Although the Criminal Procedure Law only authorizes "[a] police officer" to execute a search warrant ( CPL 690.25[2] ; cf. 18 USCA § 3105 ), the participation by an individual who does not meet this statutory definition "is not inherently improper" ( People v. Charlier, 136 A.D.2d 862, 864–865, 524 N.Y.S.2d 523 ). Indeed, courts have upheld the validity of a search where civilians participated in the execution of a search warrant (seeid. at 864–865, 524 N.Y.S.2d 523 ; People v. Cote, 124 A.D.2d 1000, 1001, 508 N.Y.S.2d 788 ; People v. Boyd, 123 Misc.2d 634, 638–639, 474 N.Y.S.2d 661 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County], affd 127 A.D.2d 1013, 511 N.Y.S.2d 455 ). Under such circumstances, "civilians who act at the behest of the State are treated as police agents, subject to the same controls and restrictions of the Fourth Amendment as the police themselves" ( People v. Boyd, 123 Misc.2d at 639, 474 N.Y.S.2d 661 ; see generallyPeople v. Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 160, 371 N.Y.S.2d 681, 332 N.E.2d 863 ).
Although the Criminal Procedure Law only authorizes "[a] police officer" to execute a search warrant ( CPL 690.25[2] ; cf. 18 USCA 3105 ), the participation by an individual who does not meet this statutory definition "is not inherently improper" ( People v. Charlier, 136 A.D.2d 862, 864–865, 524 N.Y.S.2d 523 ). Indeed, courts have upheld the validity of a search where civilians participated in the execution of a search warrant (seePeople v. Charlier, 136 A.D.2d at 864–865, 524 N.Y.S.2d 523 ; People v. Cote, 124 A.D.2d 1000, 1001, 508 N.Y.S.2d 788 ; People v. Boyd, 123 Misc.2d 634, 638–639, 474 N.Y.S.2d 661 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County] ). Under such circumstances, "civilians who act at the behest of the State are treated as police agents, subject to the same controls and restrictions of the Fourth Amendment as the police themselves" ( People v. Boyd, 123 Misc.2d at 639, 474 N.Y.S.2d 661 ; see generallyPeople v. Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 160, 371 N.Y.S.2d 681, 332 N.E.2d 863 )
We disagree. Here a disclosed citizen informant provided an affidavit upon personal knowledge (see, People v Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225), unlike the situation in People v Griminger (supra) where the search warrant was based upon hearsay information from an undisclosed informant. Information provided by a disinterested citizen informant bears a presumption of reliability (People v Cicciaro, 133 A.D.2d 645). The nondisclosure to the Magistrate of motivating factors does not invalidate the supporting affidavit (People v Cote, 124 A.D.2d 1000, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 745). The basis of the citizen's information is supported by her residency in the subject apartment and was sufficiently detailed to permit the inference that the informant had personal observations of the matters described. Search warrant applications should not be read in a hypertechnical manner but rather read in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable inferences (People v Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 559). There is no merit to defendant's argument that her room was a separate residential unit distinct from the shared apartment as a whole.
Next, we find from our review of the record that Monroe's limited participation in the execution of the second search warrant was permissible. Contrary to defendant's contention, civilian assistance in search warrants is not inherently improper (see, People v Cote, 124 A.D.2d 1000, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 745; People v Boyd, 123 Misc.2d 634, affd 127 A.D.2d 1013, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 877). Here, the police did not extend the scope of their search beyond that authorized by the warrant, nor did Monroe's presence serve as an impermissible substitute for the warrant's requirement of particularity (see, People v Boyd, supra, at 637-638).
The SOG team, though erroneously listed in the search warrant, did not execute the search warrant. The SOG team merely assisted the City of Middletown Police Department for approximately five minutes by gaining entry to the premises and securing the scene (see, for e.g., People v. Charlier, 136 A.D.2d 862, 524 N.Y.S.2d 523 [3rd Dept., 1988] ; People v. Cote, 124 A.D.2d 1000, 508 N.Y.S.2d 788 [4th Dept., 1986], lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 745, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1048, 505 N.E.2d 247 [1987] ; People v. Brancato, 101 Misc.2d 264, 420 N.Y.S.2d 854 [1979] ; People v. Gamble, 122 Misc.2d 960, 472 N.Y.S.2d 580 [1984] ; People v. Boyd, 123 Misc.2d 634, 474 N.Y.S.2d 661 [1984],aff'd 127 A.D.2d 1013, 511 N.Y.S.2d 455 [1st Dept., 1987], lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 877, 515 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 507 N.E.2d 1094 [1987] ). The SOG team gained entry to the residence to safely secure the persons therein while the City of Middletown Police Department remained within the curtilage of the house so those officers could safely enter the residence and execute the search warrant.