Opinion
2011-09-30
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,v.Logan D. CRANE, Defendant–Appellant.
John E. Tyo, Shortsville, for Defendant–Appellant.R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua (Brian D. Dennis of Counsel), for Respondent.
John E. Tyo, Shortsville, for Defendant–Appellant.R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua (Brian D. Dennis of Counsel), for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of three counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.10). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Although a different result would not have been unreasonable in light of the conflicting testimony at trial ( see generally id.), “it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the testimony and the conflicting inferences that may be drawn therefrom the weight they should be accorded” ( People v. McLean, 71 A.D.3d 1500, 1501, 896 N.Y.S.2d 753, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 890, 903 N.Y.S.2d 778, 929 N.E.2d 1013).
Contrary to the further contention of defendant, the verdict finding him guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree is neither repugnant to nor inconsistent with the verdict finding him not guilty of grand larceny in the third degree ( see generally People v. Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d 55, 58–59, 637 N.Y.S.2d 352, 660 N.E.2d 1131). “Read as a whole, it is clear that falsifying business records in the second degree is elevated to a first-degree offense on the basis of an enhanced intent requirement[,] ... not any additional actus reus element” ( People v. Taveras, 12 N.Y.3d 21, 27, 878 N.Y.S.2d 642, 906 N.E.2d 370). Thus, “[t]he jury could ... convict defendant of falsifying business records if the jury concluded that defendant had the intent to commit or conceal another crime, even if he was not convicted of the other crime” ( People v. McCumiskey, 12 A.D.3d 1145, 1146, 784 N.Y.S.2d 816; see People v. Houghtaling, 79 A.D.3d 1155, 1157–1158, 912 N.Y.S.2d 155). In any event, grand larceny in the third degree has a monetary threshold (Penal Law § 155.35[1] ), which is an “essential element” that is not an element of falsifying business records in the first degree ( Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d at 58, 637 N.Y.S.2d 352, 660 N.E.2d 1131; see generally People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1, 6–8, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d 617, rearg. denied 55 N.Y.2d 1039, 449 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 434 N.E.2d 1081).
Defendant further contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress statements that he made to the police on the ground that he was in custody at the time and had not been administered Miranda warnings. We reject defendant's contention that he was in custody when he made the statements. As the court properly determined, “ ‘a reasonable person in defendant's position, innocent of any crime, would not have believed that he or she was in custody, and thus Miranda warnings were not required’ ” ( People v. Daniels, 75 A.D.3d 1169, 1169, 904 N.Y.S.2d 859, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 892, 912 N.Y.S.2d 581, 938 N.E.2d 1016; see generally People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239; People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89). Although the interview between defendant and the police may be characterized as accusatory in nature ( see People v. Lunderman, 19 A.D.3d 1067, 1068–1069, 796 N.Y.S.2d 481, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 830, 804 N.Y.S.2d 44, 837 N.E.2d 743; People v. Robbins, 236 A.D.2d 823, 824–825, 654 N.Y.S.2d 494, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 863, 661 N.Y.S.2d 190, 683 N.E.2d 1064), the record of the suppression hearing establishes that it was not in fact “conducted in a police-dominated atmosphere” ( Robbins, 236 A.D.2d at 824, 654 N.Y.S.2d 494). Indeed, the record
establishes that defendant voluntarily agreed to meet with the police detective, who was not in uniform and was operating an unmarked police vehicle; the interview occurred in the parking lot of a store; defendant was not restrained in any manner during the interview; and the detective specifically informed defendant that he “wasn't there to arrest him” ( see People v. Semrau, 77 A.D.3d 1436, 1437, 908 N.Y.S.2d 487, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 746, 917 N.Y.S.2d 627, 942 N.E.2d 1052; People v. Duda, 45 A.D.3d 1464, 1466, 845 N.Y.S.2d 671, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 764, 854 N.Y.S.2d 326, 883 N.E.2d 1261; cf. Robbins, 236 A.D.2d at 824–825, 654 N.Y.S.2d 494). “It is well settled that, ‘where there are conflicting inferences to be drawn from the proof, the choice of inferences is for the [suppression court. T]hat choice is to be honored unless unsupported, as a matter of law’ ” ( Semrau, 77 A.D.3d at 1437, 908 N.Y.S.2d 487), which cannot be said here.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.