Opinion
G051851
01-24-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAKISHA NICHELLE CROWDER, Defendant and Appellant.
Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14NF2777) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed. Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Lakisha Nichelle Crowder appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted her of deliberate and premeditated attempted murder, carjacking, and evading a peace officer, and found true a firearm enhancement. Crowder argues insufficient evidence supports her convictions. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
At Kerry Boagni's request, Crowder arranged to have Boagni loan his sports utility vehicle (SUV) to two men in exchange for crack cocaine or money. The men provided Boagni with drugs or cash on three or four nights but then stopped. Boagni was concerned, wanted his SUV back, and told Crowder he would call the police if the men did not return his SUV.
Days later, the men informed Boagni that Crowder was going to return his SUV. Crowder told Boagni to meet her at a store. One evening, Boagni's fiancée drove him to the designated meeting place. When they got there, Crowder was sitting in the SUV's driver's seat, and Cornell Davis was sitting in the backseat. Crowder told Boagni that Davis was her cousin, and she asked Boagni to drive them to her grandmother's house in Cypress. Boagni, willing to do anything to get his SUV, agreed.
Boagni got into the front passenger seat, and Crowder drove for about 50 minutes. When they passed Cypress, he asked why they were not getting off the freeway, and Crowder said she was not going to tell him "exactly" where she lived. At some point during the drive, Crowder said to Davis, "'it will be a long walk home.'"
When Crowder exited the freeway, she pointed to a street where she claimed her grandmother lived. Crowder told Boagni that she needed to buy a couple things, and she drove to the back parking lot of a Target in Anaheim Hills. Crowder got out and removed personal items from the SUV. Boagni got out and saw clothing on the back seat. As Boagni started to say they left something, Davis shot Boagni in the face. Boagni stumbled to some nearby bushes, and Davis followed him. Davis attacked Boagni, and as they fought, something fell to the ground. When Davis went to retrieve the item, Boagni fled. Boagni called 911 and ran to a market where he collapsed. After a man helped Boagni, an ambulance arrived and took him to the hospital.
Crowder and Davis fled in the SUV. Law enforcement officers pursued them on the freeway, but Crowder refused to stop and led officers on a high-speed chase weaving through evening traffic until she crashed into a guardrail. Crowder got out of the SUV and ran, with an officer and a police canine dog in pursuit, refusing to stop. Crowder ran off the freeway, through a park, and into a residential area where first the dog and then the officer apprehended Crowder.
The bullet went through Boagni's left cheek and the roof of his mouth, and excited through his left jaw, leaving a permanent hole. The bullet destroyed his top dental bones and fractured his nasal bones. He lost his top teeth and suffered permanent numbness to the right side of his face.
An information charged Crowder with the following: deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)) (count 1), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) (count 2), and evading while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) (count 3). As to count 1, the information alleged Crowder knew a principal was personally armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)).
The information also charged Davis, and his appeal is the subject of a separate proceeding.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. --------
At trial, Crowder testified she was the "middleman" between Boagni and Andre Elliot, a childhood friend who she knew was a gang member, drug dealer, and pimp. Crowder explained Elliot picked her up and offered her $100 to return Boagni's SUV. She was reluctant to drive the SUV because it was "riddled with bullet holes" and Boagni's items were missing, but Elliot assured her that she would be safe. Elliot drove Crowder to a motel, Davis got in the SUV, and Elliot got out of the SUV. Crowder had not met Davis before that day. Elliot told her that Davis was a friend or associate, but he did not tell her Davis's name. Elliot told her where to meet Boagni, to drive on the 91 freeway to Cypress, and to drive back to Compton with Boagni. Crowder stated she did not know Davis had a gun, she was not suspicious of him, and they did not discuss harming Boagni.
When Crowder arrived at the designated meeting place, she asked Boagni if they could drop off Davis and then return to Compton together. Boagni agreed. She denied telling Boagni that Davis was her cousin. Boagni let Crowder drive and got into the front passenger seat. She and Boagni talked during the drive. She tried to drive to Cypress, but she passed it and exited the freeway in Anaheim Hills because she was low on gas, and she needed to purchase food and feminine hygiene products. She parked in the back of Target because she was unfamiliar with the store and mistakenly believed it was the customer parking lot and not part of a plan to shoot Boagni.
Crowder denied telling Davis, "It's going to be a long . . . walk home." She further denied pointing out her grandmother's house to Boagni. After she parked, Crowder began cleaning out the SUV. Boagni got out and walked around the front of the SUV. She did not hear Boagni say anything, and she did not see Davis. As she leaned into the SUV to retrieve her cell phone, she heard a gunshot. She touched her head because she thought she had been shot.
Crowder got back into the SUV because she was scared and panicked. After Davis got in the SUV, she drove away and stopped in a cul-de-sac so that Davis could "clean up" and she could make a telephone call. Crowder got back on the freeway because she wanted to go home. She intended to abandon the SUV on her way home. Elliott called her and told her that he was down the freeway. When police started pursuing her, she did not stop because she was very close to her exit, she wanted to go home, and she was worried police would shoot her. After she crashed, she ran because she was scared of the darkness on the freeway and she was afraid police would shoot her. She could not hear the canine warnings because of the sirens and police helicopter.
