Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TA106496, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama and Cassandra Hart, Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Priya Bala, and Karen Nash, Deputy Public Defenders for Defendant and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
The District Attorney of Los Angeles appeals from an order fixing the amount of restitution that defendant Alejandro Dela Cruz is obligated to pay to the victim of his assault. The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $100 to compensate the victim for her out-of-pocket expenses. The District Attorney contends the trial court erred by failing to order restitution in the amount of $960.22. That amount, the District Attorney maintains, represents the sum the hospital purportedly accepted as full payment for the medical services rendered to the victim and includes the $100 in out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the victim, plus $860.22, purportedly paid by the victim’s insurance company.
There is no evidence in the record concerning the amount paid by the insurer or the amount accepted by the hospital. The only evidence of actual economic loss was the victim’s testimony that she owed the hospital $100. The trial court’s restitution order accordingly was not an abuse of discretion.
BACKGROUND
Defendant pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). He was sentenced to summary probation and ordered to complete anger management classes and to perform Caltrans work.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
At the June 4, 2010 restitution hearing, the victim, Elizabeth Chavez, testified that defendant stabbed her hand with a box cutter. She sought treatment for her injury at the emergency room at Downey Regional Medical Center (DRMC), where she received stitches. Ms. Chavez testified that she received a bill from DRMC for a total amount of $2,839.78. A copy of the bill was entered into evidence. The bill is addressed to Ms. Chavez and indicates “Total Charges” of $2,839.78, “Payments” of $860.22, and “Adjustments” in the amount of $1,879.56. The bill further indicates a “Balance Due” and states that is “Your Responsibility to Pay” the amount of $100. Ms. Chavez testified that her insurance company paid some portion of the bill, and that she owed the hospital $100.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the prosecutor asked the trial court to order restitution in the amount of $2,839. The trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $100, noting that was the amount testified to by the victim and the amount the bill indicated it was her responsibility to pay. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1202.4 mandates defendant’s restitution obligation. Subdivision (a)(1) of the statute provides: “It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime.” Subject to certain exceptions that are not relevant here, section 1202.4 further provides that “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.... The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(2) states that the amount of restitution shall not be affected by any third party indemnification or subrogation rights: “Determination of the amount of restitution ordered pursuant to this subdivision shall not be affected by the indemnification or subrogation rights of any third party.”
“Generally speaking, restitution awards are vested in the trial court’s discretion and will be disturbed on appeal only when the appellant has shown an abuse of discretion [Citation.]” (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1320.) “‘When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 499.)
II. No Abuse of Discretion
At the restitution hearing, Ms. Chavez testified that she received a bill for the total amount of $2,839.78, and that she owed the hospital $100. There was no evidence that Ms. Chavez’s insurance company paid $860.22. While Ms. Chavez testified that her insurance paid some portion of the hospital bill, there was no testimony about the amount the insurer paid. There was also no evidence that the hospital “accepted” $960.22 in settlement of the bill. The only evidence regarding the amount of her economic loss was Ms. Chavez’s testimony that she owed the hospital $100. At the hearing, the trial court was presented with evidence and argument concerning only two figures -- the $2,839.78 billed, and the $100 owed by Ms. Chavez. Given these circumstances, the trial court’s order setting restitution at $100 was not an abuse of discretion.
The District Attorney contends People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533 (Duong) mandates a different result. That case, however, is distinguishable. In Duong, the victim was a member of Kaiser who received medical treatment for injuries suffered in an assault by the defendant. After providing treatment to the victim, Kaiser referred the matter for enforcement of its rights to an entity called “‘Healthcare Recoveries.’” (Id. at p. 1536.) The evidence presented at the restitution hearing included a “‘Consolidated Statement of Benefits’” listing “‘Total Billed Charges’” in the amount of $4,459, as well as a letter from Healthcare Recoveries advising that Kaiser would accept “a 20% reduction on all capitated charges, ” or an amount equal to $1,538.20. (Ibid.) The appellate court in Duong ruled that the appropriate amount of restitution was the sum the record showed Kaiser would accept as full payment for the services received by the victim. (Id. at p. 1539.) Here, there is nothing in the record that supports the District Attorney’s claim that DRMC would accept $960.22 as full payment for the services Ms. Chavez received.
The trial court’s restitution order was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: DOI TODD, Acting P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.