(13) "The specific intent to defraud . . . may be inferred from all surrounding circumstances." ( People v. Costello (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 748, 751 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 155].) (12b) Taking the representations about the check against the backdrop of the general conspiracy to unlawfully acquire AVCO Thrift certificates in which the parties, including Yaddow, were engaged, the unfulfilled representations to Yaddow regarding the proposed corporate merger, the obvious conflict of interest position to AVCO in which Yaddow was placed by his dealing with defendants, the fact that no account was ever appropriately opened with the bank on which the checks were drawn, and the fact that a series of worthless checks were utilized to unlawfully acquire AVCO property, an inference of intent to defraud is forced.
(2) The $175, even if received by the bank, would not have justified all of the checks which defendant wrote in June. [1] Fraudulent intent is ordinarily proven by circumstances, and where, as here, the inference drawn by the jury is a reasonable one, it cannot be upset by a reviewing court. ( People v. Costello, 223 Cal.App.2d 748, 751 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 155] .) [2] Defendant's personally written brief asserts that he was forced to trial at a time when he was "under Doctor's care."
It may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances. ( People v. Costello (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 748, 751 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 155]; People v. Weiss (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [ 266 P.2d 924]; and see: People v. Bandy (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 458, 462 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 10]; People v. Greenwood (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 300, 304 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 337].) [2] Lack of specific intent to defraud may be shown by adducing proof of diminished mental capacity upon a not guilty plea.
This finding, which tracks the language of the firearm enhancement alleged in the information, was not "extraneous" or "superfluous" to charged offenses. (People v. Costello (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 748, 754 [the verdict is construed with the information or indictment].)
When a party impeaches a witness with evidence of past misconduct, the other party may rehabilitate the witness with evidence of subsequent conduct showing present good character. People v. Farrell, 377 Ill. App. 3d 249, 252 (2007); People v. Costello, 223 Cal. App. 2d 748, 753, Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (1963). If a witness has offered crucial testimony, the trial court should allow both parties wide latitude to impeach and rehabilitate the witness to help the jury evaluate the credibility of the witness. Bianchi v. Mikhail, 266 Ill. App. 3d 767, 777 (1994).
This evidence tended to prove his character at the time of trial, and not simply to rehash the facts of the prior conviction. (SeePeople v. Costello (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 748, 753.) Marsh opined in a footnote, however, that if the testimony had concerned the details of defendant’s prior conviction “the trial court’s determination of admissibility should be determined by the factors stated in Evidence Code section 352.”
Many cases have held the question of intent to defraud under Section 476a of the Penal Code is a question of fact which may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Gentry, 257 Cal.App.2d 607, 65 Cal.Rptr. 235; People v. Simon, 227 Cal.App.2d 849, 39 Cal.Rptr. 138; People v. Costello, 223 Cal.App.2d 748, 36 Cal.Rptr. 155.) However, in none of the cases which we have examined where such general proposition is stated, has there been a factual situation, as in the case before us, in which there was disclosure by the defendant to the payee that there were no funds in the bank and a disclosed postdated check was given.