Opinion
A100680.
10-24-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JANIS KAY CORTEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant, Janis Kay Cortez, appeals from the trial courts denial of her motion to suppress evidence. She argues that the trial court erred by finding that the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause to issue the warrant and by concluding that the evidence obtained in the search was admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We discern no error and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
Detective Mike Hulsey (Hulsey) executed a search warrant at appellants residence and seized suspected methamphetamine. Hulsey also found a digital scale, small plastic baggies, and a "pay/owe" sheet, which reported ounces and dollar figures. Hulsey also seized $171 from appellants purse. Although appellant claimed that the methamphetamine was for personal use, Hulsey opined, based on his experience, that she possessed it to sell.
The affidavit supporting the warrant included the following facts. The affidavit stated that Hulsey received information from a confidential informant who had seen Cortez with a significant amount of methamphetamine within the previous 10 days. The informant also had seen her sell drugs recently. The informant also provided appellants address and a physical description of her, which Hulsey later corroborated through personal observation.
The affidavit also stated that the confidential informant was particularly reliable, because he had previously made two controlled buys for the police, which resulted in the issuance of search warrants. Moreover, the information previously provided by the informant had never been proven false or unreliable. Hulsey opined that the informant was competent to identify methamphetamine.
The affidavit included information about appellants prior convictions for possession as well as for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance. As the affiant, Hulsey stated that based on his training and experience, it was his opinion that people involved in the drug sales keep supplies of the drugs and associated materials at their residences. Based on the informants tip, Hulseys corroboration of details supporting the informants tip, appellants prior criminal history, and Hulseys expert opinions, the issuing magistrate found probable cause to support a search warrant.
Appellant sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that there was no probable cause and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The court denied her motion. Appellant moved to have the information set aside on the same basis. The trial court also denied this motion, again finding that there was probable cause to support the warrant. The court added that even if the warrant was flawed, it was relied upon in good faith, and the evidence need not be excluded. Subsequently, appellant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was placed on three years probation, with standard conditions and 60 days home detention.
On April 29, 2003, this court granted Cortez relief from her late notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The standard of review for this appeal is well established. Regarding motions to suppress evidence, appellate courts must review findings of fact under the deferential substantial evidence standard; the selection of the applicable rule of law must be scrutinized de novo. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 187; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123.) It is the duty of the reviewing court to " ` " . . . measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness." [Citation.] . . . " (People v. Loewen, supra, at p. 123.)
Appellant argues that the magistrate erred by finding probable cause for the search warrant because the supporting affidavit was conclusory. Appellant also contends that the reliability of the informant was not sufficiently established. Finally, appellant argues that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, established in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, cannot apply because any indicia of probable cause in the affidavit was too ephemeral to be reasonably relied upon.
Respondent responds that the evidence in the affidavit was sufficient and notes that the informant who provided the information was reliable in the past and that Hulsey was able to corroborate many of the facts provided by that informant. Respondent argues that the totality of the circumstances, which included the information from the informant, appellants history of drug related offenses, and Hulseys expert opinions, was sufficient to support the magistrates belief that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found at appellants residence. Further, respondent contends that even if the magistrate erred, the trial court correctly refused to suppress the evidence because Hulseys reliance on the warrant was in good faith and objectively reasonable.
To find probable cause to support a warrant, the issuing magistrate must make a commonsense determination whether, given the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238; accord, People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041; People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 391.) The reviewing court must uphold the magistrates determination if there was a "`substantial basis for . . . conclu[ding] that probable cause existed. " (Illinois v. Gates , supra, at pp. 238-239, quoting Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 271; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) The magistrates finding of probable cause should be given great deference. (Illinois v. Gates, supra, at p. 236.) Warrants are not generally invalidated based on hypertechnical interpretations. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 469; accord, People v. Leonard (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 878, 883; People v. Smith (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 942, 948-949.) Reasonable doubt is generally resolved in favor of the warrant. (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1082-1083; People v. Mesa, supra, at p. 470.)
