Opinion
2015–02338 2015–02345 Ind. No. 14–00183; S.C.I. No. 14–00445
03-21-2018
Mary Zugibe Raleigh, Warwick, NY, for appellant. David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Middletown, N.Y. (Nicholas D. Mangold of counsel), for respondent.
Mary Zugibe Raleigh, Warwick, NY, for appellant.
David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Middletown, N.Y. (Nicholas D. Mangold of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERAppeals by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Orange County (Nicholas De Rosa, J.), both rendered March 4, 2015, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree under Indictment No. 14–00183, and conspiracy in the second degree under Superior Court Information No. 14–00445, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.
ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.
We need not determine whether the defendant's purported waiver of the right to appeal was invalid (cf. People v. Ward, 140 A.D.3d 903, 904, 32 N.Y.S.3d 648 ; People v. Harvey, 137 A.D.3d 1162, 1163, 26 N.Y.S.3d 890 ), since the defendant's contentions survive even a valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022 ; People v. Harris, 153 A.D.3d 552, 553, 56 N.Y.S.3d 877 ; People v. Aquart, 149 A.D.3d 768, 49 N.Y.S.3d 632 ; People v. Bonds, 148 A.D.3d 1304, 1305, 47 N.Y.S.3d 916 ).
"The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion" (People v. Harris, 153 A.D.3d at 553, 56 N.Y.S.3d 877; see CPL 220.60[3] ; People v. Douglas, 83 A.D.3d 1092, 921 N.Y.S.2d 324 ). Here, since the record demonstrates that the defendant's pleas of guilty were entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying, without a hearing, the defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas (see People v. Harris, 153 A.D.3d at 553, 56 N.Y.S.3d 877; People v. Manragh, 150 A.D.3d 762, 51 N.Y.S.3d 431, lv granted 29 N.Y.3d 1130, 64 N.Y.S.3d 680, 86 N.E.3d 572 ; People v. Morris, 148 A.D.3d 732, 47 N.Y.S.3d 718)."A superior court information has the same force and effect as an indictment and all procedures and provisions of law applicable to indictments are also applicable to superior court informations, except where otherwise expressly provided" ( CPL 200.15 ). "An indictment is rendered jurisdictionally defective only if it does not charge the defendant with the commission of a particular crime, by, for example, failing to allege every material element of the crime charged, or alleging acts that do not equal a crime at all" ( People v. Guerrero, 28 N.Y.3d 110, 116, 42 N.Y.S.3d 80, 65 N.E.3d 51 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Price, 234 A.D.2d 978, 978, 652 N.Y.S.2d 453 ). Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the superior court information was not jurisdictionally defective. It alleged every material element of conspiracy in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 105.15, 105.20 ). By pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited his challenge to the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the superior court information (see People v. McCrory, 114 A.D.3d 810, 980 N.Y.S.2d 164 ; People v. Price, 234 A.D.2d at 978–979, 652 N.Y.S.2d 453 ).
Contrary to his contention, the defendant's waiver of indictment was valid (see People v. McIntyre, 178 A.D.2d 559, 559–560, 577 N.Y.S.2d 466 ; see also People v. Wicks, 42 A.D.3d 585, 838 N.Y.S.2d 267 ).
DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.