Opinion
H046009
10-20-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GONZALO CURIEL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS152108B)
Gonzalo Curiel was convicted by jury trial of first degree murder (counts 1 and 2; Penal Code, § 187, subd. (a)), child abuse (count 3; § 273a, subd. (a)), and torture (counts 4-6; § 206). As to the murder counts, the jury found true torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) and multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) special circumstances. For count 3, the jury also found true an allegation that Curiel personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Curiel to life without the possibility of parole for both murder convictions, consecutive to a term of life with the possibility of parole for one of the torture convictions. The court imposed and stayed additional sentences for the remaining convictions and allegations.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it denied Curiel's motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. We conclude that the trial court did not err, and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2014, Tami Huntsman agreed to take care of two nieces, Jane Doe (age eight) and D.T. (age two), and her nephew S.T. (age five). The three children lived with Huntsman in an apartment in Salinas. Also living at the apartment at the time were Huntsman's husband, her teenage son, and her 10-year old twins. Curiel, who was then 16 years old, became friends with Huntsman's teenage son. Curiel began to regularly stay at Huntsman's apartment. Curiel and Huntsman soon became romantically involved. Huntsman's husband moved out, and Huntsman's son was sent to Juvenile Hall. Curiel started sleeping with Huntsman in the master bedroom.
Curiel and Huntsman began to severely abuse Jane Doe, D.T., and S.T. The abuse included beating the children, keeping them in a cold bathroom with no clothes, spraying them with water, forcing them to sit in wet clothes, withholding food, and zip tying their hands together behind their backs or to the bed.
After Thanksgiving 2015, Curiel and Huntsman abruptly packed up some belongings and drove to northern California. Huntsman's children and Jane Doe were passengers in the vehicle; D.T. and S.T. were not. When Jane Doe asked Huntsman where D.T and S.T. were, Huntsman said she had put them up for adoption. During the drive, there was a "bad" smell coming from a storage bin in the back of the vehicle.
While in northern California, Huntsman rented a storage unit in Redding. At the storage unit, Curiel and Huntsman took items out of the vehicle, including the plastic storage bins, and put them into the storage unit. Thereafter, the "bad" smell in the vehicle dissipated.
Huntsman and Curiel eventually arrived in the small northern California town of Quincy, which is near Redding, where Huntsman attempted to establish a residence. While there, a friend of Huntsman's called Child Protective Services (CPS) because Jane Doe was extremely thin and bruised. CPS and a sheriff's deputy responded. Inside of Huntsman's vehicle, they discovered Jane Doe was badly bruised, scarred, severely malnourished, and she appeared to have a broken collar bone and broken finger. After being given Miranda advisements, Curiel admitted some culpability in causing the injuries to Jane Doe. Curiel eventually stated he wanted a lawyer present, the interview was terminated, and he and Huntsman were arrested. Huntsman was taken to jail and Curiel was taken to a juvenile detention facility in Butte County.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Later, Huntsman's mother phoned the sheriff's department to inquire about S.T.'s and D.T.'s whereabouts. The detective with whom she spoke said he had no knowledge of those children. Huntsman's mother urged the detective to find them, and she expressed concern the children were dead. The detective began an immediate and urgent effort to try to find S.T. and D.T. A sheriff's deputy questioned Huntsman, who stated that "some agency" had taken custody of the children. Feeling that the investigation had reached an impasse, and worried that the weather in Quincy was very cold, the deputy called the juvenile detention center where Curiel was being held "to have somebody talk to . . . Curiel and see if he knew where the children were." The deputy spoke with the juvenile detention center supervisor and instructed him to "ask about the kids, don't ask any other questions about the case."
The juvenile detention center supervisor and an assistant interviewed Curiel in the visitation room at the facility. They did not provide him with advisements under Miranda. During the interview, the questioning focused solely on the location of S.T. and D.T. At one point, Curiel laid his head down and acted like he was trying to sleep. The supervisor kicked the leg of the table. The juvenile detention center supervisor and his assistant stated that they spoke calmly to Curiel, without accusing him of wrongdoing or threatening him. Curiel initially claimed he did not know the location of S.T. and D.T. Curiel eventually stated that the children were in a storage unit in Redding, and gave a detailed description of its location.
Law enforcement arrived at the Redding storage facility without a search warrant. The assistant manager, who was on-site, received a call from the facility's owner stating that the police were looking for her. The assistant manager then discovered officers "scaling the rock wall" to enter the facility. The assistant manager took police to Huntsman's storage unit. They immediately went inside because "it was a lifesaving effort at [that] time," and they still "had some hope that the children were still alive." Inside of the storage unit, officers found D.T.'s and S.T.'s bodies in a plastic storage container. They immediately stepped out, secured the scene, and obtained a search warrant. Four days after the bodies were discovered, Huntsman's vehicle was searched by the Salinas Police Department, having been retrieved from the Redding Police Department. Inside of the driver's side door pocket, they found a receipt for a storage unit in Redding, a business card with information about the storage unit, and the storage unit lease agreement. The business card reflected the name of the facility, its address, the storage unit number, and the monthly payment due.
The search of the vehicle was delayed because of uncertainty over which agency had jurisdiction over the case. While the vehicle was recovered in Plumas County by the Redding Police Department, it was determined that the children likely had died in Salinas, and so the investigation, including the vehicle, was handed over to the Salinas Police Department. It was "always intended" that the vehicle would be searched.
