Opinion
2012-02-14
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Francis COWAN, appellant.
Law Office of Joshua L. Dratel, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Alice L. Fontier of counsel), for appellant. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Valerie A. Livingston, Laurie Sapakoff, and Lois Cullen Valerio of counsel), for respondent.
Law Office of Joshua L. Dratel, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Alice L. Fontier of counsel), for appellant. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Valerie A. Livingston, Laurie Sapakoff, and Lois Cullen Valerio of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Neary, J.), rendered February 11, 2009, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly declined to suppress certain statements he made to law enforcement officials on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. Although the defendant was represented by an attorney in connection with another burglary that took place in the Bronx at the time he made the statements, the law enforcement officials did not question the defendant about the Bronx burglary, and the two criminal matters were not “so closely related transactionally, or in space or time, that questioning on the unrepresented matter would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding the matter in which there had been an entry of counsel” ( People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632, 638, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30, 687 N.E.2d 1313; see People v. Madison, 22 A.D.3d 684, 686, 804 N.Y.S.2d 339; People v. Rivera, 277 A.D.2d 470, 471–472, 716 N.Y.S.2d 704).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding certain evidence of third-party culpability, as the evidence was purely speculative and would have caused undue delay, prejudice, and confusion ( see People v. Cameron, 74 A.D.3d 1223, 1224, 905 N.Y.S.2d 619; People v. Williams, 64 A.D.3d 734, 735, 883 N.Y.S.2d 566, affd. 16 N.Y.3d 480, 922 N.Y.S.2d 239, 947 N.E.2d 130; People v. Decker, 51 A.D.3d 686, 687, 855 N.Y.S.2d 910, affd. 13 N.Y.3d 12, 884 N.Y.S.2d 662, 912 N.E.2d 1041).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.