Opinion
No. 2020-963 S CR
12-01-2022
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Reyes L. Cruz, Appellant.
Scott Lockwood, for appellant. Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
Scott Lockwood, for appellant.
Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT:: JERRY GARGUILO, P.J., ELIZABETH H. EMERSON, TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (Allen S. Mathers, J.H.O.), rendered October 19, 2020. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, convicted defendant of failing to stop at a stop sign, and imposed sentence. The appeal brings up for review an order of that court entered August 12, 2020 denying defendant's motion to transfer the instant matter from the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, to the District Court of Suffolk County, and, upon such transfer, to dismiss the simplified traffic information on both statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
On November 10, 2017, defendant was charged in a simplified traffic information with failing to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 [a]); he was arraigned before the Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (SCTPVA) on February 7, 2018. Following a nonjury trial on October 19, 2020, defendant was found guilty of the charged traffic infraction, and sentence was imposed.
During pretrial proceedings, defendant moved to transfer the matter from the SCTPVA to the District Court of Suffolk County and, upon such transfer, to dismiss the simplified traffic information on both statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. By order entered August 12, 2020, the SCTPVA denied defendant's motion in its entirety.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the SCTPVA is authorized to address pretrial motions brought before it (see e.g. People v Epakchi, 37 N.Y.3d 39, 42 n 2 [2021] [in the SCTPVA, "(a) JHO may adjudicate low-level traffic violations," including determining a defendant's motion to dismiss]; People v Smith, 73 Misc.3d 136 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51071[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021] [finding that the "defendant's motion (to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds) was properly denied" by the SCTPVA]; see also People v Sarant, 60 Misc.3d 140 [A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51270[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018] ["Defendant, if he be so advised, may make a motion before the SCTPVA to vacate the judgment of conviction"]).
Next, we address defendant's argument that his trial took place after the People's statutory speedy trial time had expired. Prior to January 1, 2020, it had been the rule that "a defendant charged with a traffic infraction has no statutory right to a speedy trial" (People v Taylor, 189 Misc.2d 313, 314 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists [2001]). Legislation enacted in 2019, effective January 1, 2020, amended portions of CPL 30.30, including the addition of subsection (1) (e), which permits the dismissal of traffic infractions on statutory speedy trial grounds, subject to certain conditions. However, because "the amended statute was not in effect when the criminal action against defendant was commenced [in 2018], CPL 30.30 (1) (e) has no application to defendant's direct appeal from [the] judgment of conviction" (People v Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d 199, 207 [2022]). As the pre-amendment speedy trial statute is inapplicable to traffic infractions, defendant's appellate contention that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated lacks merit.
Even if the amended speedy trial statute did apply here, the simplified traffic information could not have been dismissed on statutory speedy trial grounds because defendant is charged with a traffic infraction only (see People v Vasquez, 75 Misc.3d 49, 52 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022] ["(A)ccusatory instruments charging (the) defendant with committing traffic infractions only remain outside the ambit of CPL 30.30," and consequently the "defendant is not entitled to relief under the amended speedy trial statute"]).
Although defendant herein "has no statutory right to a speedy trial, he nevertheless has a constitutional right to a speedy trial" (Taylor, 189 Misc.2d at 314). Here, defendant argues that the prosecution in this matter exceeded its constitutional speedy trial time, as a result of an unexplained delay in proceeding from October 4, 2018 until January 4, 2020. We reject defendant's contention that the 15-month delay constitutes a per se violation of defendant's constitutional speedy trial right. The Court of Appeals has set forth five factors for evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims, namely:
"(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445 [1975]).
Here, the entirety of the complained-of delay is attributable to defendant, not the People, who were ready for trial at each appearance during the disputed time period. The SCPTVA had to entertain several motions, all filed by defendant, which unnecessarily duplicated some requests for relief. Additionally, defendant's repeated absences from court, upon his counsel's instructions, constituted a significant waste of time attributable to defendant. During this time, defendant was not subject to pretrial incarceration, and defendant does not allege that his defense was impaired by reason of the delay.
Defendant's final contention, that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated due to the partial closure of the SCTPVA courtroom to outsiders during his in-person trial that took place in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, is unavailing. A "criminal defendant's right to a public trial, though fundamental, is not absolute. Rather, trial courts possess inherent discretionary power to exclude members of the public from the courtroom" (People v Ramos, 90 N.Y.2d 492, 497 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
As there is "a presumption of openness" (id.), prior to ordering the closure of a proceeding, a court must" 'advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure'" (id., quoting Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 [1984]). Here, the court's desire to keep necessary trial participants as safe as possible during a global pandemic was clearly an "overriding interest." Nothing in the record demonstrates-and defendant does not put forth any argument-that either the partial closure during his trial was overbroad or that the public health interest at the time could have been protected using a less onerous alternative.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.