Opinion
B326466
12-12-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGEL CRUZATA, Defendant and Appellant.
Adrian Dresel-Velasquez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA206901 Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian Dresel-Velasquez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZUKIN, J.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder for his role in a fatal shooting. Defendant petitioned for resentencing relief from his conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, finding he was ineligible for relief under the statute. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his petition as the jury instructions and jury verdict leave open the possibility that he was convicted under a theory of imputed malice. We disagree and affirm the order.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Conviction
The facts in this section are provided for background purposes and have largely been taken from this court's unpublished opinion, People v. Cruzata (Sept. 10, 2003, B160909).
The Attorney General's request for judicial notice of the entire "appeal file" for this prior appeal is denied.
On April 23, 2000, Brian Cass (Cass) was driving a car with Gregorio Gonzalez (Gonzalez). While Cass was stopped at the curb on 54th Street, a van carrying Miguel Hernandez (Hernandez) and Monico Bueno (Bueno) pulled alongside the car. A bottle was thrown or dropped from the van, hitting the back of the car. Gonzalez became angry and Cass drove away quickly.
As they drove away, Cass and Gonzalez decided to pick up two friends: defendant and appellant Angel Cruzata (Cruzata) and an individual identified only as "Danger." Cass remained in the car while Gonzalez went up to their apartment. The three returned to the car carrying bottles and a bat. The group began looking for the van. As they searched the area they agreed that when they found the men in the van they were going to "f-k them up."
They eventually found the van in a grocery store parking lot. Cass remained in the car while Cruzata, Gonzalez, and Danger got out to confront Hernandez, who was standing by the open door of the van. Gonzalez demanded to know why Hernandez had thrown a bottle at their car. Hernandez responded by claiming to be in the mafia and threatening to kill Gonzalez. Cass suggested the group leave and Gonzalez and Danger stepped back. Hernandez and Cruzata began arguing.
Someone in the group then shot Hernandez four times at close range. The second shot was aimed at-and struck-Hernandez in the head. The fourth and fatal shot was fired after Hernandez had fallen to the ground and struck him in the back of the head. Cruzata and his companions then returned to the car and Cass sped away.
The facts as recited in the prior appellate opinion stated the shots were fired by Cruzata. However, the jury verdict and appellate opinion did not conclusively determine that Cruzata was the shooter. The appellate opinion found substantial evidence supported Cruzata's conviction for second degree murder either as the shooter or as an aider and abettor. For purposes of this appeal, we will treat the identity of the shooter as an open question.
In an information filed on September 19, 2001, Cruzata was charged with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) for the killing of Hernandez. The information also charged Cruzata with enhancements for personally using a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and discharging a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). At trial, Cass testified that Cruzata was the shooter. Bueno, Hernandez's brother-in-law, testified he had been in the van with Hernandez and had gotten out shortly before the altercation to go to a nearby apartment. He did not witness the shooting but testified that both before and after the shooting he saw Cruzata sitting in the passenger seat of the car holding a gun.
The jury was instructed on first degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.00, 8.10, 8.11, 8.20); second degree murder based on express and implied malice (CALJIC Nos. 8.30, 8.31); voluntary manslaughter based on appellant's theory of imperfect self-defense (CALJIC Nos. 8.40, 5.17, 8.50, 8.55); and aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01). During deliberations, the jury asked the court: "If a crime is being committed, and during the crime a homicide occurs, is everyone who participated in the crime equally guilty of the homicide?" The court discussed the question with counsel outside of the jury's presence. The court stated, "I'm not sure that I quite understand whether they're asking if a different crime was being committed and a homicide occurs is everybody who participated in that original crime, not a homicide, responsible for the homicide; or if they're just asking if a crime occurs and one person actually pulls the trigger but somebody else was a participant, are they equally guilty of the homicide, which is a much easier question to answer actually than the first one."
