Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Nos. 2008026640, 2008005161Ventura Steven E. Hintz, Judge
Lyn A. Woodward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Maxwell Lee Coulson appeals a judgment entered following his guilty plea to two counts of sale of methamphetamine, with admissions that one count occurred within 1,000 feet of an elementary school and that he served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11353.6, subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 11, 2008, in Case No. 2008005161, the prosecutor charged Coulson with sale of methamphetamine and alleged that he committed the offense while on bail. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b).) Coulson appeared in court on that date with retained counsel and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, through August 2008, he continued the preliminary examination four times to discuss early disposition of the charges.
On August 22, 2008, in Case No. 2008026640, the prosecutor charged Coulson with sale of methamphetamine and possession for sale of methamphetamine, and alleged that he committed the offenses within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, served two prior prison terms, and was on bail at the time of the offenses. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11378, 11353.6, subd. (b); Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 12022.1, subd. (b).) On that date, Coulson appeared with retained counsel and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he continued the preliminary examinations in the two cases (to be held concurrently) eight times, until January 15, 2009.
On January 15, 2009, the parties appeared for the preliminary examinations. Coulson requested a continuance to obtain a different attorney. The prosecutor objected, stating that he had prepared for the examinations "on several occasions over the past two or three months" and had "brought officers out on probably at least five different occasions, who have been here ready to go, when Mr. Coulson has determined he would like to continue the case either to get another offer or another [early disposition conference]." The trial court reluctantly continued the matter until February 17, 2009, and stated it would not grant further continuances. The trial judge stated that it wasted public resources to require police officer witnesses to "jump every time that this case comes on calendar and stop what they are doing."
On February 27, 2009, Coulson appeared with his present attorney and a newly retained attorney, Ms. Houseman. Houseman stated that she "was just retained yesterday" and requested a continuance to prepare. The trial court denied the request for continuance. Thereafter, Coulson consulted with his initial attorney and later (following intervening matters) entered a guilty plea to two counts of selling methamphetamine, and admitted that one of the offenses occurred within 1,000 feet of an elementary school and that he served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11353.6, subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced Coulson to a prison term of six years, including a three-year concurrent term for one count of selling methamphetamine. The court also imposed various fines and fees and awarded Coulson 319 days of presentence custody credits.
On April 6, 2009, Coulson requested a certificate of probable cause, asserting in part that the trial court denied his right to substitute retained counsel. The court granted the request for a certificate of probable cause on April 13, 2009.
Coulson appeals and contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance.
DISCUSSION
Coulson argues that the trial court prejudicially interfered with his constitutional rights to counsel and to present a defense by denying a continuance to permit his newly retained attorney to prepare. (People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 982 [court should minimize interference with defendant's right to defend himself as he chooses].) He points out that his initial attorney was not available during three of the continued hearings (another attorney appeared on his behalf) and that the prosecutor did not object to prior continuances. Coulson adds that he is entitled to rely upon the advice of counsel when entering a plea and that he later wrote the trial court and stated that his first attorney coerced him into entering a guilty plea.
Generally, a nonindigent defendant has the right to discharge his retained counsel, with or without cause. (People v. Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d 975, 983.) The right to discharge counsel, however, is not absolute. (Ibid.) A court need not permit defendant to discharge retained counsel where, among other things, the request is untimely and would disrupt the judicial process. (People v. Turner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 913, 918.) The right to representation by counsel of choice is limited by the countervailing state interest in proceeding with a prosecution on an orderly and expeditious basis. (People v.Keshishian (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 425, 428.) The court must balance a defendant's interest in new counsel against the disruption flowing from the substitution. (Id. at p. 429.)
The trial court properly denied Coulson's request as untimely. At the January 15, 2009 hearing, the prosecutor objected to a continuance and stated that police officer witnesses had been ready to testify "at least four times in the last 30 days." The court then ruled it would grant a continuance, over the prosecutor's objection, with the "guarantee that there wouldn't be anymore continuances." The court then warned Coulson that it would not grant further continuances and that February 17 was the "final date." Thus Coulson received a 30-day continuance in which to retain new counsel.
The right to counsel does not mean that a defendant may continually delay his day of judgment by continuances or by discharging prior counsel. (People v. Keshishian, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 425, 429.) The trial court acted within its discretion by denying a last-minute motion to continue to secure new counsel and allow her preparation. (People v. Lau (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 473, 479.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J., COFFEE, J.