In People v. Billops (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 892, we discussed at length the responsibility of the trial court to address the defendant personally in open court for the purpose of informing him of and determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him. Likewise, it has been held that failure specifically to inform defendant of his right to a trial by "jury" is a substantial deficiency ( People v. Bolden, 7 Ill. App.3d 730), and that even the signing of a jury waiver is insufficient to comply with the requirements of the rule. ( People v. Carle, 8 Ill. App.3d 56; People v. Cummings, 7 Ill. App.3d 306.) In each of these cases the deficiency was held to constitute reversible error and they are dispositive of the issues presented in the case before us.

¶ 28 Defendant, to support his argument that the written admonishments are no substitute when the judge is required by rule to give oral admonishments in open court, cites to several cases concerning a defendant's right to a jury trial. See People v. Phillips, 242 Ill.2d 189, 351 Ill.Dec. 298, 950 N.E.2d 1126 (2011) (where statute required that judge warn accused to appear for court, warning on signed bond slip was no substitute); Scott, 186 Ill.2d at 284–85, 238 Ill.Dec. 36, 710 N.E.2d 833 (a written waiver form alone does not validly waive a defendant's right to a jury trial); People v. Cummings, 7 Ill.App.3d 306, 308, 287 N.E.2d 291 (1972) (preprinted Rule 402 admonishments did not substitute for in-court admonishments). ¶ 29 The cases cited by defendant are distinguishable from the instant case.

¶ 28 Defendant, to support his argument that the written admonishments are no substitute when the judge is required by rule to give oral admonishments in open court, cites to several cases concerning a defendant's right to a jury trial. See People v. Phillips, 242 Ill. 2d 189 (2011) (where statute required that judge warn accused to appear for court, warning on signed bond slip was no substitute); Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 284-85 (a written waiver form alone does not validly waive a defendant's right to a jury trial); People v. Cummings, 7 Ill. App. 3d 306, 308 (1972) (preprinted Rule 402 admonishments did not substitute for in-court admonishments). ¶ 29 The cases cited by defendant are distinguishable from the instant case.

We recognize that other jurisdictions have adopted this procedure (see, e.g., Mich. Gen. Rules of Ct. of 1963, rule 785.7(1); People v. Napier (1976) 69 Mich. App. 46, 48 [ 244 N.W.2d 359, 360]; Ill. Supreme Ct. Rules, rule 402; State v. Cummings (1972) 7 Ill. App.3d 306 [ 287 N.E.2d 291]; Colo. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 11; People v. Van Hook (1975) 36 Colo. App. 226 [ 539 P.2d 507]; Church v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) 344 So.2d 1253; Cooper v. State (1973) 53 Ala. App. 36 [ 297 So.2d 169]). We nevertheless remain unconvinced of its necessity.

He argues that, relying on his representation that he read the written form and understood it, without any accompanying oral admonishments, the trial court only knew that he understood his rights as he interpreted the form, not whether he understood his rights as they are enumerated in Rule 402(a). In support, he relies on People v. Cummings, 7 Ill. App. 3d 306 (1972). In Cummings, the appellate court found that the oral Rule 402 admonishments were so lacking that the written form was offered as an almost-complete substitute.

However, where oral admonishments are extremely deficient, the written admonishment is considered a total substitute. Id. ¶ 29 (citing People v. Cummings, 7 Ill.App.3d 306, 308 (1972)).

defendant personally, " 'not only will the judge be better able to ascertain the plea's voluntariness, but he also will develop a more complete record to support his determination in a subsequent post-conviction attack.' " People v. Cummings, 7 Ill. App. 3d 306, 307 (2d Dist. 1972) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)).¶ 20 An improper admonishment, however, does not automatically establish grounds for reversing judgment or vacating a guilty plea.

Substantial compliance with this requirement is not satisfied simply by showing that defendant has signed a waiver of jury form. People v. Carle (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 56, 57-58; People v. Cummings (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 306, 308. In the instant action, the trial judge and defendant engaged in the following colloquy:

(Rule 402(a)(3)) and to a jury trial (Rule 402(a)(4)), and that by pleading guilty he waives these rights ( People v. Avery (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 986, 988-89, 307 N.E.2d 213, 215-16 (not in compliance with rule where judge failed to inquire how defendant wished to plead, assumed he had pleaded guilty and conditioned withdrawal of assumed plea on court's refusal to accept it; not substantial compliance where court made no specific explanation of right to jury trial, instead presenting written form waiving jury and pleading guilty, and merely asking defendant on its return if it contained his signature); see also People v. Carle (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 56, 288 N.E.2d 876 (insufficient that defendant signed waiver of jury and plea of guilty form and judge questioned him on authenticity and voluntariness of signature)); (4) the nature of the charge (Rule 402(a)(1)), his right to confront witnesses (Rule 402(a)(4)), nor did the judge determine the factual basis for the plea (Rule 402(c)) ( People v. Cummings (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291 (transcript revealed trial judge did not give admonitions by addressing defendant in open court; 13-paragraph printed "plea of guilty" form serving as express waiver of rights cannot substitute for this duty of trial court)); (5) his right to plead not guilty (Rule 402(a)(3)) and that if he did plead guilty he waived the right to confront witnesses against him (Rule 402(a)(4)), and where court did not question defendant personally in open court to determine whether any force, threats, or promises were used to obtain the plea (Rule 402(b)) ( People v. Thompson (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 455, 294 N.E.2d 104); (6) his right to plead not guilty (Rule 402(a)(3)), and that if he did plead guilty he waived his right to jury trial and to confront witnesses against him (Rule 402(a)(4)), and court did not question defendant to determine whether any force, threats or promises apart from plea agreement were used to obtain plea (Rule 402(b)) ( People v. Kehoe (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 955, 295 N.E.2d 292

On the strength of People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill.2d 371, we reach the conclusion that there was substantial compliance with Rule 402 and that the deficiencies noted are not sufficient to constitute reversible error. • 2 We agree with the defendant's contentions that the mere signing of a printed form allegedly waiving the constitutional right to a jury trial is not sufficient to indicate that such an alleged waiver was performed not only understandingly but also expressly ( People v. Rambo, 123 Ill. App.2d 299, 260 N.E.2d 119; People v. Cummings, 7 Ill. App.3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291), and that the election to forego a jury trial must expressly and understandably be made ( People v. Surgeon, 15 Ill.2d 236, 154 N.E.2d 253). We conclude that there has been substantial compliance with the rule.