives' vehicle unrestrained ( see People v. D'Amico, 296 A.D.2d 579, 745 N.Y.S.2d 722). Although the interview that ensued was lengthy, that fact, without more, does not render the defendant's statements involuntary ( see People v. Alexander, 51 A.D.3d 1380, 1381, 857 N.Y.S.2d 418). The defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) before all questioning and again before giving his written statement. He was afforded several breaks, provided food and water, and permitted to use the bathroom ( see People v. Bryan, 43 A.D.3d 447, 448, 842 N.Y.S.2d 29; People v. Hasty, 25 A.D.3d 740, 741, 807 N.Y.S.2d 647). Under these circumstances, the lead detective's testimony at the hearing that the defendant never indicated he was tired and needed a break was not incredible or patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections ( see People v. Rivera, 27 A.D.3d 489, 490, 812 N.Y.S.2d 575; People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664, 624 N.Y.S.2d 234). Although the defendant now contends that the police unnecessarily delayed in arraigning him for the purpose of obtaining his statements in violation of CPL 140.20(1), which bears on the issue of voluntariness, the defendant failed to preserve this contention for appellate review, thereby depriving the People of an opportunity to put forth other reasons for the alleged delay in arraignment ( see People v. Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d 27, 37, 750 N.Y.S.2d 821, 780 N.E.2d 506; People v. Hayward, 48 A.D.3d 209, 210, 851 N.Y.S.2d 153; People v. Rumrill, 40 A.D.3d 1273, 1274, 836 N.Y.S.2d 333; People v. Sears, 9 A.D.3d 472, 780 N.Y.S.2d 178; People v. Seeber, 4 A.D.3d 620, 622, 772 N.Y.S.2d 122, affd 4 N.Y.3d 780, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797). In any event, “an undue delay in arraignment is but one factor in assessing the voluntariness of a confession” ( People v. Williams, 53 A.D.3d 591, 592, 861 N.Y.S.2d 420; see People v. Gladding, 60 A.D.3d 1401, 1402, 875 N.Y.S.2d 386; People v. Prude, 2 A.
The "credibility determinations of a hearing court are accorded great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record" ( People v Umadat, 29 AD3d 830; see People v Bhattacharjee, 51 AD3d 684; People v Wynter, 48 AD3d 492). Here, according deference to the credibility determinations of the hearing court, it cannot be said that the detective's testimony at the pretrial Mapp/Dunaway hearing ( see Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200) was incredible as a matter of law, patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections, or otherwise unworthy of belief ( see People v Rivera, 27 AD3d 489, 490; People v Curry, 213 AD2d 664).
In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. The factual findings and credibility determinations of the hearing court are entitled to great deference on appeal, and its conclusions will not be set aside unless manifestly erroneous or unsupported by the record ( see People v. Curry, 213 AD2d 664). Upon review of the hearing record, we find no evidence to support the defendant's claim that the detective's testimony was incredible as a matter of law, patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections, or otherwise unworthy of belief ( see People v. Curry, supra; People v. Baez, 208 AD2d 638, 639; People v. Santiago, 144 AD2d 502). Accordingly, we discern no basis for disturbing the court's denial of suppression.
The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. The police officer's observation of defendant walking in a drug-prone neighborhood with a companion who was openly sniffing a bag of marijuana, provided the officer with a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and justified a common-law inquiry of defendant as to whether he had any contraband Defendant was not merely in proximity to unlawful activity, but was clearly accompanying a person who was engaged in such activity ( see People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 971; compare People v. Leveridge, 204 A.D.2d 246, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 828). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. The defendant's contention that the police officer's hearing testimony was incredible is unpersuasive. It is well settled that the factual findings and credibility determinations of the hearing court are entitled to great deference on appeal and its conclusions will not be set aside unless manifestly erroneous or unsupported by the record (see People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664). Here, there is no basis to disturb the hearing court's determination since the officer's testimony was neither incredible as a matter of law nor patently tailored to overcome constitutional objections (see People v. Curry, supra).
The circumstances that the police encountered defendant and his companions leaving the scene as the police arrived to investigate a report of an armed robbery in progress, combined with the police observations of furtive and nervous behavior of the group at the mere sight of the police, provided a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thereby permitting inquiry as to their purpose in the building ( see, People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223). The failure of defendant or any of his companions to provide a reasonable response to that simple inquiry, and the concomitant observation by an experienced police officer of a bulge in the waistband of one of defendant's companions, justified a safety frisk of defendant and his companions ( People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 971). The recovery of a gun from one of defendant's companions, as well as a knife from defendant, who also carried a security box known to the officers to be a target of the type of robbery reported, provided the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity required to detain defendant and his companions for showup purposes ( People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 242). The prompt on-the-scene showup procedure challenged by defendant was proper in all respects. The circumstance that defendant was handcuffed at the time did not render the procedure unduly suggestive ( People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 545), and there is no evidence that the identifications made by the first complainant in any way influenced the identifications made by the second complainant, or that they were told, in advance of the showup procedure, that an item of stolen property had been recovered from the individuals being held.
( supra, at 177). Although nothing was discovered with the initial pat down in this case, the further frisk of defendant by Officer Langellotti was warranted when a gun was found on co-defendant, providing additional confirmation of the report that the men were armed, heightening the possibility that defendant too had a gun ( People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 971; People v. Pagan, 203 A.D.2d 158, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 970; People v. Chin, 192 A.D.2d 413, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1071). The frisk of defendant was reasonably restricted, and not, as defendant contends, a full-blown search.
The police officer who stopped the vehicle had reason to believe that its occupants were engaged in criminal activity as his observations and a check on the vehicle's New Jersey license plate led him to believe that the vehicle was stolen. Once a gun was found on one of the passengers, the officers were justified in frisking the appellant (see, People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210; People v. Curry, 213 A.D.2d 664; see also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1). The appellant's contention that he was impermissibly frisked a second time, after the initial frisk failed to reveal that he was armed, is without merit, as the officers were entitled to take this precautionary measure once a gun was found on his companion (cf., People v Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106).