People v. Walker, 103 Ill. App.2d 308; 243 N.E.2d 674. In People v. Count, 106 Ill. App.2d 258; 246 N.E.2d 91, it was contended that the testimony of defendant's psychiatrist was unimpeached and uncontradicted. The court held that the credibility and weight to be given psychiatric testimony was for the trier of fact, and that such opinion testimony of irresistible impulse was contradicted by facts and evidence demonstrating that the robbery was premeditated with a plan for escape.
Once evidence of insanity is introduced, the ordinary presumption of sanity does not prevail and the burden devolves on the State to prove that the accused was sane at the time of committing the act. People v. Le May (1966), 35 Ill.2d 208, 211, 220 N.E.2d 184, 186; People v. Count (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 262, 246 N.E.2d 91, 93. In the instant case, the evidence of insanity consisted of the bizarre nature of the crime itself, testimony of defendant's mother concerning his past history, and the testimony of a psychologist who examined the defendant three months after the offense was committed.
He was not obliged, as a matter of law, to accept the ultimate opinions of the psychiatrists. ( People v. Zemola, 9 Ill. App.3d 424, 431, 292 N.E.2d 195; People v. Count, 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 246 N.E.2d 91; People v. Conrad, 81 Ill. App.2d 34, 225 N.E.2d 713.) At one point, Dr. Rappaport testified that his diagnosis was based solely on the answers the defendant gave him and her reactions to the question. But he then described her as alert, well-oriented, cooperative, and unusually calm.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 6-2(a), (d).) In People v. Count (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 246 N.E.2d 91, this court held that only insanity existing at the very time of the crime, and not before or after, can serve as an excuse. In People v. Yates (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 319, 382 N.E.2d 505, we stated that evidence of prior mental disease is not probative of the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.
( People v. Gallardo (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 764, 772-73, 445 N.E.2d 1213, appeal denied (1983), 94 Ill.2d 554; People v. Jeffrey (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 455, 468, 418 N.E.2d 880, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill.2d 570; People v. Mireles (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 173, 199, 398 N.E.2d 150, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 860, 66 L.Ed.2d 76, 101 S.Ct. 163; People v. Morgan (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 711, 715, 352 N.E.2d 444, cert. denied (1977), 431 U.S. 930, 53 L.Ed.2d 246, 97 S.Ct. 2635.) However, where the basis of defendant's challenge to instructions tendered by him goes to competency of counsel, he may raise the instruction as error. ( People v. Williams (1975), 31 Ill. App.3d 161, 165, 333 N.E.2d 655; People v. Count (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 263, 246 N.E.2d 91.) For defendant to establish that his trial counsel was thus incompetent, he must demonstrate actual incompetence which resulted in substantial prejudice without which the outcome would have been different based on the circumstances of the particular case. People v. Royse (1983), 99 Ill.2d 163, 168, 457 N.E.2d 1217; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 584-85, 404 N.E.2d 233; People v. Bliss (1970), 44 Ill.2d 363, 369, 255 N.E.2d 405.
• 13, 14 The insanity of a person either before or after the commission of a crime cannot excuse the crime; only insanity existing at the very time of the crime can excuse the same. ( People v. Count (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 246 N.E.2d 91.) In People v. Yates (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 319, 382 N.E.2d 505, the court held that a doctor's trial testimony concerning his examination of decedent was not probative of his mental condition at the time of the offense.
Only insanity existing at the very time of the crime can excuse the defendant. ( People v. County [ sic], 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 246 N.E.2d 91 (1969). Since the actions of the defendant in the presence of Martha Hobbs on the morning of October 22, 1978, were not similar to the bizarre incidents related by his sisters; and since each psychiatrist testified that the defendant could have lucid moments, it is my duty, as trier of facts, to determine whether a reasonable person would believe that Martha Hobbs' testimony describes the conduct of a lucid person.
He may also characterize the testimony if he relies on the evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence. ( People v. Sinclair (1963), 27 Ill.2d 505, 190 N.E.2d 298; People v. Count (1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 246 N.E.2d 91.) Further, a prosecutor may argue the inconsistency between the testimony and the conduct of an alibi witness who had the opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the defendant at the time of his arrest but did not. People v. McMath (1968), 104 Ill. App.2d 302, 244 N.E.2d 330, aff'd (1970), 45 Ill.2d 33, 256 N.E.2d 835, cert. denied (1970), 400 U.S. 846, 27 L.Ed.2d 83, 91 S.Ct. 92. • 4 In the instant case the defendant's mother, stepfather, and stepsister made no protest to any police agency that the defendant had an alibi for the night of November 29, 1977, even though he spent six weeks in jail charged with crimes alleged to have been committed that night, yet at trial they were sure that he was with them looking at pictures.
The details had been carefully arranged with an adult accomplice and there was an extremely rational motive; namely, the commission of an armed robbery for defendant's financial benefit. (See People v. Count, 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 246 N.E.2d 91.) Defendant's conduct in other respects was rational, calculating and shrewd. While holding the police at bay, he contacted the news reporter and showed ingenuity in obtaining his assistance in arranging a safe surrender. He admitted to the reporter that he had participated in armed robbery but denied that he had murdered the owner.
In fact, Dr. William H. Haines, for many years director of the Behavior Clinic of the Criminal Court of Cook County, took the position that a psychiatrist could not make an accurate assessment of a person's impulses some months prior to an examination. See People v. Count (1st Dist. 1969), 106 Ill. App.2d 258, 262, 246 N.E.2d 91; and People v. Taylor (1st Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 1053, 1059, 275 N.E.2d 717. The recently adopted Unified Code of Corrections (effective January 1, 1973) provides a procedure for presentence investigation including a commitment for study and report.