In sum, the conclusion reached by the majority today, relying on Lorentzen to justify a test of proportionality with regard to punishments prescribed by the Legislature, is simply untenable. See People v Jagosz, 253 Mich. 290; 235 N.W. 160 (1931) (a sentence of twelve to thirty years for rape was not "cruel or unusual punishment"); People v Cramer, 247 Mich. 127, 136; 225 N.W. 595 (1929) (the penalty for not reporting a live birth within five days was not "cruel or unusual punishment"); Steele v Sexton, 253 Mich. 32, 36; 234 N.W. 436 (1931) (the loss of a right to high school credits and a graduate diploma, on the basis of a wilful violation of a statute, was not "cruel or unusual punishment"); People v Paton, 284 Mich. 427, 429; 279 N.W. 888 (1938) (the sentence for breaking and entering was within the statute and was not "cruel or unusual punishment"); People v Harwood, 286 Mich. 96, 98; 281 N.W. 551 (1938) (five to fifteen years imprisonment for placing a foul substance in a taxicab was not "cruel or unusual punishment" since it is within the statute provided by the Legislature); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 746; 295 N.W. 483 (1940) (a sixty-day imprisonment for twice failing to answer to a grand jury was not "cruel or unusual punishment" within the meaning of the clause); In re Southard, 298 Mich. 75, 80-81; 298 N.W. 457 (1941) (the length of a
The courts have long recognized that the provision of medical care involves issues of public interest. Lewis v State Bd of Dentistry, 277 Mich. 334, 343; 269 N.W. 194 (1936); People v Cramer, 247 Mich. 127, 134; 225 N.W. 595 (1929). We reject defendant's suggestion that the parties were operating with equal bargaining power when plaintiff's decedent signed the exculpatory agreement.
Moreover, this court has upheld the Council's constitutional authority to do so. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 162 A.2d 503, 505 (D.C. 1960) (stating that "it is now too settled to doubt that the legislature may dispense with intent as an element of criminal liability when the regulation is in the exercise of the police power for the benefit of the people"); accord Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 188 Pa.Super. 153, 146 A.2d 306, 308 (1958); Kirkham v. City of North Little Rock, 227 Ark. 789, 301 S.W.2d 559, 563-64 (1957); People v. Darby, 114 Cal.App.2d 412, 250 P.2d 743, 754 (1952); People v. Cramer, 247 Mich. 127, 225 N.W. 595, 598 (1929); State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N.W. 137, 138 (Iowa 1926). McNeely's counsel stated in oral argument that the language of the statute does not permit this court to interpret the statute in such a way as to impose what McNeely would consider an adequate scienter requirement, and contended that without such a requirement the statute was unconstitutional.
(Emphasis added.) The following Michigan cases either directly or by inference apply the test of proportionality to the sentence imposed: People v Huntley, 112 Mich. 569 (1897); People v Dumas, 161 Mich. 45 (1910); People v Cramer, 247 Mich. 127 (1929); Steele v Sexton, 253 Mich. 32 (1931); In re Southard, 298 Mich. 75 (1941). It will be seen from the above discussion of the leading United States Supreme Court case and cases decided by this Court that the dominant test of cruel and unusual punishment is that the punishment is in excess of any that would be suitable to fit the crime.
In this type of police regulation it is now too settled to doubt that the legislature may dispense with intent as an element of criminal liability when the regulation is in the exercise of the police power for the benefit of the people. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604; Kirkham v. City of North Little Rock, 227 Ark. 789, 301 S.W.2d 559, 64 A.L.R.2d 1032; People v. Darby, 114 Cal.App.2d 412, 250 P.2d 743, appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 937, 73 S.Ct. 833, 97 L.Ed. 1364; State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N.W. 137, 49 A.L.R. 1270; People v. Cramer, 247 Mich. 127, 225 N.W. 595; Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 188 Pa. Super. 153, 146 A.2d 306. Also assigned as error is the fact that the narcotics were found outside the house.
The statute, designed to regulate the small loan business in order to prevent fraud and undue oppression of necessitous borrowers, was enacted in the exercise of the police powers of the State and did not need to embody said element of intent in providing that its violation should constitute a criminal offense. People v. Cramer, 247 Mich. 127; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315; People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1 (19 ALR 133); People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 86 (67 Am St Rep 449). Accordingly, we need indulge no consideration of what has been held to constitute usury or the intent essential thereto in civil cases. Were the rule otherwise, the unlawful intent on the part of defendant abundantly appears from the facts at bar (See Sultan v. Central Life Insurance Co. of Illinois, 302 Mich. 425) and it need not have been shared by the borrower (See Domboorajian v. Woodruff, 239 Mich. 1; Sickles v. Schaen, 202 Mich. 327 [LRA 1918F, 381]; Vandervelde v. Wilson, 176 Mich. 185; Green v. Grant, 134 Mich. 462).
In this case two of the justices dissented. Regulations in the interest of the public health are not to be strictly construed, Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich. 238 (26 L.R.A. 484, 47 Am. St. Rep. 525); People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527 (32 L.R.A. 853, 62 Am. St. Rep. 715); People v. Cramer, 247 Mich. 127; Rock v. Carney, 216 Mich. 280 (22 A.L.R. 1178); and it must be presumed the city council of the city of Detroit acted in good faith in the line of its duty in enacting the ordinance in question. Such council has large discretionary powers and its acts should not be interfered with except when they are clearly invalid.
"The practice of medicine is subject to regulation under the police power of the State, and any reasonable condition or requirement may be imposed by the State upon those engaged in that profession." People v. Cramer (syllabus), 247 Mich. 127. Both in the circuit court and in this court the defendants have urged that the equity court has no jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs the injunctive relief sought; but instead that each of plaintiffs has an adequate remedy at law by urging as a defense his present contentions in event of legal proceedings being instituted against him.
"It is competent for the legislature, under the police power, to provide for the protection of the public health by making it an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment to sell adulterated food or drink, irrespective of the seller's knowledge of the adulteration." To the same effect see People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1 (19 A.L.R. 133), and People v. Cramer, 247 Mich. 127. As noted above, this statute, in part at least, is a police regulation.