¶ 47 In urging for a reversal of his conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence, defendant directs our attention to People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, 178 N.E.3d 1164, and People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill.2d 236, 752 N.E.2d 410 (2001). But aside from asking for a similar result, defendant does not identify similarities between these cases and his that would warrant reversal here.
¶ 35 To sustain a conviction for PCS with intent to deliver, the State must prove, inter alia, that the defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substance, that the controlled substance was in his immediate possession or control, and that he intended to deliver the controlled substance. People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 30 (citing People v. Robinson, 167 Ill.2d 397, 407 (1995)). In the instant case, defendant only disputes the element of possession.
"Possession may be actual or constructive." People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 30, 178 N.E.3d 1164. "Actual possession is the exercise by the defendant of present personal dominion over the illicit material and exists when a person exercises immediate and exclusive dominion or control over the illicit material, but does not require present personal touching of the illicit material."
See People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 29 (speculative inferences are not permissible in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claim). However, this does not impact Weitl's "main diagnosis" of pedophilic disorder, which, as discussed, was adequately supported by the evidence.
A jury could reasonably infer that having tried and failed to penetrate N.W.'s mouth with his penis, defendant's ultimate goal became to penetrate her vagina with his penis. Cf. People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 29 (observing that unreasonable or speculative inferences are not permitted).
The trial court heard counsel's justification for the question and the State's relevance objection and proposed asking the question outside the jury's presence since, it reasoned, if she did not believe a conviction would impact the asset distribution in the divorce, there was no reason for the question other than to raise an improper inference. See People v. Crane, 2020 IL App (3d) 170386, ¶ 29 (stating that reasonable inferences based on the evidence are permissible, unreasonable or speculative inferences are not). As the court noted, since the comment about marital assets of "about $800,000" was already before the jury, if she did not believe a conviction improved her position in the divorce, then counsel would not be permitted to inquire further.