Opinion
A152019
11-02-2018
In re C.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.R., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. J43534)
This is an appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders entered after the juvenile court sustained allegations that minor C.R. committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4), and misdemeanor battery on school property in violation of Penal Code section 243.2, subdivision (a). Pursuant to the dispositional order, C.R. was placed on probation subject to various terms and conditions, including that she shall attend school regularly and receive anger management counseling. On appeal, C.R. challenges these conditions of probation as unconstitutionally vague and/or otherwise fundamentally unfair. For reasons set forth below, we modify the condition requiring C.R. to attend school regularly and in all other regards affirm the orders.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2016, an amended juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that C.R. committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), and misdemeanor battery on school property (§ 243.2, subd. (a)). The petition was based on the following undisputed facts.
On June 15, 2016, minor's mother drove minor and her boyfriend, J.W., to a local high school attended by her former boyfriend, R.R. Minor and R.R. dated off and on from July 2015 to March 2016, and since their break-up minor had become afraid of R.R. because he continually contacted her and her family and brought presents to her home in his efforts to reconcile. Thus, on the day in question, minor and her new boyfriend had the plan to go to R.R.'s school so that J.W. could fight him. They sent a message through one of R.R.'s friends for him to meet C.R. outside so that they could talk. Once R.R. was outside, C.R. confronted and began yelling at him. Seconds later, he was attacked from behind. At the hearing, J.W. admitted hitting R.R. in the face "[a] lot," sending R.R. to the hospital in pain that lasted several days.
On April 21, 2017, a contested jurisdictional hearing was held, after which the trial court sustained the allegations in the amended petition with the exception of the allegation of battery with serious bodily injury, which was dismissed.
At the subsequent dispositional hearing, the juvenile court reduced the felony assault offense to misdemeanor assault. The juvenile court then adjudged C.R. a ward of the court and placed her on probation for a one-year period. In doing so, the juvenile court imposed various terms and conditions of probation on C.R., including that she "shall attend school regularly and maintain passing grades in the grading system utilized by the minor's school, and obey school rules," and that she shall attend anger management counseling of a type determined by the probation officer.
On July 27, 2017, C.R. filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Minor challenges the following terms of her probation as unconstitutionally vague and/or otherwise fundamentally unfair: Condition No. 1: "The minor shall attend school regularly and maintain passing grades in the grading system utilized by the minor's school, and obey school rules"; and Condition No. 4: The minor shall attend "Anger Management" counseling.
We address each of these probationary terms below after setting forth the relevant legal framework. Where the juvenile court places a minor on probation following the minor's commission of a crime, it "may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) " 'Because of its rehabilitative function, the juvenile court has broad discretion when formulating conditions of probation. "A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court." [Citation.] "[I]n planning the conditions of [a juvenile's] supervision, the juvenile court must consider not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor's entire social history. [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citations.] 'Even conditions which infringe on constitutional rights may not be invalid if tailored specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile [citation].' [Citations.] But every juvenile probation condition must be made to fit the circumstances and the minor." (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203.)
Despite the greater latitude afforded juvenile courts in ordering probation conditions, it remains the law in all cases that "[a] probation condition 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,' if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness." (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) In addition, a probation condition that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional right "must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." (Ibid.; see also In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1331 [probation condition against minor restricting him from associating with probationers was not overbroad where minor had previously been in trouble for fighting an alleged gang member, and the restriction was thus "sufficiently related to the goals of (1) promoting his rehabilitation and reformation, and (2) protecting the public"].) "The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the [minor's] constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)
A challenge to the constitutionality of a probation condition may, at the court's discretion, be raised for the first time on appeal (as it was in this case). (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, 888 [recognizing an exception to the forfeiture rule where a facial constitutional challenge presents a pure question of law and is "easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition . . . not requiring additional factual findings"].) Generally, the appellate court then reviews a juvenile court's imposition of a probation condition for abuse of discretion. (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 (Juan G.).) However, whether a probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague presents a question of law reviewed on appeal de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
I. Regular School Attendance.
Minor contends the probation term requiring her to attend school regularly is unconstitutionally vague because the requirement fails to provide sufficient notice or guidance as to whether receiving alternative educational services at home or online would constitute a violation. (See In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101 [" 'It is an essential component of due process that individuals be given fair notice of those acts which may lead to a loss of liberty' "].) Minor further contends this requirement is an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion because it is "fundamentally unfair to deprive [her] of her liberty for failing to achieve a condition beyond her capacity[.]" (Capitalization and bold face removed.) She thus proposes the following modification: "The minor shall receive an education tailored to meet the needs of her individual learning differences."
Minor acknowledges this probation condition was not objected to before the juvenile court. We nonetheless exercise our discretion to reach this issue, given the important role education plays in the juvenile rehabilitation process. (See In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 183-184 [" ' "[T]he fact that a party, by failing to raise an issue below, may forfeit the right to raise the issue on appeal does not mean that an appellate court is precluded from considering the issue." [Citation.] Generally, whether or not an appellate court should excuse the lack of a trial court objection "is entrusted to its discretion." [Citation.]' [Citations.]"].)
