Opinion
H042043
08-18-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL CORTINAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1370576)
Miguel Cortinas appeals from an order denying a petition for resentencing under Proposition 47. The California Supreme Court granted review of our court's 2018 opinion affirming the trial court's order, and recently returned the case to us for reconsideration in light of People v. Orozco (2020) 9 Cal.5th 111 (Orozco). The Supreme Court in Orozco determined that Proposition 47's revision to Penal Code section 496, making the offense of receiving stolen property a misdemeanor when the value of the property is $950 or less, does not extend to convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d. (Orozco, at p. 116. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Convicted of felony buying or receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d, Cortinas reargues in supplemental briefing filed after Orozco that the exclusion of section 496d from Proposition 47's purview violates equal protection. He asks that we affirm the trial court's order denying his petition, without prejudice to that court's consideration of a new petition containing evidence of his eligibility for relief.
We will again affirm the trial court's order with prejudice. We continue to adhere to the view that no equal protection violation is present here. Even if we view Cortinas as similarly situated to a person convicted of stealing a vehicle worth $950 or less or receiving stolen property of the same value, a rational basis exists to support the differing sentencing treatment.
I. BACKGROUND
After pleading no contest to buying or receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d) and admitting a prior strike conviction for residential burglary (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12), Cortinas was sentenced in July 2014 to 32 months in prison. In January 2015 he filed a petition under Proposition 47 requesting recall of his felony sentence and misdemeanor resentencing. In a brief supporting the petition, Cortinas argued that Proposition 47 redesignated as misdemeanors violations of section 496d when the value of the vehicle does not exceed $950. The petition contained no facts or evidence showing that the vehicle involved (a 1992 Honda Accord) was valued at $950 or less. In denying the petition, the trial court expressed the view that offenses under section 496d are not subject to the provisions of Proposition 47. The trial court also noted that the vehicle appeared to have a value greater than $950.
II. DISCUSSION
An equal protection violation is shown when "the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530.) Cortinas argues that a person who buys or receives a stolen car (valued at $950 or less) in violation of section 496d is similarly situated to a person who steals the same car in violation of section 487 or Vehicle Code section 10851, and to a person who receives other stolen property valued at less than $950 under section 496. Yet the person who is charged with violating section 496d is treated differently. The car thief and the person who receives stolen property under section 496 will be convicted of misdemeanors, while the person who buys or receives a stolen car, regardless of the car's value, will face a harsher penalty.
Even assuming the 1992 Honda Accord is valued at $950 or less and that Cortinas is similarly situated to persons convicted of stealing a car of the same value or of misdemeanor buying or receiving stolen property other than a vehicle, his equal protection claim fails. Given that a defendant does not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment or in the designation of a particular crime, an equal protection challenge involving an alleged sentencing disparity is subject to rational basis review. (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838.) In applying the rational basis test, a court may engage in "rational speculation" as to the basis for the legislative choice. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) "To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must ' "negative every conceivable basis" ' that might support the disputed statutory disparity." (Ibid.) "If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its ' "wisdom, fairness, or logic." ' " (Ibid.)
Compare People v. Gutierrez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 393, 403-404 ("persons convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes") with People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657, 667 (statutory proscriptions against bringing different types of contraband into jails are sufficiently similar under equal protection). --------
Receipt of stolen property does not require the offender to have engaged in any thievery. (Orozco, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 121-122.) The statutory proscriptions against buying or receiving stolen property are "directed at those who knowingly deal with thieves and with their stolen goods after the theft has been committed." (People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 183, abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1165.) Section 496 "is directed at the traditional 'fence' and at those who lurk in the background of criminal ways in order to provide the thieves with a market or depository for their loot." (People v Tatum, at p. 183.) "[B]y cutting off the 'fence' a major obstacle is placed in the path of encouraging thefts as a profitable venture." (Id. at p. 184.) It is therefore not irrational to treat those who incentivize theft by accepting stolen property differently from those who engage in stealing it. (People v. Bussey (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1056, 1064, review granted Sept. 12, 2018, review dismissed June 24, 2020.)
It is also rational to distinguish stolen property offenses based on the nature of the property. Unlike other forms of property, vehicles are often essential for victims' daily living—for transportation to work, school, and other commitments, and for obtaining basic necessities. The market for stolen cars supports chop shops and organized vehicle theft rings. In enacting section 496d, the Legislature recognized "the business of vehicle theft," and sought to "provide[] safer streets and save[] Californians millions of dollars." (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2390 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1998. Italics added.) Consequently, the electorate reasonably could distinguish between sections 496 and 496d in approving Proposition 47, and not extend misdemeanor treatment to the latter.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Cortinas's resentencing petition is affirmed.
/s/_________
Grover, J. /s/_________
Greenwood, P.J. /s/_________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.