People v. Crabtree

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Mueller

    109 Ill. 2d 378 (Ill. 1985)   Cited 49 times
    In Mueller, we noted that a homicidal concealment is not an offense consisting solely of one or more of the elements of murder.

    The purpose of this section as enacted was to preclude successive prosecutions where more than one person was injured by a single act of the accused, such as setting off an explosive. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 3-3, Committee Comments, at 201 (Smith-Hurd 1972); People v. Crabtree (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 87. Because the murder and concealment charges were based on separate acts, the compulsory-joinder statute did not require prosecution of both offenses in the same proceeding.

  2. People v. Thomann

    197 Ill. App. 3d 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 8 times
    In Thomann, the defendant was prosecuted for possessing and disseminating on July 14, 1988, a videotape containing child pornography.

    The purpose of this section as enacted was to preclude successive prosecutions where more than one person was injured by a single act of the accused, such as setting off an explosive. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 3-3, Committee Comments, at 201 (Smith-Hurd 1972); People v. Crabtree (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 87. Because the murder and concealment charges were based on separate acts, the compulsory-joinder statute did not require prosecution of both offenses in the same proceeding.

  3. People v. Hogan

    542 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 6 times

    Further, sections 3-3(b) and 3-4(b) do not apply when ordinance violations are involved. People v. Crabtree (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 87, 402 N.E.2d 417. • 4 The instant defendant was charged by means of uniform citation and complaint forms, and one of the two charges was an ordinance violation.

  4. Village of Round Lake Beach v. Sams

    96 Ill. App. 3d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 4 times
    Rejecting driver's claim that res judicata, collateral estoppel, or compulsory joinder statute prevented him from being prosecuted both for a state criminal offense and for violating a village traffic ordinance

    This statutory provision does not, however, require the joint prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation and a State criminal offense since a municipal ordinance violation is not an "offense" within the meaning of the statute. People v. Crabtree (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 87, 89, 402 N.E.2d 417, 419. We note, parenthetically, that although the parties during this appeal have considered the charges written by the Round Lake Beach police to be for a municipal ordinance violation, and although we have operated under such an assumption in deciding this matter, we are not entirely certain that such is, in fact, the case.

  5. People v. Rogers

    408 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    These sections, read together, resolve any question of the meaning of the word "offense" as it is used within the theft statute and clearly exclude municipal ordinance violations. See People v. Crabtree (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 87, 89. We hold that the term "offense," as it is used in the theft provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 16-1(e)(1)) does not include municipal ordinance violations.