Minor correctly states that probationary conditions must provide fair notice of those acts that may lead to a juvenile's loss of liberty and must be tailored to the juvenile's individual circumstances. (See Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 7 [to serve the statutory goals of juvenile rehabilitation and reformation, "the court shall consider not only the circumstances of the offense but also the minor's entire social history"].) In Juan G., the reviewing court found an abuse of discretion in requiring the minor to maintain "a 'B' grade average" when the record reflected the condition was beyond his capabilities. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Similarly, in In re Robert M. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 812 (Robert M.), the reviewing court struck a probationary term requiring the minor to maintain "satisfactory grades and citizenship" when undisputed evidence reflected he was functioning five years below his grade level and had a 70 I.Q. (Id. at p. 816.)
Here, C.R. points to evidence in the record that she suffers from several mental and physical health conditions that make her regular school attendance difficult, including anxiety, depression, chronic asthma and complete deafness in one ear. She is also learning-disabled and has had frequent anxiety attacks at school. A doctor previously recommended that she be taught from home, and the school district had thus provided a teacher for minor's home instruction. And at the time the probation report was prepared in this case, C.R. was enrolled as an 11th grade student at an online school through California Virtual Academy at Sonoma, albeit with a GPA of .43 and multiple failed grades. According to C.R. and her parents, minor's attendance problems stem from her mental health and other medical problems.
We agree with C.R. that, particularly in light of her social and medical history, which includes episodes of anxiety attacks occurring while attending school, the "regular school attendance" condition should be modified to make clear this condition may be met by her regular attendance at either an actual high school, a virtual school, or, assuming the requisite administrative procedures are followed, a home-based school. (See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 ["In deciding the adequacy of any notice afforded those bound by a legal restriction, we are guided by the principles that 'abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context,' and that, although not admitting of 'mathematical certainty,' the language used must have ' "reasonable specificity" ' "]; Robert M., supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 ["mere attendance at school without learning accomplishes little"].) At the same time, we do not believe the modification to this condition proposed by C.R. in fact eliminates the confusion of which she complains. In particular, there is no guidance therein as to what is expected of C.R. in her academic pursuit beyond merely "receiv[ing] an education." As such, we conclude the best approach is to keep the court's "regular school attendance" condition and simply add language clarifying that "school," as used in the order, need not be a physical institution, but may also include an online school or at-home instruction (assuming parents follow any and all applicable school district procedures for obtaining at-home instruction based on C.R.'s circumstances).
Accordingly, the "regular school attendance" condition of C.R.'s probation is hereby modified to read: "Minor shall attend school (to include, as appropriate, a district or private school, online learning institution or at-home instruction) regularly and maintain satisfactory grades in the grading system utilized by the minor's school in a manner consistent with her physical and medical condition, and obey school rules."
II. Anger Management Counseling.
Minor's last argument is that the requirement that she attend anger management counseling must be stricken because it bears no relationship to the underlying offense, is not itself criminal, and is not reasonably related to future delinquent conduct. (See People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) [setting forth a three-prong conjunctive test to determine the reasonableness of a probation condition], superseded on another ground by Proposition 8 as stated in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290-295; In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1034 [holding the Lent factors are applicable in evaluating juvenile probation conditions].)
The Lent test is as follows: "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." (15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) --------
"The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.)
Here, the record provides sufficient support for the juvenile court's decision that, given C.R.'s involvement in a violent attack that she preplanned with J.W. against her former boyfriend, a probation term aimed at addressing her anger was both reasonably necessary for her rehabilitation and constitutionally permissible. The record belies minor's contention that she does not have "anger issues." We acknowledge and respect her fear towards R.R. given his apparent unwillingness to accept their relationship had ended. However, there were many legal means available to minor in her efforts to prevent the continuation of his harassing conduct toward her. The court could properly find that a violent attack involving a ruse to lure R.R. to C.R. and J.W. to face a broad- side attack, and that ultimately left R.R. hospitalized and in significant pain, exhibited a degree of anger, and an inability to handle such anger, that warrants professional counseling. The juvenile court acted well within its discretion in making such counseling a mandatory term of her probation. (See In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 904-905 [the minor's previous theft of a cell phone justified the search of any cell phones or electronic devices in his possession to determine if he was the lawful owner of such]; In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19-21 [concluding that "[c]learly psychological or psychiatric counseling could be of benefit to appellant and bears a reasonable relationship to the crime he committed and to preventing future criminality" in a case involving minor's commission of petty thefts].) The anger management counseling condition thus stands.
DISPOSITION
Probation condition No. 1 in the juvenile court's disposition order of June 1, 2017, is modified to read: "Minor shall attend school (to include, as appropriate, a district or private school, online learning institution or at-home instruction) regularly and maintain satisfactory grades in the grading system utilized by the minor's school in a manner consistent with her physical and medical condition, and obey school rules." In all other regards, the orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
Jenkins, J. We concur: /s/_________
Siggins, P. J. /s/_________
Pollak, J.