eve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay” ( People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676, 678, 601 N.Y.S.2d 466, 619 N.E.2d 403 [1993];see People v. Battaglia, 187 A.D.2d 808, 810, 589 N.Y.S.2d 694 [1992] ). “While a defendant may waive rights under CPL 30.30, the record here contains no evidence of any waiver, written or oral,” and the Court of Appeals has made clear that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these” ( People v. Dickinson, 18 N.Y.3d 835, 836, 938 N.Y.S.2d 836, 962 N.E.2d 257 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). As the People failed to meet their burden of proving that the disputed 112–day period was not chargeable to them ( see People v. Collins, 82 N.Y.2d at 181–182, 604 N.Y.S.2d 11, 624 N.E.2d 139;People v. Seamans, 85 A.D.3d at 1400, 925 N.Y.S.2d 266;People v. Wiggins, 197 A.D.2d 802, 804, 603 N.Y.S.2d 81 [1993];People v. Moulton, 172 A.D.2d at 1001–1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 220;compare People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745, 745–746, 655 N.Y.S.2d 163 [1997],lv. denied90 N.Y.2d 857, 661 N.Y.S.2d 183, 683 N.E.2d 1057 [1997] ), the People did not establish that they were ready for trial within the statutory six-month period ( seeCPL 30.30 [1] [a] ).

The available transcripts show that, at a minimum, over four months of that delay resulted from adjournments requested or consented to by defense counsel. To the extent that defendant now suggests that he did not personally consent to these adjournments, his acquiescence may be inferred from his counsel's actions, and "[t]he People are entitled to rely on counsel's apparent authority to act on defendant's behalf ( People v Garcia, 33 AD3d 1050, 1052, lv denied 9 NY3d 844; see People v Crogan, 237 AD2d 745, 745, lv denied 90 NY2d 857). Moreover, defendant was not jailed from October 2005 to the date of his arraignment so that he could cooperate with law enforcement as part of ongoing plea negotiations.

Such a waiver is equivalent to an extension of time for the People to proceed with prosecution. When defense counsel requests or acquiesces in a delay in the proceedings, such time is excludable for statutory speedy trial purposes ( see People v Dougal, 266 AD2d 574, 576, lv denied 94 NY2d 879; People v Crogan, 237 AD2d 745, 745, lv denied 90 NY2d 857; compare CPL 30.30 [b]). A delay of proceedings to conduct plea negotiations is excludable where defendant or defense counsel requests the delay ( see People v Jenkins, 302 AD2d 978, 978, lv denied 100 NY2d 562; People v Henderson, 248 AD2d 485, 485, lv denied 92 NY2d 853). A defendant's acquiescence may be inferred from defense counsel's consent to the delay on defendant's behalf ( see People v Crogan, supra at 745). The People are entitled to rely on counsel's apparent authority to act on defendant's behalf and delay their case based on counsel's request and executed waiver.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and a new trial is ordered. The Supreme Court correctly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 since the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated ( see People v. Henderson, 248 A.D.2d 485; People v. Chu Zhu, 245 A.D.2d 296; People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745). Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. It is well settled that "[i]n evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, [the courts have] consistently applied a `flexible' approach * * * `[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation,' a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel will have been met" ( People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563, 565, quoting People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147). "Thus, the standard in New York has long been whether the defendant was afforded `meaningful representation'" ( People v. Henry, supra at 565, quoting People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712).

Here, the record establishes that what was contemplated by the court and attorneys was a continuance of proceedings for up to 90 days, beyond the date by which the People otherwise would have been obligated to declare their readiness on the record, in order to allow defendant to cooperate with authorities in their investigation and to pursue a favorable plea bargain based on such cooperation. A period of delay resulting from ongoing plea negotiations is excludable for the purpose of determining whether defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial, provided that, as here, defendant or defense counsel requested or consented to such delay (see People v. Delvalle, 265 A.D.2d 174, 175, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 879; People v. Henderson, 248 A.D.2d 485, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 853; People v. Chu Zhu, 245 A.D.2d 296; People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 857). The further contention that defendant was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct on summation is not preserved for our review.

Neither the prosecutor, the trial court nor the defendant may preserve such a statutory claim for review on appeal (see, People v. Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d 200, 207; People v. O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009). Were we to consider the claim in any event, we would find that County Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the time period during which plea negotiations were ongoing (see, People v. Friscia, 51 N.Y.2d 845, 847; People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745, 745, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 857). Although not waived (see, People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 314), defendant's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial is equally unavailing.

v. Dugan, 273 A.D.2d 704, 705, 711 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532; see, People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 239; People v. Osgood, 52 N.Y.2d 37, 43; see also, People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71). As defendant's competency was at issue between June 24, 1997 and August 19, 1997, this period of 56 days must be excepted from consideration in assessing the timeliness of the proceedings (see, CPL 30.30 [a]). While we observe that there is no indication that the June 24, 1997 express waiver of speedy trial rights was ever rescinded either by defendant's attorney or by defendant himself after he was deemed competent, we need not rely on the letter waiver in resolving the speedy trial issue. Since defendant's second assigned attorney aggressively pursued plea negotiations until December 10, 1997, the date he was relieved from representing defendant, we are of the view that much of the delay occasioned by those efforts is chargeable to defendant (see, People v. Dougal, 266 A.D.2d 574, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 879; People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 857). In particular, defendant is directly responsible for impeding progress during this time period, as is evident from his refusal to communicate with his own attorney for a period of 57 days (October 14, 1997 through December 10, 1997), thereby preventing defense counsel from responding to the People's outstanding plea offer.

The record reveals that on April 22, 1997, defendant's former attorney of record waived his right to a speedy trial so as to insure appropriate preindictment plea negotiations. Since the trial court properly determined that the period of time between this waiver and the date of the indictment was not chargeable to the prosecution and that the attorney who executed the waiver had the authority to do so (see, People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 857), we decline further review. We further find no error in Supreme Court's denial of the motion to suppress statements made to the police during the administration of the field sobriety tests.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. We agree with the Supreme Court that the delay of the proceedings to conduct plea negotiations, upon the consent of defense counsel, was not chargeable to the People for purposes of CPL 30.30 ( see, People v. Chu Zhu, 245 A.D.2d 296; People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745). Rosenblatt, J. P., O'Brien, Ritter and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

This assertion was supported by the submission of a copy of a plea negotiation letter which he received from defense counsel which made reference to the adjourned date. Therefore, the evidence indicated that the defendant acquiesced in the delay of the proceedings for the purpose of conduct in plea negotiations, and the period of delay was excludable ( see, People v. Crogan, 237 A.D.2d 745; People v. Rodriguez, 184 A.D.2d 317). Review of the transcript of the May 20, 1996, proceedings ( see, Fisch, New York Evidence § 1065 [2d ed]; see, e.g., People v. Notholt, 242 A.D.2d 251; People v. Rowe, 227 A.D.2d 212) further supports this conclusion, since that transcript demonstrates that defense counsel consented to the delay so that plea negotiations could be pursued. Upon deducting this period from that total amount of delay, the total delay does not exceed six calendar months. Accordingly, the defendant's motion must be denied and the indictment must be reinstated.