Prior to trial, Curiel moved under section 1538.5 to suppress the evidence obtained from the storage unit, including the bodies of D.T. and S.T. Curiel argued that the bodies had been discovered after Curiel's Miranda rights had been violated, and thus suppression of the physical evidence derived from that violation was warranted. The trial court denied the section 1538.5 motion. The court specifically found that Curiel had been advised of his Miranda rights during the initial questioning in Quincy regarding the CPS investigation into Jane Doe's injuries, that he affirmatively indicated he wanted to speak to an attorney, and "[t]hat request was honored." The court then noted that Huntsman's mother had expressed "grave concerns about [D.T.'s and S.T.'s] health and safety," which led to a "relentless" effort "to locate the children." The court then noted that inside Huntsman's vehicle there was "a rental receipt from the storage facility in Redding that contained the deceased children." Accordingly, the court determined that "the location and discovery of the children in the storage facility was inevitable" based on the effort and resources that had already been deployed towards finding the children.
II. DISCUSSION
Curiel argues that his rights under Miranda and Edwards were violated when he was questioned at the juvenile detention facility after he had previously invoked his right to counsel. He contends that "all evidence of the finding of the bodies of" S.T. and D.T. "should have been suppressed" as a result of the Miranda violation, and that the error was prejudicial because there would otherwise have been "no evidence to support [Curiel's] two murder convictions pertaining to those two children."
Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 (Edwards).
A. Standard of Review
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires state and federal courts to exclude evidence from unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.) Section 1538.5 allows a defendant to move to suppress evidence obtained in an improper seizure. Our standard of review is well established. "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] And in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)
B. Inevitable Discovery
"Evidence need not be suppressed if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means." (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1040 (Carpenter).) More specifically, the prosecution "must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that, due to a separate line of investigation, application of routine police procedures, or some other circumstance, the [unlawfully obtained evidence] would have been discovered by lawful means." (People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.) "[T]he doctrine 'is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.' [Citation]" (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800.) "As this is essentially a question of fact, we must uphold the trial court's determination if supported by substantial evidence." (Carpenter, at p. 1040.)
In this case, the trial court impliedly found, or at the very least assumed, that the interview at the juvenile detention facility constituted a Miranda violation. However, the court explicitly found that the prosecution had established that the bodies of D.T. and S.T. would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means. This finding was supported by substantial evidence. At the time that Curiel was questioned, he had been arrested for the extremely serious abuse of Jane Doe. Jane Doe had been found emaciated, bruised, and with apparent broken bones in Huntsman's vehicle. Although the vehicle was not immediately searched, it was in police custody and there was no question it would be searched. Police soon learned that two other young children, D.T. and S.T., were missing and that Huntsman's mother suspected they were in serious danger. As a result, police had undertaken an extensive search. Inside of Huntsman's impounded vehicle were documents that would have led authorities directly to the storage unit in Redding, which police undoubtedly would have searched after learning of its existence. In short, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the bodies would inevitably have been discovered as a result of an ongoing police investigation.
For purposes of our analysis, we need not determine whether a Miranda violation occurred.
Curiel suggests there is a possibility that either he or Huntsman might have been released from custody and might have been able to remove the bodies from the storage facility. We find this implausible. In assessing whether evidence inevitably would have been discovered, a reviewing court should " ' "not leave its common sense at the door." ' " (People v. Cervantes (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 872.) In this case, Huntsman and Curiel were being held on very serious child endangerment charges. Based on the call from Huntsman's mother, police had initiated an all-out search to find D.T. and S.T., with suspicion focusing directly on Curiel and Huntsman. It is unlikely that either of them would have been released before the vehicle was searched. It is inconceivable, given that two children were missing, that either of them would have been allowed to travel without police surveillance to Redding. Put simply, neither Curiel nor Huntsman was in any conceivable position to remove the bodies from the storage facility before their inevitable discovery.
At oral argument, Curiel's appellate counsel relied heavily on this court's opinion in People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 [Walker], to argue that "theoretical" or "hypothetical" suppositions of what police might have done cannot support the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. In Walker, this court rejected "any assertion that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies . . . simply because the police had sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant" and theoretically could have obtained one. (Id. at p. 1215.) The court stated that the doctrine must only be applied when "the record supports a finding that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered." (Id. at p. 1216.) The Walker court then found the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine appropriate where campus safety officers facilitated the seizure of contraband from a dorm room by police officers who did not first obtain a search warrant or lawful consent. The court concluded the administration would have involved the police in any event as the safety officers had contacted the police, gathered the marijuana and cash for inspection, and displayed it to them. "The probability that the University would have involved the police further is heightened by the fact that the safety officers' investigation had disclosed a potentially significant marijuana sales enterprise on the University campus" that would not have been addressed as an internal campus rules violation. (Id. at pp. 1216-1217.)
We do not deviate from the analysis in Walker here. The trial court did not rely on, and we do not adopt, any hypothetical or theoretical argument that the police had sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the storage unit. Instead, consistent with Walker, we conclude that the record supports a finding that the children's bodies would have been discovered as a result of the ongoing and focused police investigation of the abuse of Jane Doe and the high probability of the discovery of storage unit documents in Huntsman's impounded vehicle. The officers investigating the abuse of Jane Doe were further mobilized by the urgent need to find the two younger children who were reported missing and in danger soon after Huntsman and Curiel were arrested for child endangerment. On these facts, the trial court correctly concluded the discovery of the connection between Huntsman and the storage unit by law enforcement was inevitable.
On this basis alone, even assuming a Miranda violation, the trial court did not err in denying Curiel's motion to suppress.
The Attorney General argues that there are additional bases for affirming the judgment: Curiel cannot suppress physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation; he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage unit; and the questioning was permissible under the rescue doctrine. Because the trial court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was supported by substantial evidence, we do not address these arguments. --------
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Greenwood, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Grover, J. /s/_________
Danner, J.