Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 196789
Haerle, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
After, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree in September 2005, appellant was placed on probation for a period of three years. After two prior motions to revoke probation ultimately resulted in reinstatements of probation, as a result of the third such motion probation was revoked in September 2006, and appellant sentenced to the midterm of two years in prison on the original second degree burglary count the following month. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, he asks this court to examine the record in this case and determine if the record before us suggests any issues deserving of further briefing. We have done so, find none, and hence affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2005, appellant was arrested after a report of a possible trespass was received from a resident of an apartment building on Sacramento Street in San Francisco. After a careful search of that building and adjacent buildings––buildings which had access from the roof of the original building––the police spotted appellant walking on the garage ramps of one of the buildings pushing a bicycle. He refused to stop when and as ordered, and both screamed at and struggled with the police. After his arrest, the original resident of the apartment building identified him as the man he had seen on the staircase of that building. In appellant’s pocket, the police found four health insurance cards in other people’s names, a United Airlines travel card and a Costco card, also in other peoples’ names, and mail in someone else’s name. Also found in his possession was an instruction manual for installing and removing locks from doors.
On September 27, 2005, appellant was charged, by an amended complaint, with five counts: two of burglary in the first degree, two alleging misdemeanor resisting arrest, and one of burglary in the second degree. Via a plea agreement on or about that date, he entered a plea of guilty to the latter count. The remaining counts were stricken, and the proposed disposition called for a term of probation.
Probation was imposed, for a term of three years, at a sentencing hearing held on October 19, 2005. Appellant was given credit for time served, and the normal fines, fees and conditions were imposed.
In the ensuing six months, two petitions to revoke appellant’s probation were filed. The first was filed on December 19, 2005, and resulted from appellant’s arrest for trespassing when he was found sleeping in a building. After appellant admitted the violation of probation at a hearing held on March 23, 2006, probation for the initial term was reinstated, but modified to add a “stay-away” order regarding the building in question; a six-month jail term was also imposed.
A second motion to revoke was filed on May 11, 2006, along with a supplemental probation report which reported that appellant had been arrested for passing a bad check. At a May 18, 2006, hearing, he admitted the charged violation but probation was reinstated as originally ordered; an additional 10-day jail term was imposed.
A third, and ultimately the final, petition to revoke appellant’s probation was filed on August 17, 2006; filed with it was another supplemental probation report stating that appellant had been arrested on a charge of attempted burglary after being arrested in the courtyard of a Pacific Heights home, after being spotted on a deck outside the kitchen of that home during the evening of August 12, 2006. Upon his arrest, in a fully-enclosed rear courtyard of that house, appellant was searched and found to have a pair of wire snippers and a “speed pipe” in his socks. On this basis, the court found appellant in violation of probation based on his failure to obey all laws because, at the minimum, he had committed a trespass and was in possession of tools suitable for committing burglary.
A contested revocation hearing was held on October 27, 2006; the court revoked probation and sentenced appellant to the midterm on the originally charged second degree burglary offense. Total custody credits of 363 days were given, and restitution and stayed parole restitution fines of $200 were imposed, along with DNA sampling pursuant to Penal Code section 296.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
Appellant was ably represented by a deputy public defender in the hearing held on September 27, 2005, at which he pled guilty to the one count of second degree burglary. He was properly admonished by the court and his counsel regarding the consequences of his plea at that hearing and, afterwards, specifically stated that he understood the rights he was waiving and the consequences of the plea he was entering. While temporarily represented by a substitute public defender, he also accepted the conditions of probation imposed by the sentencing court on October 19, 2005.
At the two probation revocation hearings that resulted in a reinstatement of probation, i.e., those of March 23 and May 18, 2006, appellant was represented by a different public defender; at both hearings, he admitted the violations of probation with which he was charged. Per the record before us, no protest was made at either hearing to the additional jail terms imposed as a condition of the reinstatement of probation.
Before the final probation revocation hearing, yet another deputy public defender filed a memorandum with the court asking that appellant be sentenced to one year in county jail to be served in “residential treatment.” The memorandum argued that appellant suffered from an unidentified “mental illness” and used methamphetamine, thus demonstrating “confused activity” in connection with the offense triggering the final motion to revoke probation. At the sentencing hearing held on October 27, 2006, not only appellant’s attorney argued in favor of a reinstatement of probation, but the court heard, also, from a representative of MOST, an organization that “works with homeless and mentally ill folks in San Francisco.”
As noted, the court declined to reinstate probation, but imposed only the midterm for the 2005 second degree burglary charge, which resulted in appellant receiving only a two-year prison term, and with custody credits of almost a full year.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to revoke probation and impose the midterm for second-degree burglary for the 2005 offense. Nor does our examination of the record disclose any other issue deserving of further briefing in this case.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.