There is probable cause to support a search warrant where an officer knows of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the object of the search will be at the place to be searched. (Wimberly v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 557, 564.) However, this reasonable inference may not be based merely on suspicion, speculation, or guesswork. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21; United States v. Condo (9th Cir. 1986) 782 F.2d 1502, 1507.) Also, the information within the affidavit must be " `closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. " (Alexander v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 387, 393; Sgro v. United States (1932) 287 U.S. 206, 210.)
When the information in the affidavit is obtained from an informant, that persons veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are not absolute requirements. Rather, they are relevant factors, which may "illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is `probable cause. " (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 230; People v. Terrones (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 139, 146.) A deficiency in one of these factors may be compensated for by a showing of other indicia of reliability. (Illinois v. Gates, supra, at p. 233).
Here, the bulk of the information in the affidavit was obtained from the informant. The informant detailed the type and amount of drugs he saw in appellants possession within the previous 10 days. The informant also gave information about recent drug sales at appellants residence. Hulsey was able to corroborate the informants physical description of appellant and to confirm her place of residence through personal observation. Although these latter facts seem benign, observations of seemingly innocent facts can provide sufficient corroboration if they confirm details provided by the informant. (People v. Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1616; People v. Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1555; People v. Terrones, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 147-148.)
Further, any lack of corroboration of criminal acts can be compensated for by the proven reliability of the informant. Where an informant has provided useful information in the past, leading to the issuance of warrants or the arrest of suspects, such reliability is established. (See Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 233; People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 876.) This particular informant was known to Hulsey and had provided information, which resulted in warrants on two prior occasions. The informants past tips had never been proven unreliable or false. Hulsey was also able to confirm that the informant knew about methamphetamine, because of the informants own history with drugs and his previous experience conducting controlled buys for the police. These facts, along with the informants history of providing dependable information, provided ample indicia of reliability.
The affidavit also included the opinions of the affiant, Hulsey, as an experienced officer. Opinions of officers with extensive training and experience are valuable in interpreting the circumstances and conduct described by an affidavit. (See People v. Tuadles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1777, 1784; People v. Johnson (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 235, 244.) Hulsey explained his conclusion that it was likely appellant was keeping drugs for sale in her residence. This opinion, based on Hulseys training and experience, was consistent with the informants statements and with appellants prior history of convictions for drug possession, manufacture, and sales.
The magistrate considered the informants tip, Hulseys corroboration of certain facts within that tip, the informants previous reliability, Hulseys expert opinions, and appellants prior criminal history. These factors combined to provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause to support the warrant.
We also agree that, even if the magistrate had erred in issuing the warrant, the evidence should not be suppressed under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Suppression of evidence is generally justified for policy reasons, in order to deter police misconduct and unlawful searches and seizures. However, when an officer acts in good faith upon a search warrant, which later proves to be inadequate, exclusion of evidence will not provide such deterrence and the substantial cost of exclusion is no longer justified. (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 922.) Therefore, "`a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that [an officer] has `acted in good faith in conducting the search, " and the evidence obtained in that search will not ordinarily be suppressed, so long as the officers reliance on the magistrates determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable. (Ibid.) An officers reliance is not in good faith if the warrant is based on an affidavit that is "`so lacking in indicia of probable cause " or so facially deficient, "`as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. " (Id. at p. 923, quoting Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 610-611.)
This affidavit was not facially deficient because it was based on information from a reliable informant who described recent criminal activities at appellants residence. The affidavit also provided facts which corroborated the information supplied by the informant, and described appellants prior drug-related convictions. These basic facts were supported by expert opinions regarding drug sales. On its face, the affidavit was thus adequate to make reliance upon it objectively reasonable and there is no evidence of bad faith. Therefore, the search of appellants residence was permissible based on the exception which allows reasonable reliance upon the warrant.
Accordingly, we conclude there was probable cause to issue the warrant, and remark that even if the warrant had been inadequate, the evidence obtained in the search should not be suppressed.
DISPOSITION
The trial courts orders are affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P. J., and Ruvolo, J.