Even assuming that defendant has not waived the sentencing issues, a reviewing court will not disturb a sentence which falls within the statutory limits unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Costello (1992), 224 Ill. App.3d 500, 510, 586 N.E.2d 742. The offense of first degree murder carries a sentence of not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years.

• 4 The sentencing judge is in the best position to make a first-hand, reasoned judgment on the appropriate sentence based on the particular circumstances and factors of each case. ( People v. Costello (1992), 224 Ill. App.3d 500, 510, 586 N.E.2d 742, 749; People v. Black (1992), 223 Ill. App.3d 630, 633, 585 N.E.2d 1228, 1231.) The trial court has wide latitude in determining and weighing factors in mitigation or aggravation when exercising its discretion and imposing a sentence.

Two Illinois cases are also instructive. In People v. Castello, 586 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. 1992), the defendant posed as a medical doctor and offered the victim a free medical examination, which including touching her breasts and vagina. The court stated, "There is no evidence to suggest that [the victim] would have consented to defendant's acts of sexual penetration if she was aware that defendant was not the doctor he represented himself to be," and concluded, "undoubtedly this deception took away [the victim's] ability to give knowing consent to these acts."

The seriousness of the crime is an important factor to be considered in imposing sentence. People v. Costello, 224 Ill. App.3d 500, 510, 586 N.E.2d 742, 749 (1992). "A sentence within the statutory guidelines that is alleged to be excessive will not be disturbed on review unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense."

The purpose of section 111-3(a) "is to ensure that a defendant will be informed with reasonable certainty of the offense with which he is charged so that he can prepare his defense." People v. Costello, 224 Ill. App. 3d 500, 506 (1992). Our supreme court has held that the purpose of section 113-(c) is similarly "to ensure that a defendant received notice, before trial, of the offense with which he is charged."

]" Thus, the record indicates that the trial court properly considered the facts of the case and the manner of Denman's death when it imposed its sentence. People v. Costello, 224 Ill. App. 3d 500, 510 (1992) ("A defendant's lack of a prior record is not necessarily the most persuasive consideration at sentencing, and the seriousness of the crime has been called the most important factor to be considered in imposing the sentence."). Finally, the trial court was not required to "make an express finding that the defendant lacked rehabilitative potential," or required to give more weight to defendant's "potential for rehabilitation than to the seriousness of the crime."

The record here establishes that the trial court considered the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, including defendant's age, and determined that defendant's gang-motivated killing of the 16-year-old victim warranted a sentence above the minimum. See People v. Costello, 224 Ill. App. 3d 500, 510 (1992) (the seriousness of the crime is the most important sentencing factor). ¶ 25 In addition, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered defendant's potential for rehabilitation when it indicated that it considered all of the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, the testimony of his mother and sister during sentencing, and the three letters from individuals who are familiar with him. It is not our prerogative to reweigh these same factors and independently conclude that the sentence was excessive.

I also note that the cases cited from Illinois also involve a distinguishable statute as the statute at issue requires that the victim give "knowing consent." See People v. Costello, 586 N.E.2d 742 (1992); People v. Quilan, 596 N.E.2d 28 (1992). The district court, in crafting Jury Instruction 21, relied on our decision in Vander Esch for the proposition that an act is "by force or against the will" of another if it is procured by "deception, which may include deception concerning the nature of the act . . ." (emphasis added).

"`A sentence within the statutory guidelines that is alleged to be excessive will not be disturbed on review unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.'" Golden, 323 Ill. App.3d at 905, quoting People v. Costello, 224 Ill. App.3d 500, 510 (1992). The 50-year sentence received by Lima is within the statutory guidelines and is not manifestly disproportionate to the offense of murder.

Where a sentence is within the statutory limits, it will not be set aside on review unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. ( People v. Costello (1992), 224 Ill. App.3d 500, 510, 586 N.E.2d 742, 749.) Defendant concedes that an "enhanced sentence is available" in this case, but he argues that it is not just and equitable, given his potential rehabilitation under the circumstances.