People v. Crystal Corp.

6 Citing cases

  1. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Const

    715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986)   Cited 12 times
    Applying the Wyoming version of the Uniform Arbitration Act

    O'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Company, 48 Cal.2d 107, 308 P.2d 9 (1957); American Motorists Insurance Company v. Llanes, 396 Mich. 113, 240 N.W.2d 203 (1976); New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company v. Franklin, 160 N.J. Super. 292, 389 A.2d 980 (1978); National Cash Register Company v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951, 171 N.E.2d 302 (1960); Coventry Teachers' Alliance v. Coventry School Committee, R.I., 417 A.2d 886 (1980); and Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1242 (1970). The comments of the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Crystal River Corporation, 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429, 432 (1955), are typical: "We think it is fundamental law that an individual or an agency of the state may not freely participate in the selection of arbitrators, in accordance with statute, attend the hearing, submit his evidence, hope for a favorable award, and in the event of an adverse finding, seek a review merely because the award is unfavorable to him. * * *"

  2. Western Oil Fields v. Rathbun

    250 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1958)   Cited 6 times

    Arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact, and an award will not be reviewed or set aside because of a mistake of the arbitrator in either. People ex rel. Kimball v. Crystal River Corp., 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429; Twin Lakes Reservoir Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc., 112 Colo. 155, 147 P.2d 828. In People ex rel. Kimball v. Crystal River Corp., supra, 280 P.2d 432, the court said:

  3. Gaddis Mining Co. v. Continental Materials Corp.

    196 F. Supp. 860 (D. Wyo. 1961)   Cited 8 times

    The authority of a court to review the award of the arbitrators is limited to the causes set out in Rule 109 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of Colorado. People ex rel. Kimball v. Crystal River Corporation et al., 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429. Paragraph (g) of the rule provides that an arbitration adjudication may be "impeached and set aside for fraud or other sufficient cause, the same as a judgment of a court of record", and relief may be had "on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, as in the case of other judgments, orders or proceedings of the court". There is no evidence in the record of this case of any fraud practiced upon the arbitrators, nor of any accident or mistake which deceived or misled them, "so that the award did not in fact represent their judgment upon the matters submitted". Twin Lakes Reservoir Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc., 112 Colo. 155, 147 P.2d 828, 835; Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Colo. 615, 34 P. 175.

  4. Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local No. 858

    663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses

    When an arbitrator is required to interpret the provisions of an existing agreement, he acts in a judicial capacity rather than in a legislative one. See People ex rel. Kimball v. Crystal River Corp., 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429 (1955). The authority to interpret an existing contract, therefore, does not constitute legislative authority, and the nondelegation principle is not implicated in grievance arbitration.

  5. Int'l Serv. Ins. v. Ross

    457 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1969)   Cited 18 times
    Applying the above rule in denying a motion for change of venue, but placing some weight on the out-of-state location of the company's home office

    On the contrary, it is agreed that in Colorado an arbitrator is the final judge of both the law and the fact, and his award is final in the absence of fraud or similar misconduct. People ex rel Kimball v. Crystal Corp., 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 429, Twin Lakes Co. v. Rogers, 112 Colo. 155, 147 P.2d 828; Western Oil Fields, Inc. v. Rathbun, 250 F.2d 69; and Gaddis Mining Co. v. Continental Materials Corp., 196 F. Supp. 860. As concerns this particular matter, it is Ross's position that the first award of the arbitrator was properly subject to review inasmuch as, according to Ross, such review was predicated upon "misconduct" of the arbitrator, misconduct presumably based on fraud or bad faith; whereas the defenses sought to be raised by the Company to the second award of the arbitrator are not based on fraud or misconduct, and hence, says Ross, were properly stricken.

  6. Sisters of Mercy v. Mead & Mount Construction Co.

    439 P.2d 733 (Colo. 1968)   Cited 6 times

    The arbitration proceedings were in conformity with R.C.P. 109. [2-5] The province of arbitration was well stated in People ex rel. Kinball v. Crystal River Corporation, 131 Colo. 163, 167, 168, 280 P.2d 429, 432, and is applicable here: "We think it is fundamental law that an individual or an agency of the state may not freely participate in the selection of arbitrators, in accordance with statute, attend the hearing, submit his evidence hope for a favorable award, and in the event of an adverse finding, seek a review merely because the award is unfavorable to him or it. It is fundamental that arbitration in its very nature is a method of settling disputes without court procedure.