On cross-examination, Crowder was questioned about an interview with a detective after the shooting that she testified she could not remember because she was heavily medicated at the time. Crowder failed to tell the detective about Elliott or that she needed to purchase feminine hygiene products. But she did tell the detective she had known Davis for years and referred to him as "CJ." Crowder agreed, however, she provided accurate identifying information in her interview as well as information that was consistent with Boagni's testimony. Crowder insisted she had no reason to harm or kill Boagni, she did not plan to do so, and she was not involved in the shooting.
The jury convicted Crowder of all counts and found true the enhancement. After the trial court denied her motion for new trial or to modify the verdict, the court sentenced Crowder to life in prison with the possibility of parole on count 1 plus one year for the section 12022, subdivision (d), enhancement. The court imposed a concurrent term on count 3 and imposed and stayed the term on count 2.
DISCUSSION
"'"'"[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."'"' [Citation.] The standard is the same under the state and federal due process clauses. [Citation.] 'We presume "'in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 294.)
"Principals include those who 'aid and abet' in the 'commission of a crime.' [Citation.] 'Aider and abettor liability is premised on the combined acts of all the principals, but on the aider and abettor's own mens rea.' [Citation.] We have defined the required mental states and acts for aiding and abetting as: '(a) the direct perpetrator's actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.' [Citation.]" (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 116-117 (Thompson).)
Attempted Murder
Crowder argues there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. We disagree.
"Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing." (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1192, overruled on other grounds on People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.) "'"'[P]remeditated' means 'considered beforehand,' and 'deliberate' means 'formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.'"' [Citations.] '"An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse." [Citation.] A reviewing court normally considers three kinds of evidence to determine whether a finding of premeditation and deliberation is adequately supported—preexisting motive, planning activity, and manner of killing—but "[t]hese factors need not be present in any particular combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation."' [Citation.]" (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 235.)
Here, the record includes evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude Crowder acted with premeditation and deliberation when she aided and abetted the attempted murder. The evidence demonstrated Crowder brought Davis to her meeting with Boagni and lied to Boagni about her relationship with Davis. She provided inconsistent statements about how long she knew Davis. There was also evidence Crowder lied to Boagni about their destination. The jury could rely on this evidence to conclude Crowder tried to disarm Boagni and persuade him to accompany them to Crowder's grandmother's house, an innocuous destination.
Additionally, the record includes evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude Crowder knew of the plan to kill Boagni and assisted Davis in carrying out the plan. Instead of parking in front of the store, Crowder drove behind the Target, a dark secluded area, where Davis could shoot Boagni. After Crowder parked the SUV, she began to remove items from the SUV and Boagni began to do the same when Davis shot him in the face. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence Crowder's role was to create a distraction and the appearance they were returning the SUV. This would cause Boagni to drop his guard and put him at ease, thereby placing him in a vulnerable position.
The evidence demonstrated that instead of helping Boagni as he stumbled away bleeding profusely from the face, she helped Davis try to escape. Crowder led law enforcement on a high-speed freeway chase. After she crashed, Crowder fled. This post-crime conduct, when considered with Crowder's pre-crime conduct, is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion she acted with premeditation and deliberation. (Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 113.) Based on all this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude she knew of the plan to kill Boagni and helped Davis complete the plan.
Crowder contends there was no evidence she was the mastermind, she knew of the plan to shoot Boagni, and she knew Davis had a gun. She also claims there was no evidence she had a motive to kill Boagni. Yes, there was evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded Crowder did not act with premeditation and deliberation. But the jury did not find that evidence persuasive in light of the above evidence demonstrating Crowder drove the shooter to pick up the victim, lied to the victim, and drove the shooter and the victim to a secluded area to execute the plan. Additionally, there was evidence Crowder had a motive to kill Boagni as he threatened to call the police, and although Crowder did not have the SUV, she did sell drugs and was implicated in the SUV for drugs transactions. Finally, when viewed in its entirety, Crowder's testimony was severely credibility challenged. When considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding Crowder committed count 1 with premeditation and deliberation.
Carjacking
Crowder contends there was insufficient evidence she aided and abetted a carjacking. Not so.
Section 215, subdivision (a), states, "'Carjacking' is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear."
Based on the entire record, there was sufficient evidence Crowder aided and abetted the carjacking. Again, Crowder drove an armed Davis and Boagni to a dark secluded parking lot. After they parked, the evidence demonstrated Crowder began to clean the SUV and an unsuspecting and vulnerable Boagni did the same when Davis shot him in the face. Crowder and Davis then fled in the SUV. This evidence demonstrates Crowder knew of the plan to kill Boagni and take his SUV with force and assisted Davis in carrying out the plan. Sufficient evidence supports Crowder's conviction on count 2.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'LEARY, P. J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J. IKOLA, J.