The court determined the jury was asking about the latter situation. It referred the jury back to CALJIC No. 3.01 on aiding and abetting and gave them the following example: "And just a very simple example. If, for example, a bank robbery was occurring and there were two people involved, and one person was the driver of the car who waited outside the bank with the motor running and the second individual goes into the bank and takes the money and comes out with it, the driver of the car who then drives them away would be equally guilty of the crime of robbery as an aider and abettor." The court invited the jury to rephrase their question if the court's response did not satisfy their query.
No further inquiry was made by the jury. The jury acquitted Cruzata of first degree murder but found him guilty of second degree murder and found not true on both firearm enhancements. Cruzata was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life.
Cruzata appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Cruzata argued the instruction was warranted because the jury's question indicated that it felt the unlawful killing of Hernandez was the natural and probable consequence of some "unidentified 'target' crime." He also alleged there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second degree murder. The Court of Appeal rejected Cruzata's arguments and affirmed his conviction.
B. Petition for Resentencing
Following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) and Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 775), Cruzata filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. In his briefing in the trial court, Cruzata argued the jury instructions and the court's response to the jury's inquiry allowed the jury to find him guilty of second degree murder even if he only intended to aid and abet "some other crime" and not murder. The court denied the petition, finding the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any theory of imputed malice. The court also found the trial court had correctly stated the law of aiding and abetting in answering the jury's inquiry.
Defendant's petition was originally filed in April 2022 under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to the statutory provision as section 1172.6.
Cruzata filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Overview of Senate Bill No. 1437
SB 1437 was enacted by the Legislature to ensure a person's sentence is commensurate with the person's individual criminal culpability. To accomplish this goal, SB 1437 added sections 188, subdivision (a)(3), and section 189, subdivision (e), which collectively limit accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and eliminate convictions for murder based on a theory which allows malice to be imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) SB 775 extended these changes to apply to convictions for attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
SB 1437 also created a procedure, codified at section 1172.6, which allows persons convicted of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter to file a petition for resentencing if they could no longer be convicted of those crimes under the law as amended by SB 1437 and SB 775. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) "After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefing[ ], the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause." (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The bar for this prima facie showing was "'intentionally and correctly set very low.'" (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) In conducting its prima facie review, the trial court may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or credibility determinations and must assume the truth of all facts stated in the petition. (Id. at pp. 971-972; People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 612.)
We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied Cruzata's petition without issuing an order to show cause. (People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
B. Powell and Langi
On appeal, Cruzata does not contend the jury was instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. However, Cruzata argues the combination of instructions CALJIC No. 3.01 (aiding and abetting) and CALJIC No. 8.31 (second degree murder) left open the possibility that he was convicted of second degree murder based solely on his participation in a crime. Cruzata's argument rests entirely on the opinions reached in People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi).
As given here, CALJIC No. 3.01 provides "A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, [¶] 1. With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] 2. With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] 3. By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. [¶] Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to aiding and abetting. [¶] Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting."
As given here, CALJIC No. 8.31 provides "Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in the death of a human being."
In Powell, the defendants went to the victim's home and beat him in retaliation for beating their friend. The victim died after being stabbed in the heart. The prosecution argued defendant Powell stabbed the victim and defendant Langlois hit him with a coffee table. (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691-693, 696-697.) In his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury Langlois could be guilty of murder even if he intended only to participate in an assault. (Id. at pp. 708-709.) The jury was instructed on direct aiding and abetting as well as the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at pp. 706-707.) The jury convicted both defendants of second degree murder. (Id. at pp. 705-706.)
The Powell court held that CALCRIM No. 401, the successor to CALJIC No. 3.01, is "not tailored for" aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Specifically, the court noted that to be found guilty of aiding and abetting, a person must "intend the commission of the perpetrator's act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally aid in the commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life." (Ibid.) However, CALCRIM No. 401-like CALJIC No. 3.01-does not require an aider and abettor to have known that the act aided and abetted was life-threatening or require the aider and abettor to have personally acted with conscious disregard to human life. (Ibid.) The court concluded the jury instructions should have been better tailored to the facts of the case, but ultimately held the trial court's failure to do so was harmless. (Ibid.)
