Opinion
July 14, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agresta, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
The defendant's primary challenge on this appeal involves the denial of his motion and renewed motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.30, [4]). We find that these motions were properly denied.
The criminal action in this case commenced with defendant's arrest and filing of a felony complaint on October 2, 1979. An indictment was handed up on January 11, 1980, and the defendant was arraigned January 23, 1980. Neither party disputes that these 113 days are attributable to the People.
While the defense counsel served a notice to produce the Grand Jury minutes on January 23, 1980, for the purpose of examining the testimony of the defendant and of a potential alibi witness, the People did not supply this to defense counsel until May 9, 1980. However, the delay in producing these materials did not impede the People's or the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, since such testimony, like Brady material or Rosario material, may be provided at any time prior to the time the trial commences (see, People v Brown, 113 A.D.2d 812; People v Allen, 108 A.D.2d 601, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529; People v Jones, 125 Misc.2d 798). The minutes in this case were not required for the court's decision of the defendant's omnibus motion (see, People v Pardner, 90 A.D.2d 987). Therefore, this period is not to be counted against the People solely due to their delay in supplying these minutes. However, the periods from January 23 to February 4, 1980, March 10 to April 11, 1980, and May 5 to May 9, 1980, are attributable to the People because these delays were not due to defense motions or requests for adjournments (CPL 30.30 [a], [b]).
The defendant's motion to renew his first speedy trial motion (decided May 9, 1980), was decided on June 19, 1980. On June 18, 1980, however, the People communicated their readiness to the court in open court (see, People v Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331). While the transcript of the June 18, 1980 proceedings leaves some ambiguity, the decision of a subsequent speedy trial motion by the same Judge who presided on June 18, 1980, contains a finding of fact that the People's readiness was properly communicated on that date.
However, subsequent adjournments (from August 11 to August 28, 1980) were made at the People's request and, under the circumstances must be counted against the People (see, People v Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 541; People v Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, 186, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529).
The number of days chargeable to the People totaled 178, which was within the statutory limit of six months.
We have examined defendant's remaining contentions and find they either are without merit or were not preserved for review, and we decline to reach them in the interest of justice. Niehoff, J.P., Rubin, Eiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.