In Langi, our colleagues in the First District applied Powell's reasoning to a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. In that case, Langi and three other men beat the victim. The victim ultimately died from head trauma when one of the punches thrown during the assault caused him to fall and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 976-977.) Langi's jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine but was instructed on aiding and abetting with CALJIC No. 3.01 and on second degree murder with CALJIC No. 8.31. (Id. at p. 981.) The jury found him guilty of robbery, battery, and second degree murder. (Id. at p. 977.) Langi petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, which the trial court summarily denied.
The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the instructions permitted him to be found guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding he personally acted with malice. The court explained that although the aiding and abetting instruction stated that a person aids and abets a crime if the person acts with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and with the intent or purpose to commit or encourage that crime, "the second degree murder instruction specified that the direct perpetrator of that crime need not act with the unlawful intent of causing death." (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) The Court held that the actual perpetrator's unlawful purpose in throwing the punch could have been "only to strike or to injure, or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim." (Ibid.) "Since the perpetrator's purpose need not have been to kill the victim, the aider and abettor's knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill." (Id. at p. 982.)
The Langi court thus reasoned the instructions, when read together, created an ambiguity that could have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder even if he only intended to aid or assist in the punching of the victim and did not intend to aid or abet a killing. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) Langi concluded that the instructions should have been tailored to state that, to be guilty as a direct aider and abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice must have acted with the mental state of express or implied malice. (Ibid.)
C. The Jury Instructions Did Not Allow Malice to be Imputed to Cruzata
Cruzata argues the reasoning of Langi applies with equal force here because he was also found guilty of second degree murder based on the same two instructions at issue in Langi. While Langi involved the same jury instructions at issue here, it must be understood in the context of that case. Critically, the defendant in Langi was charged and convicted of robbery and battery in addition to second degree murder. Under CALJIC No. 3.01, a defendant can only be convicted as an aider and abettor if the jury finds the defendant acted "[w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime." It also requires a defendant to have knowledge of the "unlawful purpose" of the perpetrator. In Langi, this "unlawful purpose" or "crime" could have referred to non-lethal robbery or battery rather than an unlawful killing. This is the ambiguity at the heart of Langi and Powell: the possibility that the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting murder when he only intended to aid and abet a non-murderous battery or other crime.
This ambiguity does not appear where a defendant is only charged with unlawful killing. In this instance, Cruzata was only charged with unlawful killing, either as first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. As there was no other crime alleged, CALJIC No. 3.01 required the jury to find Cruzata acted "[w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the [unlawful killing]" to be found guilty as an aider and abettor. Our California Supreme Court has stated that where "[t]he only unlawful purpose charged" is an unlawful killing, "one cannot knowingly and intentionally help another commit an unlawful killing without acting with malice." (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123.) Thus, by finding Cruzata intentionally aided and abetted an unlawful killing, the jury necessarily found Cruzata acted with malice. The potential ambiguity in Langi and Powell is simply not present here as there was no other crime or purpose Cruzata could have intended to aid or abet.
"Purpose" in this context is synonymous with intent. (See People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 96 [rejecting the argument that the jury could have understood "purpose" to be something different from or lesser than "intent" and holding "If anything, 'purpose' is a higher standard than 'intent'"].).
The Attorney General argues Langi was wrongly decided and applied the wrong standard at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition. As we find Langi is distinguishable, we need not decide whether it was wrongfully decided and decline to do so. In this instance, the instructions given by the trial court required the jury to find Cruzata personally harbored express or implied malice either as the shooter or a direct aider and abettor. This renders him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, and we find his petition was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Cruzata's section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: COLLINS, Acting P. J., MORI, J.